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Stripe cofounder here. As this news breaks, I want to say thanks to the HN community. Stripe is in large part the result of the feedback and advice we've received here since we launched on HN back in Sept 2011 -- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3053883.

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Seeing this comment makes me realise how much of a crazy technical risk I made choosing to use Stripe when I did.

My company started charging for things in April 2012, but I made the decision to use Stripe months before that, something like January 2012. Only 4 months after you launched!

We only did 1500 transactions on our launch day, yet at the time it was enough to break your service for a little while due to load. Your customer service at the time was really great and you refunded all the transaction fees for our launch day and gave us a list of all the customers who had tried and failed to make transactions so we could contact them.

I don't think I realised at the time how small you guys were. We are lucky that you guys didn't fail, and I doubt that the me of today would have relied on such a young company. Certainly we could have moved to a different payment processor, but losing all the saved card data would have sucked a lot.

So great work on that!

Thanks for taking the risk :-).

Large companies tend to have arbitrary size requirements for potential vendors before allowing them to become an approved vendor. But I think companies should consciously choose startups as vendors for precisely that reason. Startups care more about figuring out what it takes to make customers happy.

Yep, same here. Had our first customers in February 2012 on Stripe. Glad it worked out, but we always knew it would :)

Hope to see you guys update the web interface a bit for a performance/little more flexibility. The API is great, but the web interface could use a bit more love :)

Agreed. On the way!

Awesome :) One big issue (with actual effect on revenue of your users) you guys could solve better would be handling delinquent/expiring cards better. We had to built some things in house to deal with this on our end, as once you have a non trivial amount of paying customers it can become at least a small pain. I know there are webhooks for failed payments etc but this stuff is really difficult to surface in the web interface.

Hey Alex, Churn Buster (http://churnbuster.io/) is available via Stripe Connect to solve exactly this problem. We're in private beta right now, so please email me at andrew@churnbuster.io if you'd like to take it for a spin. We've got a number of paying customers already (including some folks who previously had their own basic webhooks integration) and they're all saving much more in rescued transactions than they're investing in the product. Also, it's a 30-day free trial, so you literally can't lose! :-)

Eduardo from Stripe here - sending you an email now; I think we can help!

(I'm not associated with Stripe)

Can you please give at least one example or suggestion?

Sure, glad to give feedback, though this would make sense if you're familiar with using stripe. Our team is of course not one of Stripe's larger users, though we do use them enough to fall under one of the volume discounts. Here's a few things that I can think of from the top of my head:

When selecting a user to change the plan, the modal takes about 3-4 seconds to populate the new plan dropdown. The new plan dropdown is like 200px wide, which makes managing multiple plans pretty cumbersome.

The main dashboard view only has Gross Volume, with no way to switch to other views (ie, no way to take into account refunds)

Event view is pretty cumbersome for managing things, as it shows only 20 events at a time. Also, event filters apply to all of customer payments, not one ( so going to filters resets whatever customer you were looking at )

Logs are labeled with non human readable things like "200 DELETE /v1/customers/cus_2fdyjF3lV1FYyc/subscription"

There's no dedicated "Name" field for customer details though there is a name field that lives under card details.

> Event view is pretty cumbersome for managing things, as it shows only 20 events at a time.

Here's a secret URL for you: https://manage.stripe.com/events?count=100 :)

>When selecting a user to change the plan, the modal takes about 3-4 seconds to populate the new plan dropdown. The new plan dropdown is like 200px wide, which makes managing multiple plans pretty cumbersome.

I agree with this. I was wondering "What Stripe UI improvements?" because I am largely happy with the UI (very much so, actually). But there are corner cases that could use some tweaking. This is definitely one.

The main dashboard could have some more information, or could be customizable, I agree. Not high priority for me but would be nice.

This is great feedback -- thanks very much!

Happy to swing by your office sometime when you're hosting one of those hackathons (we're a few blocks away ourselves) :)

That would be great -- want to drop me an email (patrick@stripe.com) to coordinate?

And thank you, as a developer stripe has made a ridiculously difficult process ridiculously easy.

