This is, sadly, not a great post-mortem. They missed an opportunity for goodwill. I don't feel more confident in their level of understanding or ability to remediate the problems that led to it after having read it. I know they have an excellent engineering and operations staff -- this post-mortem doesn't reinforce that, though.

A few of the things that jumped out at me after one reading:

1. The apology is the next to last sentence. That's burying the lede. I'd like to see that far earlier, in the first two to three sentences.

2. The tone is overly clinical and lacks humanity. I suspect they felt that it made them sound more authoritative and in control, but instead it comes off somewhat robotic.

3. There's a mixture of too little and too much technical detail. It feels like they couldn't decide who the audience was. There were technical tidbits thrown out without any elaboration that lead to more questions than answers.

4. The remediations sound pretty weak. There's no discussion of the human factors like how the recovery process went, how this issue was missed in testing, or what changes if any they think they should make to their incident response process. At the very least I'd expect to see some remediation around their during-outage communication process since it has pretty universally been considered to be poor.

It's not the worst post-mortem I've read, but they missed a few chances to reassure customers.