I mean we've known about bump keys and lock picking for more then 50 years. None of this is news. If I 3D printed a set of lock picking tools would Wired run a story on me?
What I'm saying is, if you lock the case to your desktop shut. Dumping your unencrypted hard drive is still possible, and easy. And fundamentally completely unchanged. All you did was put a hurdle in front of it, not fundamentally change the attack vector.
Additionally, people have been bumping things with just about anything that can fit into a keyway, it doesn't particularly matter if it conforms to the exact shape of the key, so long as it can still interact with the pins directly. So, bent sheet metal with teeth cut into them, flexible grocery loyalty cards, etc. have all been used by folks in the locksport community to bump locks they didn't have proper blanks for. I can't deny the SK6 (and many Ikon locks, they are vicious) didn't have a particularly murderous keyway, but the possibility of carrying out a percussive attack wasn't nil.
"As a result, all anyone needs to open many locks previously considered “unbumpable” ..."
B: He asked someone to tell him how it could have been bumped prior to this application.
C: I described, in my scenario, the purchase of a 1 Euro blank from someone who runs the machine, which is actually /less/ than the Shapeways scenario, which is otherwise the same - you don't purchase the equipment, you purchase the product the equipment makes.
Not to mention that you seem to be ignoring the second paragraph entirely.
And, honestly, this seems like a silly argument to be having. I actually think the boys did great work on this, and I really appreciate that you mention the possibility of forensic evidence (in the practice of which Germany is a leader) left by these keys. I just think that some people commenting on this thread are a bit frustrated by some of the hyperbole, and your insistence that there is no hyperbole is continuing to derail whatever point you are attempting to make.
I agree this argument is silly. Whether an Ikon SK6 lock is considered "umbumpable" and by who is pretty subjective. But this thread began with a commenter saying that none of this is news, and that it's all 50 years old. Hyperbole is indeed pretty annoying.
Again I'll state, "This doesn't fundamentally change the attack vector, all it does is put a hurdle in-front of it."
One that is now easier to circumvent, true. But one that was circumventable in the past with the correct resources.
"As a result, all anyone needs to open many locks previously considered “unbumpable” ..."
You are implying that this has made the impossible, possible. I think that may be valarauca's point of contention.
When the flaw becomes easier to exploit its isn't so much news, it was bound to happen anyways, I mean your just wrapping iron bandages around a flaw and causing it fixed. This happens in software security all the time. The flaw still exists, just we added an abstraction above the flaw, that makes the flaw harder to exploit.
If I have access to a mill and pictures of some "high security key", sans magnets and other types of active mechanisms, I can duplicate that key.
It may be difficult, but subtractive method still works. A subtractive method is what is used when you go from blank to key.
What is new here is someone can print a plastic key. Cool. with PLA and a rubber vacuum set, I can cast any amount of iron blanks of said 'secure keys'.
Yes.
It's funny because it's true.