Of course it would, the same way encrypting data works.
Encrypt some data in the video itself (ideally every frame changing), unique and can be created only by the holder the private key. Anyone can verify it. Flag reused codes. That's it?
Encrypt some data in the video itself (ideally every frame changing), unique and can be created only by the holder the private key. Anyone can verify it. Flag reused codes. That's it?
If you flag a reused code in 2 different videos, how do you tell which video is real?
For example, you encrypt the hash of the frame itself (+ metadata: frame number, timestamp, etc.) with a pkey. My client decrypts the hash, computes the hash and compares it.
The problem might present itself when compressing the video but the tagging step can be done after compression. That would also prevent resharing.
It's a lot of complexity, so probably only worthwhile for high value targets like government press conference rooms, etc.
echo "This comment was posted at 18:21 UTC" | sha256sum
4f51109e71ec4df85a52affec59a9104837664be3008d1bd70cb8b4fbe163862 -
“ rather than encoding a specific message, this watermark encodes an image of the unmanipulated scene as it would appear lit only by the coded illumination”
They are including scene data, presumably cryptographically signed, in the watermark, which allows for a consistency check that is not easily faked.
It turns out if you give an adversary physical access to hardware containing a private key, and they are motivated enough to extract it, it's pretty hard to stop them.
edit forgot the link: https://people.csail.mit.edu/mrub/vidmag/
Or anyone else who cares enough about deepfakes and can afford the effort
It'd agree that it's a lot of effort for very marginal gain