With a TPM you can set it up that your disk is unlocked automatically, but only if no-one changed anything in the signed boot chain. This is the default with Bitlocker on Windows and is also possible on Linux, though somewhat more finicky.
It's just added complexity and corporate control so people can use worse passwords
I want a TPM in my computer so I can have the security and convenience. Yes, it's another point of failure. But I need backups in case the hard drive fails anyway. And besides, the OS can be designed so I can enter a password if I need to use the drive without the TPM.
I think in general biometrics are in the same ballpark as low-entropy passwords. IDK, I personally have no faith in trusted computing hardware because it can be broken with the right equipment. You're right that it can be used alongside ordinary security measures, but I just think it encourages putting your eggs into a cryptographicially-weak hardware-strong basket (which represents a downgrade because crypto is stronger than hw).
>A server that I want to turn back on all by itself after a power outage can only be done securely with a TPM.
Can you describe how this prevents a MITM attack? I assume you mean a remote server? I've heard of colocation setups like this, but I think they rely on a couple of unstated assumptions.
> Can you describe how this prevents a MITM attack? I assume you mean a remote server? I've heard of colocation setups like this, but I think they rely on a couple of unstated assumptions.
I'm not sure what you mean by prevent a MitM attack, unless you're worried about someone with probes MitM-ing your TPM-CPU connection in the DC.
You can bind a TPM to measurements on the host (let's say for argument's sake you want Secure Boot state, Option ROM state, and UEFI state), then configure the OS to ask the TPM for the (or rather, a) decryption key during boot.
The TPM will check that the state(s) you bound to is (are) the same as when you bound them, and if so it will give the OS the key. Your disk is encrypted, but the boot process is automatic/unattended, as well as completely contained within the server chassis.
There are ways to attack this hypothetical setup, buuuuut there are ways to attack remotely entering your disk password as well, and bear in mind that denial of service is a security vulnerability. Tradeoffs.
Windows Hello allows you to log in with a 6-digit pin. That's perfectly secure, because the TPM lets them design a system where you can't do an offline attack on the pin. Too many wrong entries and you'll need to use your password.
I doubt there's more than two dozen bits of entropy provided by finger print readers or facial recognition authentication, but you can make an acceptably secure login experience with it because, again, the TPM lets you prevent offline attacks.
The risk is data leakage. With a TPM and no password, there is no data leakage protection.
Consider a server. It can have an encrypted hard drive, boot with the TPM without a password, and run its services. In order to steal data from it, you need to either convince software running on the server to give you that data, or you need to do some sort of advanced hardware attack, like trying to read the contents of DRAM while the computer is running.
There are other use cases too, like kiosks, booting to a guest login, corporate owned laptops issued to employees, allowing low-entropy (but rate limited) authentication after booting, to name a few.