I mean, for one thing, a commercial LLM exists as a product designed to make a profit. It can be improved, otherwise modified, restricted or legally terminated.
And "lying" to it is not morally equivalent to lying to a human.
And "lying" to it is not morally equivalent to lying to a human.
I never claimed as much.
This is probably a problem of definitions: To you, "lying" seems to require the entity being lied to being a moral subject.
I'd argue that it's enough for it to have some theory of mind (i.e. be capable of modeling "who knows/believes what" with at least some fidelity), and for the liar to intentionally obscure their true mental state from it.
“Lying” traditionally requires only belief capacity on the receiver’s side, not qualia/subjective experiences. In other words, it makes sense to talk about lying even to p-zombies.
I think it does make sense to attribute some belief capacity to (the entity role-played by) an advanced LLM.
No need to say he "lied" and then use an analogy of him lying to a human being, as did the comment I originally objected to.
I can lie to a McDonalds cashier about what food I want, or I can lie to a kiosk.. but in either circumstance I'll wind up being served the food that I asked for and didn't want, won't I?