1. Browsers are open ended tools
2. A knowledgeable user can accomplish all sorts of things with a browser
3. Most people can do very impactful things on browsers, like transferring money, buying expensive products, etc.
4. The problem of older people falling for scams and being tricked into taking self-harming actions in browsers is ancient; anyone who was family tech support in the 2000's remembers removing 15+ "helpful toolbars" and likely some scams/fraud that older relatives fell for
5. Claude is a tool that can use a browser
6. Claude is very likely susceptible to both old and new forms of scams / abuse, either the same ones that some people fall for or novel ones based on the tech
7. Anyone who is set up to take impactful actions in their browser (transferring money, buying expensive things) should already by vigilant about who they allow to use their browser with all of their personal context
8. It is reasonable to draw a parallel between tools like Claude and parents, in the sense that neither should be trusted with high-stakes browsing
9. It is also reasonable to take the same precautions -- allow them to use private browsing modes, make sure they don't have admin rights on your desktop, etc.
The fact that one "agent" is code and the other is human is totally immaterial. Allowing any agent to use your personal browsing context is dangerous and precautions should be taken. This shouldn't be surprising. It's certainly not new.
I'd be happy to respond to something that isn't ChatGPT, thanks.
No.
Give them access to a browser running as a different user with different homedir? Sure, but that is not my browser.
Access to my browser in a private tab? Maybe, but that still isn't my browser. Still a danger though.
Anything that counts as "my browser" is not safe for me to give to someone else (whether parent or spouse or trusted advisor is irrelevant, they're all the same levels of insecurity).
We shouldn't be sacrificing every trade-off indiscriminately out of fear of being left behind in the "AI world".
It is rather similar to your option (b).
See also CaMeL https://simonwillison.net/2025/Apr/11/camel/ which incorporates a type system to track tainted data from the Quarantined LLM, ensuring that the Privileged LLM can't even see tainted _data_ until it's been reviewed by a human user. (But this can induce user fatigue as the user is forced to manually approve all the data that the Privileged LLM can access.)
Non-deterministic security feels like a relatively new area.
https://gandalf.lakera.ai/baseline
This thing models exactly these scenarios and asks you to break it, its still pretty easy. LLMs are not safe.