It's abundantly obvious to me now that bad actors are purchasing legitimate chrome extensions to add this functionality and earn money off the user's data (or even worse). I have seen multiple reports of this pattern.
It's abundantly obvious to me now that bad actors are purchasing legitimate chrome extensions to add this functionality and earn money off the user's data (or even worse). I have seen multiple reports of this pattern.
> Firefox is committed to helping protect you against third-party software that may inadvertently compromise your data – or worse – breach your privacy with malicious intent. Before an extension receives Recommended status, it undergoes rigorous technical review by staff security experts.
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/recommended-extensions-...
Updates must also be vetted before being made available.
You know, a lot of consumer cybersecurity focuses on malware, browser security, LAN services, but I propose that the new frontier of breaches involves browser extensions, "cloud integrations", and "app access" granted from accounts.
If I gave permission for Joe Random Developer's app to read, write, and delete everything in Gmail and Google Drive, that just set me up for ransomware or worse. Without a trace on any local OS. A virus scanner will never catch such attacks. The "Security Checkup" processes are slow and arduous. I often find myself laboriously revoking access and signing out obsolete sessions, one by one by one. There has got to be a better way.
Which is all the more incredible, considering Blackberry (the phone company that was big before the age of iPhones or YouTube) had a permission model that allowed users to deny 3rd-party apps access to contacts, calendar, etc, etc. The app would get a PermissionDeniedException if it can't access something. I remember the Google Maps app for Blackberry, which solution to that was "Please give this app all permissions or you can't use it"...
This is of course easy to say in hindsight, and is absolutely a requirement that should be enforced by the extension appstore, not by individual contributors such as yourself.
[1] Of course, the issue here is that no contracts were signed.
[2] In the specific case I was replying to, there was no malice or intent to hide from you as seller. Yet, a better outcome could have been achieved by advertising the sale to those impacted.
I don't think there is any legal support for what I describe above, but in principle whenever a user signs up for Good Thing, and then gets baitswitched to Evil Thing, the main victim is the user, and it is fair to hold responsible everyone involved in the bait-and-switch maneuver.
At least there's invididual states actually responding to this malpractice: https://pestakeholder.org/reports/2025-state-healthcare-poli...
If the old owner gives their key to the new owner, then they should be on the hook for it. I was thinking of this yesterday, as I think this is also how domains should work.