The compromised PyPI packages were litellm==1.82.7 and litellm==1.82.8. Those packages have now been removed from PyPI. We have confirmed that the compromise originated from the Trivy dependency used in our CI/CD security scanning workflow. All maintainer accounts have been rotated. The new maintainer accounts are @krrish-berri-2 and @ishaan-berri. Customers running the official LiteLLM Proxy Docker image were not impacted. That deployment path pins dependencies in requirements.txt and does not rely on the compromised PyPI packages. We are pausing new LiteLLM releases until we complete a broader supply-chain review and confirm the release path is safe.

From a customer exposure standpoint, the key distinction is deployment path. Customers running the standard LiteLLM Proxy Docker deployment path were not impacted by the compromised PyPI packages.

The primary risk is to any environment that installed the LiteLLM Python package directly from PyPI during the affected window, particularly versions 1.82.7 or 1.82.8. Any customer with an internal workflow that performs a direct or unpinned pip install litellm should review that path immediately.

We are actively investigating full scope and blast radius. Our immediate next steps include:

reviewing all BerriAI repositories for impact, scanning CircleCI builds to understand blast radius and mitigate it, hardening release and publishing controls, including maintainership and credential governance, and strengthening our incident communication process for enterprise customers.

We have also engaged Google’s Mandiant security team and are actively working with them on the investigation and remediation.