This is how we would end up with nuclear disasters, not because the technology is bad, but purely because of mismanagement and human negligence.
Safety and reliability come from understanding the system. Something that's old but that you know everything about is far safer than something new. This risk is that the people who know move on, or the sources of replacement parts stop working, or that other things around the system change. Then the risk curve inverts and you find the old system more of a liability than a asset.
Almost always people choose to update things either too early or too late. Knowing when to do something is hard.
I guess that kind of thinking is what led to the collapse of ancient civilisations like why even bother to improve anything and let everything decay and die out
I think almost nobody from that era would have believed you if you told them that more than 50 years later not a single human would have traveled beyond low Earth orbit, and that we'd now be struggling to recreate what we did in 1969. Furthermore a significant chunk of the world doesn't even believe we landed on the Moon anymore, no doubt in part because of this apparent anachronism.
It's not like there was any sort of collective or even singular decision to just let things die out. I mean sure Nixon did his thing intentionally, but even as a President in the golden years of the US, he was still just one man.
Four people went around the moon earlier this year (leaving earth's orbit for the first time since '72)
That's just lazy thinking, and probably a sign you've never been a manager. For all the responsibility to lie with management you'd have to be leading people who enthusiastically do what they're asked to do, raise problems, document things, follow processes, and make sure everything is handed over to the next person when they leave.
That's not how people are. They'll have times when they're unmotivated, underpaid, grumpy, over-worked so they miss things, etc. That's when the organisational tech debt starts piling up, and there's nothing a manager can do to stop it except manage it as best they can even though they're under the same pressure, with the same lack of motivation and crap pay as everyone else.
It's so easy to think you can fix it just by keeping on top of it and micromanaging where it starts to show up. It doesn't work that way.
These two (and many others) are well within management’s purview.
> … there's nothing a manager can do … [emphasis added]
Right, but Management (capitalized and plural) can. A manager should report, and management should fix - if not, it’s management’s fault.
The fact that you're willing to absolve an individual manager but still believe Management can fix the problems is a big part of the problem. The Management usually includes the last person in the chain who has the ultimate decision making power. If you assume that when I said 'a manager' I meant that person, it should be fairly obvious that even they don't have unlimited budget or unlimited time, and they can only try to fix problems they hear about. Within those constraints Management are still going to find fixing systemic problems hard.
It's very easy to look at something with hindsight and think the outcome should have been predicted and corrected. If you look at the real world you'll see that just isn't the case. Personally, I wish we had a lot more people applying some systems thinking approaches to at least consider the second- and third-order impacts of their decisions but I imagine that won't ever happen. It makes me sad because it's actually really interesting.
- profit, if a system generates it, people will keep the system running.
- dilligence, usually driven by personal idealism, and unrewarded.
- legal or financial penalties, or insurance costs.
- it has collapsed to a temporarily stable state for now.
For another comment I was looking at the Grenfell Tower fire in the UK around 2017 and the people who lived there had been raising fire risks for years and the landlord (management organization) and the council had been ignoring them, and ignoring the fire department. The companies which replaced the cladding on the tower with flammable cladding were choosing the cheaper flammable option and pointing fingers as well. And during the fire, the fire service had never dealt with such a big fire and didn't have a truck with a long ladder, didn't have extended-breathing gear, had radio problems, water pressure problems from the local water company (who deny that).
This kind of backstory is typical for disasters, and for IT outages - and I've taken to believing that if something "should work" but wasn't tested recently then you should expect that it doesn't work. This is a common saying in backups (you need to test restoring), but it seems to apply everywhere. Backup internet connections that don't have enough bandwidth for the company to keep running. Disaster recovery sites that share resources with the production site. 'Disaster recovery' that recovered into a remote site, but they couldn't do CAD work remotely over their slow connection so it was still disastrous. Multiple power feeds but they were cross-wired so one failing still functionall took down everything.
If knowledge transfer "should be happening" but it's not critical to a job, or it's not profitable, or it's not legally required and audited, then it isn't happening. Subject to the dilligent idealist employee mentioned above who are temporary in the long view. Management's involvement seems not to arrange the larger system to effectively shoulder responsibility, but rather find ways to avoid personal blame while cutting costs beyond the point where everything that needs to happen keeps happening.
I'm pretty sure constant upgrading would be more likely to cause disasters.
For non-perishable things - i.e technologies, ideas, books, institutions - the expected remaining lifespan is roughly proportional to how long they have already survived
Time acts as a filter: what has already withstood a long stretch of disorder is more robust, so the longer it lasts, the longer it is expected to last.
The old nuclear software running on mainframes have passed the test of time. The new software, has yet to.
Nassim Taleb talks about this at length in his book, Antifragile.
Same reason why MTA in NYC still operates subway using 100 y/o signaling hardware on most of the lines.
In a way, your comment and the responses you get is a perfect allegory to inexperienced vs experienced engineering.
I understand that way of thinking for a small business computer system. Not for a critical infrastructure. Also if people actually thought about like that we would still be in stone age, like why invent something new or use a new technology? Keep on using rocks to crack nuts and kill animals
Replacing the relays in old telephone switches is a problem because they use so many weirdly specific types of relays - but those systems are only found in museums now. I believe track control uses fairly ordinary DPDT, etc., relay designs.
The designs for the electrified track switches were made by one company which was sold, re-sold, and then burned down and the designs lost, and there isn't anywhere else to buy them because nowhere else uses such old track design anymore, so not only is Toronto struggling to buy parts to continue electrifying the manual junctions, it's struggling to custom-make enough replacement parts to keep the aging electric switches working faster than they fail.
And they were using trolley poles to connect to the overhead power lines instead of Pantographs until 2017, 50-100 years after everywhere else, which meant a) they couldn't get enough power through them to run air conditioning, and b) they are more likely to fall off the power line and the tram stops and the driver has to get out and reconnect them, and c) their newer trams now have to have custom dual-power connections to go through older parts of the network, and d) the carbon shoes on the trolley poles wear out quicker which means the trams are dirtier and taken out of service for maintenance more often in the wet which is when people want to use trams more.
Also, I happen to be familiar with NotJustBikes, watch regularly. I don't see this as the same kind of problem. What you explained is clearly BROKE. What we're talking about works just fine and migration to newer technology doesn't provide advantages outside easier maintenance. It can't be justifies by costs, either.
They moved a booth or something and the compartment it was stuffed in was missed during the cleanout. The thing was working for at least 20 years and may still be there!
I worked with a client that had a cash disbursement system working on an ancient dBase 16-bit application. They had a very difficult to change process that required multiple transactions because the system couldn't represent the dollar amounts appropriately.
Same reason they don't modernize health care infrastructure. It's too expensive, people die if they get it wrong and they get voted out of office for their troubles.
Relevant: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2000/04/06/things-you-should-...
Chernobyl is the perfect example to not use outdated old technology. Had they used the modern western technology at that time to upgrade their nuclear reactors the kill switch would have prevented the whole disaster instead of increasing the neutrons make the core a nuclear bomb.
Next time educate yourself with facts before making a fool out of yourself
But you are aware that this thread is about a reactor in the west, that "updated" their certified hardware to a VM instead running on windows NT?
Wikipedia's pages on Chernobyl say that construction started in 1972 and the problem with the control rods causing an initial spike of power was discovered in 1983 ?
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_Nuclear_Power_Plant
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster#Accident_se... (search 'Ignalina nuclear power plant')
DOS was a single task operating system. Once you proved such a system could run for days, months and years, there's no reason for it not to function 50 years later other than component failure.