Comment by _djo_ | Hacker News Reader

Comment by _djo_ | Hacker News Reader

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You're leaving out crucial information. Obama didn't keep his BlackBerry for classified information, he was given the then-standard government secure mobile communications device, a Secure Mobile Environment Personal Encryption Device (SME-PED).

More specifically, the device Obama was given was a Sectéra Edge [0][1] by General Dynamics, a device specifically designed to be able to operate on Top Secret voice and Secret data networks. It had hardware-level separation between the unclassified and classified sides, even having separate flash memory for both. [2]

The NSA contributed to the design and certified it and another device (L3's Guardian) on the SCIP, HAIPE, Suite A/B, Type 1, and non-Type 1 security protocols.

It was absolutely not a regular BlackBerry, it didn't run any RIM software, no data ever went through RIM's servers, and secure calls were encrypted and didn't use SS7. It was a clunky purpose-designed device for the entire US government to be able to access Secret information and conduct Top Secret voice calls on the go.

Even then, there were limitations to when and where it could be used and when a SCIF was required.

The current equivalent of the SME-PED programme is the DoD's Mobility Classified Capability[3], which are specially customised smartphones again made by General Dynamics.

There is no excuse whatsoever for the current administration's use of Signal, let alone TeleMessage Signal, for Secret and Top Secret discussions on regular consumer and personal devices. It's deeply irresponsible and worse than any previous administration has done.

[0] https://www.cnet.com/tech/tech-industry/obamas-new-blackberr...

[1] https://gdmissionsystems.com/discontinued-products/sectera-e...

[2] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA547816.pdf

[3] https://www.disa.mil/~/media/files/disa/fact-sheets/dmcc-s.p...

Your reference [0] appears to contradict what you've said here. It speaks at length about several NSA approved options as alternatives, but says Obama used a BlackBerry.

The photo attached to the article captioned "President-elect Barack Obama checks his BlackBerry while riding on his campaign bus in Pennsylvania last March." appears to show a blackberry.

I take it from the article that this was as controversial as I remember it being at the time. Thanks for posting it.

He was allowed to keep his BlackBerry for personal communication only, not classified communication, and had to use a Sectéra Edge for classified communication. [0]

The Blackberry for personal use wasn't a stock BlackBerry, but hardened by the NSA and fitted with the SecurVoice software package to encrypt voice calls, emails, and messages. The few people he had on his approved communication list were given the same devices.[1]

That BlackBerry was, again, not used for classified communication. So it's not the same thing as the current scandal.

[0] https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/jan/24/obamas-other-p...

[1] https://www.wired.com/2009/04/obama-to-get-back-blackberry-a...

> He was allowed to keep his BlackBerry for personal communication only, not classified communication

Presence of the senior staff on his (very limited) contact list would seem to contradict that statement. Communication with them would be, by definition, not personal.

I agree with you that our government officials should be using the secure infrastructure our patriotic service members and civil servants work so hard to build and maintain.

If you’d prefer, we can call it unclassified communication rather than personal communication. The point is that it was not used for Secret, Top Secret, or other classified communications. For that, he had the SME-PED device.

So, again, it’s not a parallel to the current situation. Nobody is saying the SecDef and other staff shouldn’t have unclassified devices as well as their classified devices, the issue is that they’ve been using the unclassified devices to conduct Secret or Top Secret discussions.

But how could he have created accidentally a conversation for discussing targets during military attack with a journalist if secret communication was not done on his clear-text device ?

I think you're misunderstanding me, I'm referring to Obama's use of an NSA-hardened BlackBerry for unclassified communication with a select group of people, while using a purpose-built and NSA-cleared secure phone for classified communication. All of which was done correctly in terms of information security processes.

Secretary of Defence Hegseth sent Secret or Top Secret information over a channel (Signal/TM Signal and a regular mobile phone) that was never cleared for classified communications. The person I was replying to was trying to equate Obama's actions to those of Hegseth (and Waltz and others), I was providing context showing that to be a false equivalence.

What Hegseth did was indefensible.

Thank you for the clarification

Obama wasn't allowed to keep his Blackberry; he requested a secure commercial-quality cellphone to communicate with his aides, and NSA (which was, to be sure, not really happy about the request) selected the Blackberry as their platform. The end solution was a highly pared-down device that could only communicate via a hosted encryption server (a commercial product, SecurVoice) to a small number of paired devices, which were distributed to Obama's inner circle. The Presidential devices had additional security limitations (e.g., they could only connect to WHCA-controlled base stations). End of the day, what they had was an encrypted closed network of devices, some of which communicated over public wireless infra, running a very limited, NSA-reviewed, approved, and altered, software suite.

What's clear is that NSA put a fair amount of effort into securing and maintaining that system, so much that its use was limited to the White House; Hillary Clinton wanted a similar setup (her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, had been allowed to use unaltered "off the shelf" Blackberries under an NSA waiver, but NSA had declined to renew those waivers due to security concerns), but NSA slow-walked and effectively derailed the discussions with State's security team, perhaps because they wanted to limit the amount of technical detail discussed outside the White House, or because they were concerned that State would be unable to provide SecState with the kind of technical support necessary to secure the devices during global travel. (We all know what happened next, of course.)

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