Because email customers on all sides want email to arrive, there's little incentive to modernize configurations or requirements. When you disable ancient cryptography, you'll get blamed for your change making email from someobscurewebsite.gov no longer arriving. For a significant amount of mail servers, you can pick between "accept a random self-signed certificate using a cipher suite from the late 2000s" or "send email over unencrypted SMTP", and you just have to hope that the email server doesn't have your domain configured as "secure transmission required".
I'm in favour of Google just breaking the old, broken mail servers, but I wouldn't assume that TLS 1.2 is available on email servers.
The 3DES saga is still ongoing...
TLS libraries do drop old, weak ciphers from time to time. But thanks to auto-negotiating, this will only be a problem if your TLS lib is so out-of-date that it doesn't support any still-trusted alternatives.
Which brings me back to why this story is so strange: "Gmail upgrades TLS library, drops old insecure algorithm that OpenSSL had dropped almost 10 years ago."
I always customize TLS versions and cipher suites because I don't trust the defaults.
AFAIK you can customize them on:
- Chrome & Firefox (can only enable/disable ciphers, no reordering, PQ ciphers supported since 2024)
- OpenSSL (by customizing openssl.cnf, PQ ciphers supported since 3.5)
- curl
- nginx/apache
- OpenSSH (I enabled PQ ciphers too)
- Multiple programming libraries
- and others...
Also, clients and servers don't "pick the strongest cipher that they both support". Servers select the cipher ultimately, and they can be misconfigured to pick, for example, 3DES over AES.
But what about someone maintaining and developing, say, an obscure e-mail client?
And if it hasn't been updated for that long, it probably doesn't support TLS 1.2 and is getting rejected from just about everything for that reason.