> SDI made sense.
SDI could be said to plausibly make some kind of sense only in the context of the proposed broad national shield being propaganda to serve as (1) a tool to get the USSR to accelerate its spending in a way that would hasten its collapse, and (2) domestic political cover for more limited shields that would protect key military command and control sites.
If Teller's exuberant promotion of SDI was knowing participation in those propaganda efforts, then it was extremely dishonest but perhaps defensible as not completely nonsensical; on its face, however, it was nonsense.
> We still have SDI. Now we call its "Strategic Missile Defense" and its our biggest counter against rogue nation nuke launches and other attacks.
No, our biggest counter against rogue nation nuke launches is, and remains, a combination of assured destruction of any attacker and active steps to prevent undeterrable actors from gaining the capacity to make such attacks in the first place.
Strategic missile defense of any kind remains, and will for the forseeable future, an extremely limited tool, and far less than SDI was sold as by proponents like Teller.
> It also has Putin scared as he can't match it and is demanding we don't continue to build new sites in Eastern Europe out of desperation.
There's a whole lot I could say about this, but I'll let this suffice: you can't say in one post defend MAD with "With madmen like Putin running nukes, MAD makes sense", and then defend Strategic Missile Defense with the argument that it undermines mad and makes Putin scared and more aggressive.