(On a side note, the word "framing" is also the wrong word to use.)
One way to phrase your message correctly would be: "This article is about the impact of the president's decision, but I wish it also talked about whether the president has the authority to make that decision in the first place".
"Conveniently Ignoring" the standing question is frankly an admission of compliance to something that is not the law. Who cares "why people can't live without food" if someone is saying "let's starve the population." One question isn't worth platforming while the other is on the table.
> Columbia...has an endowment of roughly $15bn. Mr Trump’s administration withheld a mere $400m in federal funding.
With the best investing in the world, that $15bn might throw off 1 billion a year in perpetuity. $400m (a year) is a very serious chunk of the university's budget.
We don't know unless we fill in the unknown numbers. Knowing that the amount of federal aid being removed is 40% of an estimate of the amount produced by one source (the endowment) isn't enough information to answer the question. The right question is what percentage of their budget this represents.
From what I can tell, Harvard's actual annual budget is about $6.5B (https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2024/10/financial-report-fis...). A $400M shortfall is thus about 6% of their annual budget. Significant, but also something they could probably cover for the next decade or two by drawing down their endowment until they adjust.
Yes there is.
Congress, moreover, has enacted laws that use those funds as a hook to influence the behavior of private universities. Specifically, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows the executive branch to deny federal funds to universities that discriminate on the basis of race. Now, it just so happens that, in 2023, Harvard university, among others, was found by the Supreme Court to have flagrantly violated that law: https://www.ed.gov/media/document/dear-colleague-letter-sffa...
There is nothing "dictatorial" about the President withholding taxpayer dollars from a university that is in violation of the law, where Congress has authorized the executive branch to do so. Indeed, I'm at a loss to understand who else you think has the power to do this, if not the President?
To put it differently: a state of affairs where the Executive/President has those powers may not be dictatorial, but this specific instance of him making use of that discretion in this specific way might be.
Hey now, wait a minute. Has the “violation of law” been established yet? There’s a pretty wide gulf between “I believe a violation of the law has occurred” and having the matter adjudicated.
You’re clearly an intelligent person; there’s no need to try to sneak bullshit in through the back door. Let the strength of your arguments and facts speak for themselves. And make sure they are actual facts.
Didn't SFFA clearly establish that? The Supreme Court outright reversed the bench trial ruling, which had found that Harvard and UNC's programs comported with Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.
You have a point that I should've said "was found to have violated" rather than "is in violation." Whether Harvard is still violating the law is debatable. But I'm not sure Title VI withholding can't be predicated on a recent violation.
Regardless, as you know, the government routinely uses the threat of legal action for suspected violations to coerce compliance. Virtually every FDA/SEC/CFTC/etc. enforcement action starts with a letter along the lines of: "you're in violation of the law, do X, Y, and Z, or else we'll take action."
At the time, universities were adhering to existing law (Bakke and Grutter cases). The Court then overturned its own precedent and decided that what was once acceptable under its own law was no longer so. The text of the Equal Protection clause didn’t change; the only thing that changed was the Court’s interpretation of it.
So it’s not like Harvard was operating in bad faith or being malicious, which is the characterization suggested by your “violation” language. (Not to mention that every university in America that considered race in their admissions process, despite not being a named party to the suit, was similarly situated—probably most universities in the country.) And there’s no evidence to suggest that Harvard didn’t respond appropriately and in a timely fashion to the new law.
As I understand it, that’s the legal effect of SFFA. SFFA sued Harvard seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Harvard’s admissions policies violate Title VI. The district court ruled, after bench trial, that Harvard didn’t violate Title VI. The Supreme Court didn’t remand for further proceedings, it outright reversed. Meaning that it found that Harvard’s procedures did violate Title VI.
Bad faith or malice aren’t elements of a Title VI violation. And I don’t see any legal reason why an administration couldn’t hold Harvard’s discrimination against students—which happened, even if the Supreme Court changed its mind about whether it was permissible—against Harvard in allocating federal funding.
Moreover, Harvard’s defiant response to SFFA provides a reasonable basis for the administration to believe it has continued to engage in discrimination: https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2023/06/harvard-unite...
Of course, now that Harvard has decided to fight it, the administration will have to prove its belief: https://www.axios.com/2025/04/28/harvard-law-review-trump-ad.... That’s how these enforcement letters always pan out. Many targets fold to avoid litigation. Sometimes, a defendant fights it and the government has to initiate a formal enforcement action.
The DOJ, FDA, FTC, and SEC do stuff like this all the time. These agencies all lean very heavily on the threat of an enforcement action to enforce changes in private behavior without having to actually take entities to court.
