It's probably the best you can do, but it still doesn't prevent your anonymity from being compromised. As soon as the malware is installed, it can phone home, even if you end up wiping it after you are done.
- If the host <=> guest tools are installed on the guest host, then it would be possible for the malware to install them itself.
- If the host <=> guest tools can't be enabled/disabled on a per-VM basis, then that could be an issue, as you would probably have VMs that you wish to use in a less convert capacity.
- The malware would have access to your browser for the duration of that session. Presumably any information that you accessed during that session is compromised. If they are consistently able to compromise you during every session, then any slip-up with PII during any session could compromise you.
(vm-tor-net
(vm-tor-browser))
Even if the gui VM that is used for running Tor has been compromised it should still be impossible to determine where the Tor client node is running. That is goal right?