The statements "2 + 2 = 4" and "2 + 2 = 5" are not consistent (unless 4 = 5), which is OK; the second one is not true (unless 4 = 5).
The statements "Norm said '2 + 2 = 4'" and "Norm said '2 + 2 = 5'" are consistent. (A sufficient but not necessary definition of consistency of a collection of statements is that there is a model—let's leave the meaning of that vague—in which they hold. If we are sufficiently vague about what 'model' means, then we may take the real world to be one.) As you say, together (if true, and if taken to be true expressions of Norm's beliefs) these consistent statements imply the inconsistency of Norm's beliefs. That is a good thing; it is useful to be able to judge the consistency of statements about inconsistency, just as it is to be able to judge the truth of statements about falsity. (For example, I think that you will agree that the fact that "2 + 2 = 5" is false does not make "Norm said '2 + 2 = 5'" false.)
To me, the nuanced distinction between truth and consistency comes in the facts that (1) the latter is weaker than the former ("Norm said '2 + 2 = 4'" and "Norm can do basic arithmetic" are consistent, even if they are not both true), and (2) that the latter is of interest mainly about collections of statements; the truth of a group of (non-mutually referential) statements is determined by the truth of each individual statement, but the same is not true for consistency.