> Since computers don’t have bodies, let alone sensations, what are the implications of these findings for their becoming conscious—that is, achieving strong AI? Lakoff is uncompromising: "It kills it."

This just makes me think he both doesn't understand brains or AI.

I also don't get the insistence on a 'body'. If we weren't planning on having the AI totally isolated, and intended to say, talk to it in order to see if it was an AI, then we were already proposing to give it senses right from the start.

In fact, I don't think I've seen a single proposal for an AI that didn't give it at least one external sense and many internal ones. I don't see why we would think it would have that much trouble building metaphores.

As Lera Boroditsky says:

> If you’re not bound by limitations of memory, if you’re not bound by limitations of physical presence, I think you could build a very different kind of intelligence system

> I don’t know why we have to replicate our physical limitations in other systems.