Declaratory judgments aren't findings of wrongdoing. They're simply words (hence "declaratory") that describe a relationship between the parties of a case. Cases that end in declaratory judgements are also always civil in nature, so I don't believe they can be used to penalize the party later as if they had conducted a criminal act.
> I don’t see any legal reason why an administration couldn’t hold Harvard’s discrimination against students—which happened, even if the Supreme Court changed its mind about whether it was permissible—against Harvard in allocating federal funding.
That would actually be an interesting case. I find it difficult to believe that the Court would allow such an ex post facto application. The problem with this is that anyone who engaged in behavior that was lawful at the time, then subsequently deemed unlawful, could be subject to abrogation of benefits or other penalties. That said, in light of how the Court's makeup has changed in the past 20 years, I suppose I shouldn't be surprised if I turn out to be wrong. I would be very sad, though, because it would mean that nobody can be assured that their current conduct, even if lawful at the time, won't be held against them in the future if the law changes later.
> Harvard’s defiant response to SFFA provides a reasonable basis for the administration to believe it has continued to engage in discrimination
I don't think it does. I think Harvard is saying "we will continue to lawfully promote diversity however we can." There's no unlawful action being contemplated, described, or advocated in its response. Costco and Disney, BTW, do the same.
> now that Harvard has decided to fight [Trump’s investigation of Harvard Law Review’s publication policy], the administration will have to prove its belief
You're mixing up two different plot lines. We're discussing NSF and other Federal grant withdrawal resulting from Harvard's failure to implement discretionary measures Trump wants them to take relating to hiring, policy, and curriculum. This other story is about investigating Harvard Law Review, which was announced weeks after the grant rug pull. It seems pretty obvious that Trump is trying to find any angle he can to prevail in his war against the institution.
Title VI seems to clearly say "don't discriminate" but again I might not understand how exceptions are allowed.
So, from the 1960s until recently, the Court allowed universities to consider race in university admissions because it advanced a public policy that sought to improve the lot of Black people: the more Blacks could enter the ranks of the educated elite, the better off they would be in the long run, both socially and economically.
Over time, though, people whose admissions were rejected started to fight back: they felt that academic merit trumped all other considerations. After all, if they got better grades and aptitude test scores, weren't they more deserving of admission? The fights began, and over time, the Court chipped away at the acceptable use of race in admissions. Finally, in SFAA, the Court did away with them altogether.
As far as "pushing the boundaries" is concerned, actors will generally try to do whatever's in their best interest provided it's not illegal. There's no reward for maintaining a wide margin from legal boundaries when there's competition.
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."
It turns out that "malice aforethought" is a term of art that requires no actual malice and not much forethought.
Anyway, if you look at the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act (and courts frequently look to legislative history when interpreting statutes), you'll see that its backers in Congress were concerned about racial segregation, which at the time according to practice separated white people from everyone else (mostly Blacks).
A logical and factual error made by proponents of affirmative action is to start with the premise that the civil rights laws were intended to help american descendants of slaves, but then extend them to other non-whites by categorizing them as “functionally black.” This is utterly incoherent, because black descendants of slaves and native americans are sociologically and economically distinct from other non-whites. Hispanics are just time-shifted Italians and Irish: low skill immigrants that economically assimilate within a few generations. By contrast, the gaps between black descendants of slaves and native Americans and other americans are not shrinking over time. They remain as large today as in 1965.
There’s a coherent version of affirmative action that gives a preference to descendants of slaves and native Americans but nobody else. But that bears no resemblance to the “diversity” based system that actually exists, which irrationally privileges Cubans over Bangladeshis because Indians are richer than Mexicans.
This is very much false, and can be easily refuted by reading what the lawmakers were saying as the law was being passed. For example, here's from the DoJ's memorandum, as quoted on the Senate floor by Senator Clark:
> "Finally, it has been asserted that title VII would impose a requirement for 'racial balance.' This is incorrect. There is no provision . . . in title VII .. .that requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any individual or any group for the purpose of achieving racial balance. . . . No employer is required to maintain any ratio of Negroes to whites .... On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly run afoul of title VII because it would involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. What title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish is equal treatment for all."
This explicitly says that you cannot have a racial quota, because it would be against Title VII of the proposed Civil Rights Act, meaning that the lawmakers proposing the bill explicitly said that the Title VII will protect whites (and all other races) as well as blacks.
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court adjudicated the question in United Steelworks v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), this is what they said:
"""Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the language and legislative history of 703 (j) of Title VII. Opponents of Title VII raised two related arguments against the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate. Second, they argued that employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant preferential treatment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 8618-8619 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman). Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action; as respondent urges, it easily could have answered both objections by providing that Title VII would not require or permit racially preferential integration efforts. But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather, Congress added 703 (j) which addresses only the first objection. The section provides that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because of the race . . . of such . . . group on account of" a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work force. The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances. The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action.
