Hacker News Reader

Comment by gzread | Hacker News Reader

It will change as soon as one of them gets meaningfully DNS hijacked.

Zones get meaningfully hijacked all the time. It just doesn't happen through cache poisoning; it happens through phished registrar accounts.

Phishing existing isn't a good argument against cryptographically authenticating DNS records.

"Phishing existing" isn't the argument. "The dominant vector for actual domain takeover over the last 5 years is phishing" is.

But it also applies to every other part of the stack, including WebPKI. Would you accept this as a valid argument against using HTTPS everywhere?

I can't even follow your argument anymore. DNSSEC is proposed as a feature to make DCV certificates more difficult to misissue. But DCV misisuance is overwhelmingly caused by registrar ATO. DNSSEC therefore can't address most DCV misissuance. And it has no other mainstream security proposition.

That is obviously not a claim you can make of the WebPKI. Your problem here is that the WebPKI is a very large superset of the security capabilities of DNSSEC. Unlike with DNSSEC, people --- millions of them --- actually rely on it.

I'll rephrase the argument to make it more clear for you: Phishing attacks are far more common than HTTP MITM, so we don't need protection against HTTP MITM. If you think this conclusion doesn't follow from this premise, then what differentiates HTTP from DNS in your mind, because you are making this argument about DNS?

Neither DNSSEC nor the WebPKI are defenses against phishing. But phishing (registrar ATO more generally) is the dominant vector through which DNS spoofing occurs, and DNSSEC solely addresses DNSSEC spoofing.

Do you agree that we don't need HTTPS because phishing is the most common HTTP attack, not MITM?

No? This is the third attempt you've made at this faulty syllogism. If we simply can't resolve enough premises to hash it out, that's fine, we don't have to try to understand each other.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com