https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37520065
https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2016-March/0...
The first version of NTRU Prime in an SSH server was implemented in TinySSH and later adopted by OpenSSH. Bernstein provided new guidance, and OpenSSH developed an updated algorithm that TinySSH implemented in return.
The NIST approval process was fraught, and Bernstein ended up filing a lawsuit over treatment that he received. I don't know how that has progressed.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32360533
While Kyber may have been the winning algorithm, there will be great preference in the community for Bernstein's NTRU Prime.
There's IETF WG drafts for use of Kyber / ML-KEM, but none for NTRU, so I'm not sure about that:
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mlkem/
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-desig...
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ml...
And given that NTRU made it to the third round, and NTRU Prime is labelled as an alternative, I'm not how strong a claim Bernstein can make to being ill-treated by NIST.
While NTRU Prime is not implemented in TLS, if it has even half the lifespan of DSA in SSH then it will be quite long lived.
So while some SSH folks just happened to pick NTRU after looking at the options at a particular point in time, some of the other most widely deployed systems (TLS, IPsec) will not be using it. So I'm not quite sure how defendable the "great preference" claim is.
Have you ever visited their site?
I use this in a variety of ways, thousands of logins per day. I don't see much love for AES.
Yes, I know. I mention this timeline in another one of my comments:
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44866802
> I use this in a variety of ways, thousands of logins per day. I don't see much love for AES.
So? Given its focus on low(er)-performance systems, perhaps on chips without AES-NI, it's no surprise that TinySSH does not have AES. Further, Dropbear, another implementation often used on smaller footprints, does have AES and recently added ML-KEM:
* https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/1748ccae5090d511753c0...
PuTTY added ML-KEM in 0.83 earlier this year. So I'm not sure how talking about a niche SSH implementation supports your claim that "there will be great preference in the community for Bernstein's NTRU Prime."
The evidence appears to me that implementation have been adding NIST's choice(s) since they have become available.
ML-KEM (originally "CRYSTALS-Kyber") was available, it's just the Tiny/OpenSSH folks decided not to choose that particular algorithm (for reasons beyond my pay grade).
NIST announced their competition in 2016 with the submission deadline being in 2017:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Post-Quantum_Cryptography...
TinySSH added SNTRUP in 2018, with OpenSSH following in 2019/2020:
* https://blog.josefsson.org/2023/05/12/streamlined-ntru-prime...
SSH just happened to pick one of the candidates that NIST decided not to go with.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32366614
I'm curious where you got the idea that they had mlkem available to them? They disagree with you.
> We (OpenSSH) haven't "disregarded" the winning variants, we added NTRU before the standardisation process was finished and we'll almost certainly add the NIST finalists fairly soon.
Nothing in his statements talks about 'availability', just a particular choice (from the ideas floating around at the time).
CRYSTALS-Kyber (now ML-KEM) was available at the same time as SNTRUP because they were both candidates in the NIST competition. NTRU (Prime) is listed as round three finalist / alternate (along with CRYSTALS-Kyber):
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Post-Quantum_Cryptography...
Given that they were both candidates in the same competition, they would have been available at the same time. Tiny/OpenSSH simply chose a candidate that ended up not winning (I'm not criticizing / judging their choice: they made a call, and it happened to be a different call than NIST).