Yeah, actually it might have been. But I prefer to give HN the benefit of the doubt.
Umm I try and be gentle. But let's talk about the fundamental problem, since you appear to understand it.
TCP-RST DoS is like the worst denial of service ever, since it has such massive negative amplification. You're spending like something like 30k * (required window guess packets) to interrupt one connection, which requires like say less than 10 packets to re-establish. Unless you're talking about BGP, which shit, we normally use TCP-MD5 for anyway. Even commodity home bullshit throws most of your packets away for free.
I take things quite slowly. The normal HN methodology is to go "Incorrect. blah blah blah.". Reality is nuanced and complicated. I try and avoid doing that, because honestly most statements are actually right when you squint at them the right way. Unfortunately, I get the most fake internet points when I say stupid and ultimately unsupportable bullshit while drunk. I still try to avoid doing that :/ But ahhhh here I go anyway.
The nuanced version of this is that most people's devices are going to get DoS'd way harder by fake ipsec traffic which forces checksums in CPU than it is by out of sequence packets which get handled in hardware.
But why don't we live in this fantasy world where we can all terminate TCP connections with imaginary sniper packets and ipsec solves everything.