Code-based 2FA, on the other hand, is completely useless against phishing. If I'm logging in, I'm logging in, and you're getting my 2FA code (regardless of whether it's coming from an SMS or an app).
"I went to the link which is on mailchimp-sso.com and entered my credentials which - crucially - did not auto-complete from 1Password. I then entered the OTP and the page hung. Moments later, the penny dropped, and I logged onto the official website, which Mailchimp confirmed via a notification email which showed my London IP address:"
> the 1Password browser plugin would have noticed that “members-x.com” wasn’t an “x.com” host.
But shared accounts are tricky here, like the post says it's not part of their IdP / SSO and can't be, so it has to be something different. Yes, they can and should use Passkeys and/or 1password browser integration, but if you only have a few shared accounts, that difference makes for a different workflow regardless.
"Properly working password managers" do not provide a strong defense against real world phishing attacks. The weak link of a phishing attack is human fallibility.
The key here is the hacker must create the most incisive, scary email that will short circuit your higher brain functions and get you to log in.
I should have realized the fact that bitwarden did not autofill and take that as a sign.
... and specifically by using the link in the email, yes?
But it's also why sites that don't work well with a password manager are actively setting their users up to be phished.
Same with every site that uses sketchy domains, or worse redirects you to xyz.auth0.com to sign in.
It's always possible to have issues, of course, and to make mistakes. But there's a risk profile to this kind of stuff that doesn't align well with how certain people work. Yet those same people will jump on these to fix it up!
Blaming some attribute about user as why they fell for a phishing attempt is categorically misguided.