I may be wrong, but I still couldn't find anyone that could convince me that Hume's response to induction was not valid. From here (which was linked to in the Solomonoff induction wiki page) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#Practical_consi...
> The pragmatist may go on, as David Hume did on the topic induction, that there is no satisfying alternative to granting this premise. Though one may claim that Occam's razor is invalid as a premise helping to regulate theories, putting this doubt into practice would mean doubting whether every step forward will result in locomotion or a nuclear explosion. In other words still: "What's the alternative?
Again, and this is also my opinion, I think we're afraid to admit that either we don't know anything at all or that most of the things that we "know" are based on intrinsic faith, with the accent on the word "faith". Granted, this is at least a 2,500 years problem, dating back to the Old Greeks.
It was treating the human mind as a black box trying to pretend we have no insight in human thoughts. It was trying to avoid antropomorphizing people as Morgenbesser put it. In fact, quite the opposite, I'd attribute this blatant idiocy to Popperism. After all, introspection isn't testable or falsifiable in a popperian sense. There's no room for the concept of models in Popperianism. There are just big black box ideas that you test and are falsified or not.