Subjects received monetary payments for each good estimate.
Possible rewards were 4, 2, or 1 points if their estimates fell into the
10%, 20%, or 40% intervals around the truth; otherwise, they
received no points. The rewards applied to all rounds to make sure
that individuals took all of their decisions seriously. The correct
answer and the rewards for all
five estimates were only disclosed to
the subjects after the
fifth estimate. This reward structure in-
troduced incentives only to
find the truth and avoided incentives to
conform with others. Furthermore, there were no incentives for
strategic considerations. For example, there was no benefit of being better than others or of misleading others, because this did not
affect individuals
’
payments. There was also no possibility to help
others by deviating from the strategy to
find the best estimate.
Therefore, our experimental design put subjects into a situation in
which they would try to get as close to the truth as possible by using
their own knowledge and the estimates of others.
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/10/1008636108.full...