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Comment by nardi | Hacker News Reader

Um. Isn't encrypted calling on iPhones already provided by FaceTime Audio?

Yes. And you should probably assume that their claims of end-to-end encryption are about as solid as they were for iMessage.

http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/can-apple-re...

http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/06/can-apple-read-your-...

http://www.zdnet.com/apples-imessage-encryption-claims-refut...

Didn't Apple debunk that debunking themselves in February, when they released the iOS Security doc? [1]

According to Apple, each device's private key is generated locally and never leaves the device, making it impossible to MITM your messages.

From page 20: "For each key pair, the private keys are saved in the device’s keychain and the public keys are sent to Apple’s directory service (IDS), where they are associated with the user’s phone number or email address, along with the device’s APNs address."

[1] http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Fe...

That doesn't make it impossible to MITM - Apple still controls the keyserver.

When I ask for nardi's public key, they can give me theirs, I encrypt it with that key and send it. They use their private key to decrypt it, store it, and then encrypt it with your actual public key and forward it along, neither of us any the wiser.

Ah yes, of course. It's missing secure identification.

There is value in being able to call people who do not have iOS devices. This is more similar to SilentCircle, but without a monthly fee.

They claim to use SIP to establish an SRTP connection with AES-256. But I don't know any way to verify that the data is being encrypted well or sent only to the intended recipient. https://ssl.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb1...

> But I don't know any way to verify that the data is being encrypted well or sent only to the intended recipient.

Couldn't you say the same thing about Signal? Both parties claim to use end-to-end encryption.

If you don't have a SAS phrase or some other way to aurally verify the other party, you can never be secure against a MITM. Signal does this, while I doubt it's available in FaceTime audio.

I'm sure there is no real end-to-end encryption. And you can only do that between iPhone/Mac users.

> I'm sure there is no real end-to-end encryption.

"The audio/video contents of FaceTime calls are protected by end-to-end encryption, so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple cannot decrypt the data."

https://ssl.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb1...

> And you can only do that between iPhone/Mac users.

Ah yeah, I thought Signal was only for iPhone, based on the title. Should have read the first paragraph more closely.

You don't know what you don't know - or in other words, have you seen the latest research on iOS surveillance mechanisms? There could be other "undocumented" stuff that makes the encryption of Facetime Audio irrelevant.

>This product, Signal, seems to only be for iPhones. So it's even more limited.

It appears to interoperate with RedPhone, an Android app by the same authors.

In the very same doc you quote, they also say of iMessage:

"Apple does not log messages or attachments, and their contents are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple cannot decrypt the data."

Which has been refuted several times.

Yes, but it is not secure

"The audio/video contents of FaceTime calls are protected by end-to-end encryption, so no one but the sender and receiver can access them. Apple cannot decrypt the data." [1]

[1] https://ssl.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb1...

This does not mean that it's secure. See for example http://www.zdnet.com/apples-imessage-encryption-claims-refut... and http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/can-apple-re...

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