Not ridiculously easy, rather slightly easier as the merchant still must maintain aspects of their environment covered by the PCI DSS as they are still delivering Stripe.js from their server environment. Here's a bit more information on that:

http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2013/06/30/developers-beware-st...

This post is inaccurate. (Check out Darragh's response in the comments.) It's also worth noting that 1) Stripe and its processes are audited every year (we're a PCI-certified service provider), and 2) that MasterCard has actually followed a very similar strategy with their Stripe competitor.

Stripe's level one service provider which is independent of the merchants PCI compliance. The merchant is presenting the form for which the user enters their credit card information from within the context (same origin) of their domain: e.g., https://merchant.com/payment... As a result, under the PCI DSS they are obligated to protect that component of the transaction because if they don't a criminal could change it so that the card data doesn't POST to Stripe.com but instead goes to the criminal. Implementing a bit of Javascript and enabling SSL/TLS is far from all that is needed to be PCI compliant as a merchant so long as the payment form itself, whether delivered via an iFrame or a bit of Javascript is hosted within the merchant domain.

(Stripe Developer) - tl;dr -- This claims that Stripe.js runs on the merchant's server environment, causing the server to be subject to PCI DSS. In reality, Stripe.js is served from Stripe's servers, and runs only in the browser, and this has always been the case.

In order to get Stripe.js to execute within the same origin of the merchant environment the merchant must include code like this: <script src='//stripe.com/Stripe.js> within their HTTP response. This can be modified by a criminal on the merchant server to go to <script src='//badguy.com/mystripe.js> if the merchant has not implemented proper controls as outlined in the PCI DSS. The same can happen if they implement weak crypto. At the end of the day the merchant is responsible for this PCI related component because it's executing within the context of their merchant domain.

Adding a bit more to be crystal clear here. The merchants customer will only see the address in the address bar for the merchant and will be able to validate the merchants public cert. No customer I know of would view the source to make sure that the reference to Stripe.js is in the source.

Additional edit to address Silhouette's point. Yes, an attacker can modify the <a href to go to their site as well, but unlike an embedded script the customer does have a chance to call BS and back out of the transaction after growing concerned by the domain transfer & doing a Google search to see if it's legit. They don't have any chance in the case of an embedded script. Now if we go back to my original concern, it's that merchants are being told that they simply need to implement Stripe.js & enable HTTPS. Modifying that statement to something like this would be far better:

"Stripe minimizes the scope of PCI DSS by removing the need to implement and audit security controls surrounding the transmission, processing, and storage of card-holder data. This does not; however, absolve Merchants from compliance with the PCI DSS & in order to assist with that we offer the following..."

This can be modified by a criminal on the merchant server to go to <script src='//badguy.com/mystripe.js>

And then the merchant won't be following one of Stripe's two basic rules for staying PCI DSS compliant any more, will they?

That aside, of course you want to keep your server secure. But if you can't, as a matter of practical security and protecting cardholders in the real world, how would it be any better to have your site intended to transfer entirely to a payment service on their own domain rather than just loading JS from that domain? An attacker who has compromised the security of the files on a merchant's server can change an <a href='...'> that should transfer to the payment service so it goes to a hostile site just as easily as they can change a <script src='...'> that should load JS from a payment service so it loads JS from a hostile site.

I know it's not a priority but. Will you guys bring your magic to Brazil at some point?

I would be really interested in it.

On a side note I see Australia is in Beta :D which is great.

Thanks

We definitely will. (Sorry we don't have a timeline, though.)

No Worries! Congrats and keep up the good work!

I started building a SaaS for the legal industry around 2004. It was very small targeted at specific industry. Back then it was very hard to get everyone on board to use Credit Card. I ended up automating everything (including the monthly billing sent directly the user's inbox), but because of difficulty of payment gateway processing (getting a merchant account, parsing the authorize gateway code)

And since I was a one man shop, I just had my users to send me checks at end of the month. I was not the best organized person back then. So let's just say there were quite few uncashed checks. Really wish Stripe was around them.

