1. Yes, I am biased toward determinism in this case. But that's largely because of the methodology used by proponents of indeterminism (I don't believe their conclusion necessarily follows from their data. In fact, I think it's an entirely unnecessary conclusion). Determinism is my default, unless a more convincing argument prevents itself.
That being said, if indeterminism is true, I'm fine with that - so long as "superposition" doesn't include mutually exclusive states. If the theory can avoid logical contradiction, then it's possible.
2. I'm fine with the MWI. However, I think it's unnecessary and have difficulty getting around Occam's razor in this situation. If the choice is between a) believing a practically-infinite set of real-universes exist (all requiring explanations) or b) remain skeptical for a more compelling theory preserving the simplicity of one universe, I'll take the latter. (Given enough time, the highest levels of abstraction about reality seem to be universally simple, so I'll hold out a bit longer)
3. I also have a difficult time accepting that there's logical proof that hidden variables don't exist. Mathematical proof (satisfying a particular, non-necessary set of mathematical theories) does not sufficiently qualify as logical proof. And, indeed, Bell's theorem has likely already been proven invalid.