One thing the FBI does not realize, or does not care, is that THEY ARE NOT THE ONLY ONES THE BACKDOORS WORK FOR.
A backdoor is a backdoor. Period. When so much private information is on a single device it's not just about being beyond the law (which is a great reason in and of itself because law enforcement is itself beyond the law). It's about being safe.
"Leave your front door unlocked. Just in case we want to search you for drugs/obscene material/weapons/etc."
I don't know about you, but I don't want to leave my house unlocked 24/7 "just in case" the FBI wants to serve me with a warrant.
Now the FBI complains they can't just go through the front door anymore. Well yes.
Edit: downvote all you like, but this is a simple factual statement.
Your reply is overly pedantic, when taken in the best light.
You even admit I'm right yet claim I'm not. So I'm kinda confused.
The key phrase there is "break in". As in, they acquire access without the consent of the owner. In this case, the "door" is the encryption key which they are expected to acquire and/or break so that they can gain access.
A conventional door you can:
1) Get a locksmith to essentially duplicate the essential function of a key to gain access. [Steal the Key]
2) Kick it in. [Brute Force]
3) Convince the owner to cooperate. [Social engineering]
They have the same options to acquire an encryption key. The fact it makes their job more difficult isn't relevant.
Cash makes their job more difficult as well since its essentially anonymous when handled with gloves. Should we ban cash and gloves too?
More likely you have a basic level of security that deters crimes of opportunity, perhaps even a serious burglar, and that is sufficient, same as for most people. Now maybe I'm wrong and you live in a decommissioned missile silo or some other super-hardened structure, but to pretend that there's no difference between basic security measures and leaving your front door unlocked is total BS.
Say you use TextSecure. If someone installs Malware on the phone and keylogs, they can capture your password. With the password and the phone, they can decrypt the messages.
I'm not sure why this is the equivalent of a bank vault to you? It can be defeated by some guy in his basement.
Law enforcement has shown the ability and willingness to use malware as well.
http://www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/
So given that:
1) The app store is still controlled by the corporation. 2) Malware to capture the key is all that is required. 3) Law enforcement is capable of producing malware competently and legally forcing it onto machines. 4) The corporation can be legally compelled to install said malware via an automatic update [thereby disabling and/or capturing the key]. If that isn't an option, there are various other methods [such as taking the person into custody, installing the malware manually, then releasing them].
The only difference is the number of steps involved.
Now you're saying it's just a basic locked door and it's trivial to break anyway and law enforcement can legally force malware onto machines if they need to do password harvesting, which to my mind sounds worse than having a backdoor in the first place that might be exploitable.
If I understand you right you just want some additional steps for law enforcement to go through (although the legal step of getting a warrant should be sufficient; making it more difficult after that is obstructing a lawful search rather than an opportunistic one. But now you also potentially have malware in the wild, because it's not beyond the capacity of bad guys to set up a honey pot to attract the attention of law enforcement.
Sorry, I just find you argument fundamentally circular.
Let us start from the top to get this across:
Me: > "Leave your front door unlocked. Just in case we want to search you for drugs/obscene material/weapons/etc."
I said people have the right to lock their door [encryption key -> encryption software == key -> door].
You: > Except it isn't. When the FBI has a warrant they are legally entitled to break into your house even if you don't want them to.
Yes, they have the right to break into your phone. That doesn't stop me from having a lockable door. It is perfectly legal and has always been so. There was a fight about it in the 90s with PGP and such.
So you are agreeing with me. Except for the fact you put "except it isn't" without providing any actual proof it isn't. Because y'know, there is no actual proof I'm wrong.
Me: > The key phrase there is "break in". As in, they acquire access without the consent of the owner. In this case, the "door" is the encryption key which they are expected to acquire and/or break so that they can gain access.
You: > Your original claim was that you were being asked the equivalent of leaving your house unlocked for their convenience, which is a wild exaggeration.
That isn't a wild exaggeration. Plain text being stored accessibly from the internet is the equivalent of leaving your house unlocked. Its basic, fundamental security. Its why you hash your password and store your backups in an encrypted container.
I don't understand why basic, standard precautions any competent IT person engages in is "wild exaggerations".
Me: > No, it isn't. If I don't have the ability to prevent 3rd parties from entering my house, it isn't a wild exaggeration.
If strangers can walk into my house without breaking in and do WTF they want, it isn't locked by any sane definition.
You: > Of course it is. You keep your front door locked, you might have a lockable screen door and bars on the windows, or a burglar alarm or a number of other security precautions, but I'm pretty sure you don't live in an impregnable fortress or a bank vault.
Now that is a wild exaggeration. Encryption is not an impregnable fortress.
Me: > http://www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/ > 1) The app store is still controlled by the corporation. 2) Malware to capture the key is all that is required. 3) Law enforcement is capable of producing malware competently and legally forcing it onto machines. 4) The corporation can be legally compelled to install said malware via an automatic update [thereby disabling and/or capturing the key]. If that isn't an option, there are various other methods [such as taking the person into custody, installing the malware manually, then releasing them].
A couple of ways in which encryption can be circumvented (malware, two delivery methods)
You: > This is absurd.
At no point did I say it was "trivial". You've resorted to misrepresentations, putting word in mouth, etc. to argue with me.
The fact you are going to such lengths to argue against an obvious and accurate analogy [in the majority opinion, since I'm being upvoted while you are downvoted] is absurd.
You: > If I understand you right you just want some additional steps for law enforcement to go through
At no point did I say that. What I have said this whole time is "Same steps as serving a physical warrant? Well, same for technology."
Get Warrant from Judge -> Serve Warrant [Force Entry if required] -> Find Evidence.
That is how physical warrants are handled and it is how digital warrants should be handled. That is how it works for computers too, fyi. Like desktops with full disk encryption.
Is it clear enough now?
Dude, the Washington Post is owned by Jeff Bezos. Of course he's going to attack Apple and Google for their phones, while his phone kind of flopped.