> especially in light of the aggressive "exercises" by the PLA in recent years.
As we've seen with Russia targeting them in Ukraine, nuclear plants are the last thing you want around during a war.
As we've seen with Russia targeting them in Ukraine, nuclear plants are the last thing you want around during a war.
Important note, the Geneva Convention states that one cannot attack a nuclear power plant, though it may be a military objective. You can take control of a plant, but you cannot use force in a way that risks releasing radiation.
It is also a pretty stupid idea for an invading force to do so. Invaders don't want scorched earth tactics. It undermines their own objectives of taking over some territory. Who cares if you're king of a nuclear wasteland. Rather these tactics are much more likely in non-invasion situations. Like if Russia and US duked it out in the Cold War, or India and Pakistan where it's become about much more than land.
This isn't the type of tactic you'd expect with PRC invading Taiwan. They want that land. They want the territory. They want the waters in the region and don't want to contaminate their own fishing supply. Nor do they want to incur the image of violating the Geneva Conventions. They maintain the claim that Taiwan is and always has been their territory, that the island is controlled by rebels. Such violations would invite global forces to come to Taiwan's aid and it would be much harder to paint the U.S. (or others) as aggressors interfering in internal matters. Remember, war is still highly political. Russia still depends on allies and should the PRC invade Taiwan, they too cannot operate in isolation.
[0] https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profil...
You are completely ignoring
a) That Russia did attack multiple nuclear sites with troops, missiles, and drones without significant international pushback
b) That Russia has used Zaporizhzhia as an unattackable forward operating base housing over a thousand troops, munition dumps, and so on. Demonstrating that nuclear power plants are a strategic liability to the defending side even should no nuclear incident occur.
c) That it isn't sufficient to say "nothing bad happened this time", but you must also say "it is very unlikely something bad could have happened", and that you can undeniably not say that here.
Here are a few statements by the IAEA (international regulator)
> This [thing that did not happen] is the only way to ensure that we do not face a nuclear accident. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals...
> This situation is untenable, and we are playing with fire. We cannot continue this situation where we are one step away from a nuclear accident. The safety of Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is hanging by a thread. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/situation-at-zaporizhzh...
> your condescension is unnecessary.
Believing you might not understand the situation is a legitimate and reasonable belief.
Providing historical records and operational context is not patronizing.
These are important details with high relevance to the topic at hand, especially considering the noisy information environment around these sensitive topics where there are large amounts of accidental and intentional misinformation or propaganda. It warrants letting the record be set straight. What I have stated are facts or well discussed beliefs of military strategy and the underlying ideas of what has led to such treaties and global policies. The conjectures made are not of my own but of general consensus by military scholars. And to clarify, the conjecture is with respect to what might happen, not with what did. Conjecture only exists where is necessary: predicting future events.
> You are completely ignoring
> a) That Russia did attack multiple nuclear sites
> b) That Russia has used Zaporizhzhia
Clarification: you should differentiate site from reactor and infrastructure necessary to maintain radioactive containment.
I made such a clarification in stating what is permissible under the Geneva Conventions and what is not.
Note that linked page's summary highlights that the IAEA has had permanent presence at the facilities since January 2023.
I would also like to request you read the linked material in full and pay careful attention to the targets and tactics used. I made a point about the Geneva Conventions not just for sake of the PRC but because it strongly clarifies the difference between what is allowed and what isn't. It is clear Russia is toeing this line and I'll agree may have even crossed it. But we must be clear that there is a large distinction between targeting the reactors or structure critical to ensuring reactor containment is maintained from taking operational control. These are wildly different situations, notably the former leading to the nuclear disaster you suggested and continue to.
Again, I want to stress conjecture occurs only in relation to future events and does not deviate from the general consensus of (global) military scholars. Only summarized for brevity.
> c) That it isn't sufficient to say "nothing bad happened this time", *BUT YOU MUST ALSO SAY "IT IS VERY UNLIKELY SOMETHING BAD COULD HAVE HAPPENED",
> AND THAT YOU CAN ***UNDENIABLY*** SAY THAT HERE.
[emphasis my own to draw focus to an obtuse accusation]
Here is a summary that may be more easily parsed:
- unlikely when:
- invading or seeking occupation
(b/c you destroy the "goods" you seek)
- do not wish to incur outside involvement
(i.e. retaliation or direct armed conflict with additional countries/organizations (i.e. NATO))
- must maintain strategic alliances in global politics
(i.e. PRC undermines its most important objective of replacing US as global leader by obtusely violating many international laws and creating a physical reminder of these autocracies that will last for centuries)
- likely when:
- willingness to use nuclear weapons
- No intention of invasion AND believe can withstand global political ramifications
- MAD
(mutually assured destruction)
- intent to commit genocide regardless of global ramifications and harm to self
(i.e. India and Pakistan)
> Here are a few statements by the IAEA
Compare that to the outright destruction of Ukrainian thermal and hydroelectric power plants: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-04-17/rus...
I don't recall any nuclear incidents as a result of the war in ukraine? Attacking the power infrastructure in general is bad, but hardly relevant to the type of generation
However there has been strategic use of them against Ukraine. Russia attacked and captured Zaporizhzhia and then used it as a base of operations on the front line that Ukraine couldn't attack back, because Ukraine is much less willing to risk a nuclear incident on their own territory than Russia is. Nuclear reactors strategically favour the invading army, because they care less about being careful.
It's also really not valid to say "the really bad thing didn't happen this time, so it's fine". Avoiding any meltdowns ever means even "that looked vaguely close to something bad happening" is something that must be avoided, and there have been several times in this war where it's looked more than vaguely close.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_of_the_Russian_invasion...