Most modern servers at least implement ECC on their RAM. I would expect flight electronics to be designed to a higher standard.
Not going to happen. The potentially huge cost to their reputation alone makes it not worth it, the modification would cost money and make logistics more difficult, and the plane couldn't be used (or sold) worldwide anymore.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-w...
Two different companies.
Boeing had tons of failures recently, flight search services started adding filters for the airplane because people didn’t want to fly with them.
Airbus is doing better for now, hopefully it will stay that way.
I wonder why you disagree about this? The only reason I can thing of is: - same sw with same hw with same lifecycle would probably have the same issue. (vendor diversity would fix this) - The consensus building unit is still a possible single point of failure.
Any other reasons you might doubt it as a methodology? It seems to have worked pretty well for Airbus and the failure rate is pretty low, so... It obviously is functional.
Modern units I'm sure have ECC, AND redundace as well.
Regardless, there are multiple fronts you need to tackle to have high reliability so you should use all techniques at your disposal.
Good part selection and different EMI environment meant the calculated risks from not having ECC were considered too low to care and the idea that they might have to deal with radiation outside of flying near nuclear explosion arrived after the specific devices got designed.
But for the 2008 incident I read and linked the report, that was what happened. The ADIRU unit did probably get a SEU event and that should have been mitigated by the design of the ELAC unit. The ELAC unit failed to mitigate it so that's the part that they probaby fixed.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/3532398/ao...
My reaction was initially that it was a cop out, but looking a bit in the report and thinking things through, I think that, yes, it's most likely a bit flip.