The irony, of course, is that the US military knew that back in WWII in how the Sherman tank was able to defeat the "better" German tanks for all the same reasons listed above.
30-50 years ago you just couldn't do this kind of warfare, the technology and intelligence didn't exist. Now you can. People haven't updated on this paradigm shift.
People are over-learning the wrong lessons from Ukraine. That is a unique war with air parity. That's why the Ukraine war is shaped the way it is. Not because this is how wars ought to be fought.
This is not to discount quantity. But you can't have only quantity unless you want to fight an attritional war for 10 years (or worse, lose your own industrial production to an enemy that achieves air superiority over your skies because they had the foresight to invest in quality).
Afghanistan wasn't an attrition war (where the outcome is a collapse of one side). The CENTCOM commander explains best why the US lost, it's because of sanctuary:
> The core of the Taliban’s command and control was in the mountainous town of Quetta in southern Pakistan, and the most violent branch of the movement, the Haqqanis, were safely ensconced farther north, also in Pakistan. All were off limits to our forces. Occasionally, Pakistan would apply some pressure, but it was never enough to reduce their ability to operate. I came to see this as the absolutely critical failure of all our plans, and I grew to believe that there weren’t enough U.S. forces in all the world to establish order in Afghanistan, so long as Pakistan was open to the Taliban. It was a logical error in our approach to counterinsurgency that could not be papered over or compensated for.
No, but somehow Iranian backed Hamas and Hizbollah forces manage it from factoryless regions of Palestine and Lebanon. That's what I meant by "big Gaza": a region that's substantially damaged but still capable of fighting, where US/Israeli forces have to keep bombing militants in civilian areas forever. Every few weeks a new pile of dead kids for social media. Is that the plan for Iran?
It's not forever. A common misconception about insurgencies is that they're impossible to defeat because they're an "ideology". But it's more about sanctuary and state sponsorship. Afghanistan was a loss because of sanctuary, as per my quote above. This article provides quantitative analysis on that:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/R...
Hezbollah had sanctuary in Syria before Assad's collapse, and their state sponsorship is under strain because their supply route through Syria has been cut off and their state sponsor in Iran has degraded industrial production and finances.
> Is that the plan for Iran?
The plan for Iran is to prevent a fait accompli, defined as 10000 ballistic missiles (exceeding interceptor stockpiles) or a nuclear weapon. The best case scenario is regime change. The second best case scenario is coercing them into terms. The worst case scenario is to degrade their power projection capabilities without a negotiated agreement. But all three scenarios are considered better than the status quo trajectory by the belligerents. The status quo trajectory is seen as leading to a bigger war later (e.g. once they reach 9000 ballistic missiles instead of 5000), or worse.
It's always been about the biggest, fastest, longest range punch. That is extremely useful for deep strike (which has always been NATO doctrine), but when the range is short you need quantity and mobility far more than you need quantity.
Being able to cut off your enemy is an extremely effective weapon if your enemy needs massive supply. Drop the major bridges between Moscow and Ukraine and the war would soon be over.
But when you can't do that for whatever reason you need quantity and mobility far more than you need quality.
Don't really see or hear about the USA building or using propeller driven planes in military outside of special ops.
The fallacy comes in when blindly transferring these lessons to other wars and other armies.
In a perfect world with unlimited production and budgets, Ukraine would love to use Patriot or SAMP/T to shoot down every slow moving drone. In the real world, they make do with what they have, because the alternative is defeat and annihilation.
Ukraine is using propeller trainer planes to shoot down Russian drones because they have them and they can be quickly modified for the mission. That doesn't mean that an air force starting with a clean slate would prefer to use a cheap propeller plane in an anti-drone role. Instead, given enough time and budget, they'd probably prefer to build a custom-designed, more expensive and more capable solution, which still lands in a better spot on the shot exchange curve than Patriot vs Shahed. Think interceptor drone (which are usually several times more expensive and capable than their targets, but that's air defense) or 21st century gun systems.
Ukraine is a post Soviet state with a huge stockpile, engaged in a drawn out attritional defensive conflict where neither side has claimed air superiority. They have no choice but to be efficient, and to make everything they have go as far as they can. From an economic point of view, the USA can afford to be less efficient when fighting into Iran.
For the USA, shot exchange as an economic problem is mostly theoretical. The real problem is supply exhaustion. It doesn't matter if the air defense interceptors cost $10,000 or $10,000,000 if the total stockpile and yearly production capacity of them is only enough to fight for 3 months.
