It is actually worse than that. Given an active attacker one can easily steal passwords using SSL stripping attacks. Ebay is also affected. Cookie stealing also works.
Pretty much every mixed http/https setup ("encrypt only the login") is broken.
Pretty much every mixed http/https setup ("encrypt only the login") is broken.
Many sites have multiple tiers of authentication. For example viewing items to purchase is over HTTP but to actually checkout or manage your account requires you to go to HTTPS and reauthenticate on an HTTPS login page. Always. After this you are kept on HTTPS for the trusted actions. Amazon only does shopping over http but trusted actions are all HTTPS.
This has been amazons authentication scheme for years and it is actually the same as googles (where Google does have http assets, they force a reauth before going to https only stuff).
The most an attacker could do is inject code on http pages, annoyingly add things to cart, purchase items with 1 click purchase (inject javascript that clicks the button) and eavesdrop on all items purchased (quite serious).
BUT they cannot perform SSL stripping if Amazon doesn't do any auth over HTTP. An attacker could do some phishing like attacks to try to convince the user to put their password in at the wrong time, though.
An attacker can attempt phishing with HTML/JS injection on a HTTP page but an attacker cannot get a user to be looking at Amazon's real login page over http.
I think the problem here is the term ``SSL stripping'' was used and it may be kind unclear what MITM attacks is actually encompassed by it.
The OP wrote ``An attacker can easily steal passwords with SSL Stripping''. If OP meant he can easily steal passwords by basically a s/https/http on all urls on the page, OP's wrong. The attacker needs to create their own fake login page, present it to the victim, and hope the victim falls for it
Thus, the first leg of the traffic, between the victim and the MITM attacker is forever unencrypted. The second leg, between the attacker and the servers can be encrypted; it's not going to impact the attacker's capabilities in any way.
The attacker doesn't need to create their own fake login page, etc, because she can simply proxy all traffic from and to Amazon's servers.
To summarise, the attacker injects herself into the traffic stream, fully controlling the Amazon side of the communication, and forwards traffic to the victim rewriting as appropriate. The account compromise occurs when Amazon asks the victim for the password (as they do before each purchase) and the attacker captures the password (because it will have been sent to her, rather to Amazon).
I never said an attacker can't do this. I'm saying an attacker can't do a s/https/http and have a user end up at an HTTP login page, where the attacker can sniff credentials.
Remember: HTTPS does not ensure the identity of the client.
It sounds like you are talking about creating a phishing page and injecting it, hoping the user enters their credentials, and stealing them. I already said this was possible.
User requests login page over http
HTTP request is intercepted, and relayed over https to amazon
https response from Amazon is modified to show http links, and presented back to the user
User fills in credentials and submits request over http
Request is intercepted, and relayed over https back to Amazon
MITM now has all credentials.
Doesn't require any special tools, or a phishing page, just a spot between Amazon and the user, and the ability to re-write responses from https back to http.
HTTPS with a HSTS setting would mitigate this, since the browser would refuse to request the HTTP page if the user had ever successfully visited https://www.amazon.com before.