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More specifically, the device Obama was given was a Sectéra Edge [0][1] by General Dynamics, a device specifically designed to be able to operate on Top Secret voice and Secret data networks. It had hardware-level separation between the unclassified and classified sides, even having separate flash memory for both. [2]
The NSA contributed to the design and certified it and another device (L3's Guardian) on the SCIP, HAIPE, Suite A/B, Type 1, and non-Type 1 security protocols.
It was absolutely not a regular BlackBerry, it didn't run any RIM software, no data ever went through RIM's servers, and secure calls were encrypted and didn't use SS7. It was a clunky purpose-designed device for the entire US government to be able to access Secret information and conduct Top Secret voice calls on the go.
Even then, there were limitations to when and where it could be used and when a SCIF was required.
The current equivalent of the SME-PED programme is the DoD's Mobility Classified Capability[3], which are specially customised smartphones again made by General Dynamics.
There is no excuse whatsoever for the current administration's use of Signal, let alone TeleMessage Signal, for Secret and Top Secret discussions on regular consumer and personal devices. It's deeply irresponsible and worse than any previous administration has done.
[0] https://www.cnet.com/tech/tech-industry/obamas-new-blackberr...
[1] https://gdmissionsystems.com/discontinued-products/sectera-e...
[2] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA547816.pdf
[3] https://www.disa.mil/~/media/files/disa/fact-sheets/dmcc-s.p...
The photo attached to the article captioned "President-elect Barack Obama checks his BlackBerry while riding on his campaign bus in Pennsylvania last March." appears to show a blackberry.
I take it from the article that this was as controversial as I remember it being at the time. Thanks for posting it.
The Blackberry for personal use wasn't a stock BlackBerry, but hardened by the NSA and fitted with the SecurVoice software package to encrypt voice calls, emails, and messages. The few people he had on his approved communication list were given the same devices.[1]
That BlackBerry was, again, not used for classified communication. So it's not the same thing as the current scandal.
[0] https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/jan/24/obamas-other-p...
[1] https://www.wired.com/2009/04/obama-to-get-back-blackberry-a...
Presence of the senior staff on his (very limited) contact list would seem to contradict that statement. Communication with them would be, by definition, not personal.
I agree with you that our government officials should be using the secure infrastructure our patriotic service members and civil servants work so hard to build and maintain.
What's clear is that NSA put a fair amount of effort into securing and maintaining that system, so much that its use was limited to the White House; Hillary Clinton wanted a similar setup (her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, had been allowed to use unaltered "off the shelf" Blackberries under an NSA waiver, but NSA had declined to renew those waivers due to security concerns), but NSA slow-walked and effectively derailed the discussions with State's security team, perhaps because they wanted to limit the amount of technical detail discussed outside the White House, or because they were concerned that State would be unable to provide SecState with the kind of technical support necessary to secure the devices during global travel. (We all know what happened next, of course.)
So, again, it’s not a parallel to the current situation. Nobody is saying the SecDef and other staff shouldn’t have unclassified devices as well as their classified devices, the issue is that they’ve been using the unclassified devices to conduct Secret or Top Secret discussions.
Secretary of Defence Hegseth sent Secret or Top Secret information over a channel (Signal/TM Signal and a regular mobile phone) that was never cleared for classified communications. The person I was replying to was trying to equate Obama's actions to those of Hegseth (and Waltz and others), I was providing context showing that to be a false equivalence.
What Hegseth did was indefensible.
> false equivalence
We're literally talking about people occupying the same positions. If anything, blackberry seems less secure. For instance, there's a global en/decryption key, and it's known: https://www.vice.com/en/article/exclusive-canada-police-obta...
1) you don't have any evidence that he used it for TS and are just trying to make a false equivalence.
2) you think secdef and potus occupy the same position.
Got it.