Remote attestation is literally a form of DRM
There are also bad forms of remote attestation (like Google's variant that helps them let banks block you if you are running an alt-os). Those suck and should be rejected.
Edit: bri3d described what I mean better here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46785123
No doubt. Fully agree with you on that. However Intel ME will make sure no system is truly secure and server vendors do add their mandatory own backdoors on top of that (iLO for HP, etc).
Having said that, we must face the reality: this is not being built for you to secure your servers.
Let's say I accept this statement.
What makes you think trusted boot == remote attestation?
No, it's not. (And for that matter, neither is remote attestation)
You're conflating the technology with the use.
I believe that you have only thought about these technologies as they pertain to DRM, now I'm here to tell you there are other valid use cases.
Or maybe your definition of "DRM" is so broad that it includes me setting up my own trusted boot chain on my own hardware? I don't really think that's a productive definition.
This company is explicitly all about implementing remote attestation (which is a form of DRM):
> Remote Attestation of Imutable Operating Systems built on systemd
> Lennart Poettering
Is there a HN full moon out?
Again, this is wrong.
DRM is a policy.
Remote attestation is a technology.
You can use remote attestation to implement DRM.
You can also use remote attestation to implement other things.