I am uniquely identifiable out of the 3.7 million samples because of my system fonts.
I am uniquely identifiable out of the 3.7 million samples because of my system fonts.
Importantly, we can assume that the fingerprint will change incrementally, and remain mostly constant (eg., upgrade plugin OR install new fonts, but probably not everything at once). Therefore, closely-spaced repeat visits could be algorithmically matched, even if the fingerprint changes. This could be especially effective when including other "unstable" (short term) information, such as IP or geolocation, something the authors did not attempt (because these are generally unstable).
From the paper (page 13):
"We ran our algorithm over the set of users whose cookies indicated that they were returning to the site 1-2 hours or more after their first visit, and who now had a divergent fingerprint. Excluding users whose fingerprints changed because they disabled javascript (a common case in response to visiting panopticlick. eff.org, but perhaps not so common in the real world), our heuristic made a correct guess in 65% of cases, an incorrect guess in 0.56% of cases, and no guess in 35% of cases. 99.1% of guesses were correct, while the false positive rate was 0.86%. Our algorithm was clearly very crude, and no doubt could be signifcantly improved with effort."
Even when you do make a change, you could still easily be tracked in many cases. If I see a new signature that I have never seen before that differs from an existing signature only by the version of a plugin, I can probably safely assume it's the same person, especially if I see that the plugin was updated between the last time I saw the existing signature and now.
I have a feeling that web developers are extra vulnerable to this type of tracking because we tend to install several useful developer extensions, and many of us have our own unique combination of extensions.
On top of that, if you use a resource that had only previously been used by your previous fingerprint, your identity can probably be smeared that way too. This is only measuring client-side entropy, but there is also server-side entropy that can be used to make inferences about clients.
But what if you have the same IP address, user-agent, and plugins for a week, and midway through the week your font fingerprint changed? Then they just go and tie both fingerprints, or repalce the old one with the new one.
In reality this is not going to be a problem for any web service that seriously attempts to track users, and there are multiple such companies that are doing so and don't let this stop them. Usually only one fingerprint will change at a time, which makes it easy for them to account for it.
The only good solution is to prevent them from capturing that information in the first place, and the only way to prevent it is to block Javascript and Flash, which is most easily done with NoScript.
Also, they aren't particularly picky about keeping you, the trackee, forever uniquely-identifiable.
Consider this: when was the last time you (the non-average) or your grandmother (the average) installed a font?
AFAIK the project it's still active, but no definitive conclusion has been obtained.