Exactly. The warnings about "entropy depletion" are only relevant to theoretical attacks which require either impossibly large computational resources or a flaw in the PRNG algorithm. Since either assumption breaks all our crypto for other, unrelated reasons, we use /dev/urandom.
That, and if you use /dev/urandom before it's seeded, you expose yourself to real attacks.
Why is /dev/urandom spitting out anything before it has acquired enough entropy for the initial seed? Wouldn't it be a good idea for it to initially block?
On a system with a recent Intel processor, there's a instruction (RDSEED) that uses on on-die hardware RNG. I'm not familiar with the standard linux boot-up process, but it could in principle seed urandom using RDSEED arbitrarily early in the process. That should work on VMs too unless the hypervisor is blocking access (can't imagine a good reason for that).
Via has on-die RNG considerably longer, though it's accessed slightly differently. I don't believe AMD or ARM has anything similar.