Not that I believe the Russians wouldn't lie, but the internal logic of the article does rest on the assertion that they are technically telling the truth while leaving themselves a loophole. Since it is safe to assume that Snowden did strong-encrypt the docs on his laptops, this internal logic falls apart.
(As a sidenote, I don't think I've heard the phrase "semantically (in)correct" as much in my life as in the past month. Someone should write a browser extension that automatically replaces it with the phrase "weasel words".)
Even then, if that horrible scenario results, if he's smart, has a mechanism for plausible deniability, so he can give a key that decrypts to false information. [1]
The assumption of this article is bogus.
[1] You create a hidden true crypt volume and you put that inside another volume, do this for as many layers as you wish.
Or keyloggers, or sensitive listening devices, or hidden cameras, et cetera.
Even Snowden himself admits that security at the endpoints is incredibly weak.
Of course they may briefly arrest him to check his status, and Igor on the other room is cloning his hard drives. Last resort they may blackmail him, go to hell /a USA prison or tell us the password.