if you want to learn how CodeRabbit does the isolation, here's a blog post about how: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/ai-machine-learning/h...
if you want to learn how CodeRabbit does the isolation, here's a blog post about how: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/ai-machine-learning/h...
It's really hard to trust a "hey we got this guys" statement after a fuckup this big
1. You run git clone inside the GCR function, so, you have at the very least a user token for the git provider
2. RCE exploit basically used the external tools, like a static analysis checker, which again, is inside your GCR function
3. As a contrived example, if I could RCE `console.log(process.env)` then seemingly I could do `fetch(mywebsite....`
I get it, you can hand wave some amount of "VPC" and "sandbox" here. But, you're still executing code, explicitly labeling it "untrusted" and "sandboxed" doesn't excuse it.
Someone could have taken the private github key and cloned your customers' private repos.
You would need to audit every single access to github made via your app since the beginning and link it somehow to your side. Did you do this?
> After responsibly disclosing this critical vulnerability to the CodeRabbit team, we learned from them that they had an isolation mechanism in place, but Rubocop somehow was not running inside it.
In case you don't want to read through the PR
Edit: I'm this old when I learned that Germans spell it "chuzpe."