Now if Stripe could practice truth in advertising that would be great. SpecificallY:

"Anyone accepting credit card payments must be PCI compliant. Stripe makes it easy to do so:

Serve your payment page over SSL, i.e., the page's web address should begin with “https”, not “http”.

Use Stripe.js or Checkout to accept payment information and transmit it directly to Stripe's servers.

And you'll be PCI compliant!"

https://support.stripe.com/questions/do-i-need-to-be-pci-com...

If it were only so easy. I guess there's no need for the merchant to have a PCI program, properly implement SSL/TLS, have anti-virus, change default passwords, protect agains SQLi, XSS, command injection or any number of other flaws which would give an attacker access to modify the Stripe.js code or the DOM for the page used for the collection of card information within the merchant's same origin. Nope, none of this is necessary because Stripe says that a merchant only needs to use HTTPS & implement their Stripe.js to be PCI compliant.

It's interesting that this isn't how the PCI council sees things:

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Tokenization_...

Hm, it looks like that support forum answer needs to be updated -- we actually support filling out PCI SAQs right from our dashboard (and automatically ask users to do so). We'll go update it.

Also, if you'd like to drop me an email at patrick@stripe.com, would be happy to chat about PCI more.

(Updated.)

Confirmed.

Instead of just down voting this post, it would be helpful to know what specific parts of it are incorrect. This is the first I've heard of these objections.

These posts are probably being downvoted because they come from a new account, which has been attacking Stripe repeatedly in multiple discussions now, including making some assumptions/claims that are readily confirmed to be false (and are obviously so to anyone who's actually integrated Stripe) and citing supporting web pages that don't necessarily support the claims made.

While the PCI compliance issue may not be quite as simple as Stripe's documentation has previously implied, nobody else seems to be able to identify the kinds of serious compliance issues that patcheudor keeps implying we're all suffering from by using Stripe and following their existing advice.

I am simply pointing out that unlike what is covered in the Stripe documentation, a merchant is not absolved of PCI compliance by simply implementing Stripe.js in their HTTP response & turning on SSL/TLS. The PCI DSS and related materials cover this fact quite well. This "dispute" if you could even call it that came about when Pete Keen inadvertently also over simplified the compliance issue in one of his posts, for which he has since rectified:

https://www.petekeen.net/life-of-a-stripe-charge

Subsequent discussion here:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7091788

I think the downvotes have to do with what is a pretty serious accusation and not apparently backed up with facts. What would be helpful is if the accuser produced a better description of what he feels is out of compliance, wrong or misleading.

Because the PCI guidance isn't factual enough? An essay could be written about the problems with broad statements like merchants only needing to worry about the inclusion of Stripe.JS and the use of HTTPS to be PCI compliant. Luckily those already exist. This one covers it pretty well:

http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2013/06/30/developers-beware-st...

That article is wrong on the technical implications, like "It may be their code, but it is executing on your server" (cc data is sent directly to Stripe's servers, never touching your own).

That was maybe not quite the right language, but is easily salvageable. What the author was trying to convey is that the Stripe.js code is instantiated within the user browser by an HTTP response from the server infrastructure owned by the merchant. The actual credit-card form is delivered by the merchants server & therefore they own all the PCI DSS related controls surrounding ensuring that the payment form code delivered via their HTTP response is secured. If instead of referencing Stripe.js, the merchant instead sent the user directly to https://stripe.com/payment... and the user could validate they are at stripe.com by looking in their address bar & checking the SSL/TLS security by clicking on the lock then that's a different story and the merchant would have far less exposure to the requirements outlined in the PCI DSS.

[Stripe Developer] [edited for clarification]

I appreciate your interest in the security of Stripe, I think we definitely share the same goals here (making everything as secure as possible). However, I think there's some misunderstanding in some posts (and in the blog post):

> [...] the Stripe.js code is instantiated within the user browser by an HTTP response from the server infrastructure owned by the merchant When Stripe.js is included within the user's browser by a (mandated https, not http) request, it comes directly from Stripe's servers, not from "the server infrastructure owned by the merchant."

