When I worked at Yahoo, an XSS on yahoo.com (which almost never happened) was a code-red, drop-everything, holy-shit event. If I were at Google I'd probably give this guy a bonus.
When I worked at Yahoo, an XSS on yahoo.com (which almost never happened) was a code-red, drop-everything, holy-shit event. If I were at Google I'd probably give this guy a bonus.
The importance of httpOnly had somehow escaped me until today :-)
Cookies set for just subdomain.hostname.com can only be "seen by" that particular subdomain, while cookies set for hostname.com can be seen from hostname.com and any and all subdomains. I think that's why they do it constantly, at least stuff like www.google.com/glass certainly makes no sense otherwise. Why not make a fancy new domain for that? I think it's cookie greed.
The real threats I imagine is social engineering it enables or running code on the users' machines through browser plugin vulnerabilities. Also, running signed Java with a fake certificate is just a dialog confirmation from the user.
But I agree on your other point.