ECC is good, better than RSA, but what this paper militates for is leak-resistant cryptography implementations, not ECC in particular.
ECC is good, better than RSA, but what this paper militates for is leak-resistant cryptography implementations, not ECC in particular.
Blinding techniques are not constant-time, but what you really want in the end is to reduce the Signal-to-Noise ratio on the radiated energy.
For ECC it is more difficult, and it becomes very hard for most symmetric ciphers.
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-48059-5_25
The problem with GnuPG is not that it's using RSA/ElGamal instead of ECC; it's that it's using a general-purpose large integer arithmetic package, MPI, whose purpose is to optimize speed for a wide range of input arguments.
I also agree with you on the fact that ECC is not immune to side-channel attacks at all: for proof this cool paper [2] by Barthe, Dupressoir, Fouque, Grégoire, and Zapalowicz, which will appear at CCS 2014 which shows working fault-injection attacks on both RSA and ECDSA.
[1] http://pablo.rauzy.name/research.html#hofa
[2] http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/436
FDTC 2014: http://conferenze.dei.polimi.it/FDTC14/
CHES 2014: http://www.chesworkshop.org/ches2014/start.php
CCS 2014: http://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2014/