Stripe.js isn't served from the merchant. It comes directly from Stripe. Stripe.js helps keep payment card data away from a merchants own servers.

Keeping card data away from someone's machines doesn't mean that they don't need to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, but it does make things quite a bit simpler.

In most cases it means that they're eligible for one of the light-weight self-assessment questionnaires.

PCI compliance, of course, shouldn't be where people stop thinking about security though. You're absolutely right that if the pointer on the merchant's site is changed to a malicious site, that's where the payment data will go. The merchant needs to keep that pointer safe in the same way that if you're redirecting to a hosted payment form or elsewhere, you need to make sure that isn't tampered with either. (A hosted form has the advantage that at least a customer can view the SSL cert but if they don't recognize the domain (or if the domain is obscure anyway), that's not much good.)

Being compliant with the PCI standards is important but it doesn't cover all of the very, very important points of web security.

We do take security very seriously, and if you happen to find a valid security issue with our service, we pay bounties[1] for properly disclosed vulnerabilities.

If you have any other questions, or would like to wax poetic about security or PCI please don't hesitate to send the security team an email at security@stripe.com or to email me personally at alex@stripe.com.

[1] https://stripe.com/help/security#rewards

Alex, thank you for your response. I don't think my original observations about the wording of a support doc falls into a vulnerability disclosure. That doc has since been updated with enhanced guidance which addresses my original concern. As I think we all understand, the merchant must be responsible for ensuring the integrity and security of the HTTP response containing the reference to Stripe.js. After that they are absolved of the requirements surrounding the transmission, processing, and storage of the card data. As the PCI DSS states, they are ultimately responsible for their PCI compliance as the merchant.

My understanding by reading patcheudor's responses is that the issue isn't with Stripe's PCI compliance, but rather the fact that merchants that use Stripe's API need to be fully PCI compliant. According to him, using Stripe's API doesn't obviate the merchant's need to be fully PCI compliant, unless they do something like open up another window where the URL clearly shows that they are inputting a form from Stripe's own servers. Otherwise, the merchant needs to conform to full PCI compliance.

This is my reading of his comment too.. more specifically, that since the page comes from the merchants server, the page could be modified by an attacker to alter the form to (for example) submit credit card details to another server instead of Stripe's.

I think he has a point here. Certainly if the merchants web site is compromised, Stripe's PCI compliance won't prevent or detect the loss of credit card data (since it never reached the point where Stripe could protect it).

> I think he has a point here. Certainly if the merchants web site is compromised, Stripe's PCI compliance won't prevent or detect the loss of credit card data (since it never reached the point where Stripe could protect it).

Yes, this is certainly true. This is why we also use the dashboard to ask the relevant questions from the PCI self-assessment questionnaires. https://support.stripe.com/questions/do-i-need-to-be-pci-com... gives a brief overview, but this discussion is making me think that we need to write something longer and more definitive. There's a lot of confusion around PCI pretty much everywhere.

You're playing semantic shell games here. The user has no reasonable way of knowing that stripe.js came from stripe, and as such, there are no technical OR human controls that enforce that behavior.

In short, the fact that stripe.js is delivered from stripe DOES NOT MATTER, because the user CAN NOT reasonably validate this behavior.

I know you're not dumb over at Stripe; I have a hard time believing that you're not willfully lying. After all, "disrupting" onerous industry security standards is to your competitive advantage.

This pretty clearly demonstrates to me the problem --- the stripe developers and management themselves don't actually understand the problem.

Patch is right, you need to be PCI compliant and Stripe (despite their recent funding) is apparently misunderstanding the problem with their approach.

And frankly, PCI compliance be damned, can ya'all not see how the "redirect to page" way is more secure.

Stripe hiding behind "our code is fine, only if you get hacked is it a problem" is, quite frankly, disgusting blame redirection.

I read that and am still far from clear on whether or not your accusations have merit.

