It isn't. Otherwise, the Nazis were moral. As were the Jews. But in that case, all moral truth is relative, which means absolute moral truth doesn't exist. Which means that "moral" is a synonym for "feeling" or "taste". Which it is not.
> My philosophy is that consciousness is orthogonal to reality.
It is how you and I experience reality and we exist in reality, so I'm not sure how it could be anything other than congruent with reality.
> Whether or not anything is conscious has, by definition, no observable effect to anything else.
It would be an interesting and rather useless definition of "conscious" that didn't allow for expressions of consciousness. Expression isn't required for consciousness, but many conscious observers can be in turn observed in action and their consciousness observed. Which maybe is what you are saying, just from the perspective that "sometimes you can't observe evidence for the consciousness of another"?