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Comment by fishd | Hacker News Reader

Please read the rest of what Ojan wrote: "In areas where libraries like MathJax are not good enough, we'd love to hear feedback about what APIs we would need to expose so that MathJax, et al, can create an awesome MathML implementation."

One of our goals is to make it possible to layer technologies as complex as MathML on top of Blink without requiring Blink to ship everything and the kitchen sink. See new technologies like Custom Elements (http://www.w3.org/TR/custom-elements/), which are part of this story.

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So why didn't you say that at the time this was being proposed? Now we have yet another part of the standards that people can't actually use because one browser vendor didn't like it for a vague reasons.

It undermines the process to go around cheering for HTML5 and then later decide that you don't like it after all.

That approach makes sense for technologies outside of the scope of the HTML5 spec, but for a core element like <math> it seems rather silly to propose external implementation using custom elements (and therefore requiring Javascript availability, which shouldn't be taken for granted).

The engine obviously does support javascript, so an alternative is ensure extensions can "plug in" these custom elements and implement them in JS in a separate sandbox regardless of whether JS is enabled or disabled for the page itself.

Less code with direct OS access sounds good to me.

But you'd still have to download and install the extension in order to use it (or, as was somewhat glibly proposed in a comment on the bug, Google would need to ship a version of MathJax with Chrome). Anyone without the extension and with JS disabled would still be out of luck.

So far as direct OS access, I'm having trouble envisioning a situation in which the layout code for MathML would be any more vulnerable than SVG (or the rest of the layout engine for that matter).

Didnt XHTML stand for eXtensible HTML ? maybe XHTML was the right way at first place , just saying.

XHTML _was_ right. People were just too lazy to close there tags and did not really understood what would the consequences of not having a robust and formal way to extend the language.

HTML went the same way other popular languages (e.g.: VB, PHP, Perl), they got broad adoption because the compiler/interpreter/renderer would be too kind in working hard to fix user mistake instead of reporting them.

And then, when they tried to fix it, the same user base complain (despite being bitten many times by the language) that it should stay like it is, because it has always been like that.

When bad habits became traditions, you are really in a bad position.

No: http://web.archive.org/web/20081211052740/http://diveintomar...

"The client is the wrong place to enforce data integrity. It’s just the wrong place. I hear otherwise intelligent people claim that if everyone did it, it would be okay. No, if everyone did it, it would be even worse. If you want to do it, of course I can’t stop you. But think about who it will hurt."

Hard to see how it would have been worse if all browsers had implemented stop-on-error, because then the developer/tester's browser would not have rendered the erronous page. That would mean that the developer/tester would have had to not try the page even once before shipping, if a bad page were to make it to production.

The page only became bad when the blog received a trackback from a different blog with a different character set. At that point the blog software erroneously changed the page's content and made it invalid. It was a software bug, plain and simple. The page was fully valid when the blog author published it.

For the developer/tester of Typepad (the blog software) to catch the bug, they would have had to trigger this bug in development/testing before it made it into the wild. While we always hope developers will catch as many bugs as possible, some will always slip through. Strict validation on the client means that even the slightest bug can make the website 100% down/unavailable, even though the browser would be perfectly capable of displaying something that 99% works.

Modern web sites are huge amalgamations of dynamically-generated content using umpteen templating technologies and aggregations of data that come from sources that the page's authors do not necessarily control. Guaranteeing that their output will always be valid XHTML is not trivial.

Bringing attention to errors and attempting to recover from errors aren't mutually exclusive. I would much prefer that poorly formed pages cause the address bar to change in some visually distinctive way, similar to how modern browsers make part of the address bar green for pages retrieved over HTTPS. Another option would be to display an error page with a button that says something to the effect of "try and guess what the lazy developer wanted".

An inability to guarantee valid output hints that inputs aren't being properly analyzed and sanitized, with terrible security consequences. Both developers and users of pages should be made aware when these errors occur.

If the error messages are too intrusive, adoption of browsers displaying them would of course suffer greatly.

I disagree. The issue described is an input sanitisation issue. The same thing would have happen to a SQL query and everyone would have put shame on you.

It IS a bug that the blog engine developers should have catch, in the same way they should have protect the trackback from XSS injection.

Guaranteeing your output will always be valid might not be trivial, but it is way less harder that some people pretend it to be.

Bugs will slip through. They just will, it's a fact of life.

The question is, when they do, will you let the browser gracefully recover, or will you demand that the browser show an error page, even though it could do something reasonable?

The security analogy would be to let all your code run as root, because the main security mechanisms should prevent users from executing arbitrary code. But this is fragile, because any security bug would compromise the security of the system completely.

What we do instead is have defense in depth: even if the first layer of security is compromised, there are other layers of security that can (hopefully) contain the damage. Permissive client rendering likewise limits the damage that one bug can do.

Having seen so many failure getting worse because people did not paid attention to it in the first place, I would go for the error page.

That said, even if we choose a defense in depth, it still is not a valid reason to throw away XHTML as it was done.

The same way you will not remove your firewall because it does not block dormant viruses, but add an antivirus, the browsers could have still continue putting effort in rendering the correct, and powerful, XHTML, while setting down some decent fallbacks to recover. Being we a be red warning to raise awareness that something need to be fixed.

maybe XHTML was the right way at first place , just saying.

It very probably was. The path we're going down with HTML5 and "modern" browser technologies is taking a muddled clusterfuck of a mess, and making it even more muddled and even more of a clusterfuck. It'll work, but only through heroic effort and sacrifice.

I feel like we're painting ourselves into a corner with the web these days, and actually reducing choice and flexibility on the web. One thing that is clear, is that we've lost sight of the distinction between a document and an application, and have managed to turn a pretty good hypertext platform into a Dr. Frankentein's Monster that combines hypertext browsing and a poor man's X-server in eldritch and grotesque ways.

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