I think you just hit on a major issue that merchants face when it comes to the PCI DSS. Many merchants have been wrestling with the scope of PCI DSS compliance for years. They are looking for easy solutions where unfortunately there are very few. The PCI council has done a very respectable job of creating compliance guides and standards documentation. However, when it comes to implementation merchants struggle with scope. If a merchant server as an example responds with a reference to the stripe.js & that code is then executed within the browser context of the merchant domain, is that merchant server in scope for that component? I believe it is and every QSA (PCI qualified security assessor) I've had this same conversation with has come to that exact same conclusion. If Stripe consults with their QSA and they come to a different conclusion, then I would hope Stripe would share that publicly with the community. That would certainly be a ground breaking event for those of us who deal with PCI DSS on a daily basis.

In terms of accusation, my goal here is to ensure that Stripe.com and others who are working in this space are being as clear as possible with their communication, that's it. Stripe is going to address statements like the one I pointed out on their site & hopefully as an industry we can get to a point where everyone is a bit more clear on what falls in and out of PCI DSS scope.

Stripe is great, we're really enjoying using it!

I have three comments though if you're willing to listen!

- I think your customer service department (although they do a good job) the quality has gone down, I often have to now wait several days for a reply. I guess this is the inevitability of growth though. In an ideal world it'd be nice to go back to when I got same day replies :)

- We're a UK business. We take payments in EUR/GBP/USD. Like EUR, it would be nice to be able to withdraw our USD to our USD account in the UK! At the moment we're forced to withdraw it to our GBP account which is expensive.

- It would be nice to be able to hold up withdrawls. At the moment our account is flooded with lots of payments, it would be nice to schedule all payments to be weekly/fornightly or a specific day of the month. Make our accounting process a lot easier and cheaper.

Thanks for all the great work, I've been excited ever since I've started reading about you and am a big fan! (I got a tshirt on the way as well for reporting a small glitch which I'm excited to receive!)

Thanks for the feedback, Tom! I understand how the USD -> UK transfers would help; we're looking into making that an option.

For accounting, we've found that better reporting tools usually solve the need for less frequent transfers. Would one of the options at https://support.stripe.com/questions/reconciling-transfers-w... make this easier on you? Feel free to email me if not so I can understand more about your setup. Every part of Stripe should be incredibly simple, including accounting, and I want to make sure we get this right.

Re support: you're right that the replies have been slower than they should be, though that's getting better. Basically, our userbase grew massively in 2013 and our support hiring didn't keep up with it. I spend all of my time on scaling the team, and we've more than doubled the size of the team in the past couple of months. More hires are on their way. I realize our internal machinations aren't very relevant—you just care that the result is excellent—and I'd like to be clear that we're working on this. You should expect to see significantly faster replies and more ways to get in touch with us over the coming months.

While you should already be seeing improvement in this area, feel free to get in touch with me directly at michael@stripe.com anytime. I'd love to hear any other feedback, and am more than happy to help with whatever questions you have.

I'm pretty sure you can hold up withdrawals. You just cancel the automatic transfers from your dashboard then when you want to do a transfer just schedule it manually (or through the API).

One of the best parts of that 2011 thread is the number of people asking for Canadian support, then how quickly Stripe actually ended up supporting Canada (within 1 year roughly).

We desperately needed Stripe and you guys delivered so quickly. Much appreciated.

Patrick, big fan here - we also met in person once, in the Mission. Congrats on the milestone, and keep up the good work.

At Blue Bottle, right? (Thanks!)

Dear Stripe. I love you. Please add Micro-Transactions support like PayPal at the 5% + 0.05 cents transaction fee for payments under $12 dollars. Patiently waiting, Chris Norstrom.

great job guys. i've used stripe and it definitely works well. love the "checkout" and the customization i can do with integration into my own page. pretty seamless compared to other vendors.

only quip: price! would love to see a different pricing scheme for cheaper products. $0.30 fixed fee is a lot for carts that are only a few dollars!

awesome man, joined the club 2 years ago and now my company relies on you and EasyPost, both YC companies to get our work done every day. It's great to work with your group, you guys have done a great job, props!

any Bitcoin integration plans?

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