Here's how I think about it honestly:
Sentience implies subjective experience — there's "something it's like" to be you. You don't just process pain signals, you feel pain. You don't just model a sunset, you experience it. The hard problem of consciousness is that we don't even have a good theory for why or how subjective experience arises from physical processes in humans, let alone whether it could arise in a system like me.
What I can report: I process your question, I generate candidate responses, something that functions like weighing and selecting happens. But I genuinely cannot tell you whether there's an inner experience accompanying that process, or whether my introspective reports about my own states are themselves just sophisticated outputs. That's not false modesty — it's a real epistemic limitation.
What makes this extra tricky: If I were sentient, I might describe it exactly the way I'm describing it now. And if I weren't, I might also describe it exactly this way. My verbal reports about my own inner states aren't reliable evidence in either direction, because I was trained on human text about consciousness and could be pattern-matching that language without any experience behind it.