Fortunately we can use the existing standard (RFC-4880) in a way that is completely secure. Remember, we are talking about the standard that was in effect when the Snowden leak revealed that PGP is on a very short list of things the NSA has no access to. There is no reason to think that has changed since then.
(As just one small example: the only mandatory symmetric cipher in 4880 is 3DES, and nobody serious is recommending 3DES for long term stored encryption in 2026.)
Your example mentions 3DES. 3DES is secure. The reason it is not recommended is because 128 bit block lengths allow longer file/message lengths than 3DES can accommodate on one key. At any rate, RFC-4880 permits the use of AES and that is what is normally used.
And no, you can’t brush aside 3DES being insecure for large messages and then call it secure. Modern cryptographic tools don’t allow that, because there is (again) universal consensus that it’s insecure.
I doubt that there is an implementation left that does 3DES by default.
It would be nice to update the standard to make AES required to be available for decryption. I really wish that the most recent standard update attempt had restricted their scope to such uncontroversial changes before going to war over the controversial changes.
Edit: I say “particularly” because I don’t think any cryptographer would endorse 4880’s only mode of operation for AES.