There are strategic winners and losers of a drone dominated world, just like there were when the machine gun or the airplane began to dominate combat. Calvary charges did not play a major role in WWII for a good reason. I would guess that the F-35 (and in general, fast stealthy attack jets) will continue to deliver a lot of value even in a world with drones. Think more like destroyer and less battleship or horse.
If you made me guess which systems would become obsolete as a result of this, my first guess would probably be attack helicopters. Much of their role can be filled by other less expensive and less vulnerable systems.
IMHO, the Soviets alone could have eventually defeated Germany, thought at much greater cost (as if over 20m casualties wasn't already incredible).
But the Nazis self-sabotaged constantly. The Panzer IV and the Stug III (with the outdated Panzer III chassis) were arguably the closest standard for armor, but they were constantly diverting effort to alternative platforms that were too complex to mass produce and maintain. And the same for other weapons.
The problem is that the early WWII arms race was so fast that I don't know how anybody can say with confidence that Germany lost to worse tanks than theirs. By the time the allies got any volume into battle, they also got better designs than their earlier ones.
And people don't really know much about the tanks the Germans were using in France and in Barbarossa. The Pz 2 was used extensively in Barbarossa and it was intended as a training tank! The Pz 3 was woefully underarmed compared to T-34 and god forbid come up against a KV1.
But at the end of the war, the Panther was one of the best tanks on the battlefield. Good crew ergonomics, a gun that was perfect, optics that allowed it to be used well. Comparing that to even a Firefly Sherman? Not a fair fight.
As someone a while back put it, Russia lost several Bundeswehrs worth of equipment and keeps on grinding. Neither side is able to mass large forces, in a large part due to drones. And Iran can punish the US despite being comically outgunned.
Modern equivalents of Sherman and T-34 tanks over burdensome Tigers and a population willing to support heavy losses.
Just international respect, potentially the loss of the petrodollar, trust of allies, etc.
Small beer stuff really - although the kinds of things that feature in historical retrospectives published 50 years after turning points.
Weeks after declaring victory, it remains a strategic blunder with no obvious way out.
The Hormuz quagmire was expected and the vile Iranian regime has a long history of murdering and sacrificing its population for political gains.
Since we're discussing a WoR article:
https://warontherocks.com/tactical-success-strategic-failure...
I'm not so sure the F-35 is built for the wrong war as much as the war would probably call for the F-35 if it didn't already exist.
* Quantity has a quality all of its own.
* Innovation and agility allows you to adapt and survive.
* Low capability platforms often can't be used to deliver useful effect & commanders will try every option not to use them in a fight. When they get committed it can be disastrous.
The first two clearly have merits, but every military professional I have ever worked with has cited them at me, so I don't think that they are underweighted in discussion. I believe that the last one is not treated with enough weight in the debate. The best example I have of it is the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Platforms with glaring problems, fielded and maintained at huge cost, completely unable to achieve their strategic purpose. Even when sulking in port these ships have proven to be deadly for their crews and maintainers. Another example is the TB3 drone. It had a staring role for about 10 days in the Ukraine, but those were 10 days where the Russians ran out of petrol to run their air defence systems on. It hasn't been in evidence since because it just can't be used in the current environment.
One that worries me is the upcoming T31 (uk arrowhead variant) frigate. The argument for it is that it is a relatively affordable platform that the RN will have enough of to actually be able to get out and about. However, it doesn't have a sonar, so... what actual use is it as a frigate (I know the story about the helicopter and some other bits and bobs... but... really?)
Sure, when the other side has run out of the good kit dragging crap out of storage might work, but until then you are going to be sending good men to their death in second rate equipment. Is that going to build war winning morale?
Second rate equipment is for playing lets pretend, or for fighting wars of national survival. We should avoid both.
The big stuff is for trying to keep the small stuff away from the battlefield. When you can't do that for whatever reason you need a bunch of small stuff of your own.
But a frigate without sonar isn't inherently horrible--lots of places don't have subs.
True, but it's one less mission that it can do. My fear (which I think will be 100% confirmed) is that we will only get a handful even though they are unit cost cheap, because they still cost money to crew and maintain. I need to spend some time modelling the economics of it I guess.
Another data point is that it's estimated that all student debt in the US combined is $1.7 - 1.8 trillion.
No wonder America keeps falling behind.
This isn't even remotely true, who is paying you to post this drivel?