However, it's more difficult for other SPDY implementations to use the patched zlib, so this isn't an ideal solution. For SPDY/4 / HTTP/2, we will have a custom header compressor which is intended to eliminate CRIME-like attacks: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compre... .
(Disclaimer: I work on SPDY / HTTP/2 for Chromium.)
Personally I feel SPDY was a huge benefit to the internet, but in saying that it was a huge benefit in the form of "a cautionary tale to others"
Having known vulnerabilities baked into a standard with "weird looking" mitigation strategies is really poor choice IMO.
That said, I do see your point. There are also other edgecases, like serving statics on a seperate, uncookied domain that benefit greatly from SPDY in the here and now.