The reasons for this choice are evident from the legislative record. Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963). Section 703 (j) was proposed by Senator Dirksen to allay any fears that the Act might be interpreted in such a way as to upset this compromise. The section was designed to prevent 703 of Title VII from being interpreted in such a way as to lead to undue "Federal Government interference with private businesses because of some Federal employee's ideas about racial balance or racial imbalance." 110 Cong. Rec. 14314 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller). 6 See also id., at 9881 (remarks of Sen. Allott); id., at 10520 (remarks of Sen. Carlson) id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). Clearly, a prohibition against all voluntary, race-conscious, affirmative action efforts would disserve these ends. Such a prohibition would augment the powers of the Federal Government and diminish traditional management prerogatives while at the same time impeding attainment of the ultimate statutory goals. In view of this legislative history and in view of Congress' desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses, use of the word "require" rather than the phrase "require or permit" in 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action. """
The judicial branch has authority to stop him but they're only supposed to use it if they are convinced that what he's doing is unconstitutional. Some of the executive branch's appointee's have authority over him but only in specific circumstances (such as 25th amendment) and they're usually in agreement with him since he gets to appoint them anyways. Otherwise, all authority in the executive branch effectively belongs to the president and random midlevel bureaucrats can only exercise it on his behalf.
So if it decides to spend $X on something specific, it has to be spent on whatever that something is. The President doesn't have discretion in that case.
But the Congress never did that. You won't find an appropriations bill where Congress allocated $X to Harvard and $Y to Princeton, etc. In fact, it did the opposite. Under Title VI, it empowered the executive branch to withhold money based on civil rights violations. And regardless of your view on Presidential power vis-a-vis executive branch agencies, 42 USC 2000d-1 specifically subordinates federal agencies' rules, regulations, and orders pursuant to Title VI to the authority of the "President."
Trump is not using Title VI to justify withholding federal funding. He's just withholding federal funding and his minions are coming up with the justification after the fact. And even then, it's insufficient, because Title VI requires an investigation and a fair amount of procedure.
Who knew that driving off everyone who was good at their job would make the administration less competent?
Directly or indirectly the people of the United States have power over all three branches. One can easily make strong arguments that the problem here is both that Congress as abdicated its powers to the executive (rather than delegated), and that the people have ignored that Congress should retain those powers while focusing on the presidency as the important election to the exclusion of all others.
This has been going on for decades or longer.
>So if it decides to spend $X on something specific, it has to be spent on whatever that something is. The President doesn't have discretion in that case.
Sure. Definitely means he can't spend it on something else. But how much wiggle room is in this? Does it say on which day, hour, and minute it must be spent? Sure, it's probably tied at least to the fiscal year (in which case it needs to be spent by September, one would suppose), but that's months away. Does allocating a budget imply that it needs to be spent at all? If some bureau or department fails to spend all of its budget, has the president somehow committed some treason-adjacent crime, or is that just thriftiness? Are these funds earmarked for specific universities? What if he just goes shopping for alternative recipients?
To say that he has no discretion at all is absurd, if that were the case then Congress would have mandated that these be automatic electronic bank transfers without any human intervention (or oversight). The nature of the job not only implies but practically demands some (if limited) discretion.
Yes, he has. It is not the presidents power to judge whether the money he spent in defiance of congress is sufficient, it is congress that holds this power. If congress thinks they should spend less, they can settle this by changing the budget. What would you say if the next democratic president simply refused to spend a single dollar assigned to ICE to "be thrifty"?
I'd be thrilled. There's $6 billion that they spend on DEA every year that I'd be happy if it was just pocketed by Trump and spent on hookers or something. Normalize this, please.
The perverse incentives people will defend so that they can obey the letter (but not the spirit) of the law are downright bizarre. You're all getting everything you deserve, too bad I'm getting it with you.
Trump is literally breaking the law but no one really cares to discuss that anymore since the gish gallop has be so quick this term.
If Congress wants to fund something specific, they need to pass a law or budget that names that specific thing and how much they are appropriating. They aren't doing that.
So, Trump taking money from Harvard and giving it to say, a community college in Tampa is technically still correct implementation of the law. I mean, it all depends if he can defend his decision in court, because of course he cannot discriminate based on race, ethnicity, political affiliation etc.
How corrupt do you want a nation to be?
We used to have a shared sense of custom and mores that helped preserve this stability. But that seems to be out the window now, and regrettably so.
If someone has more knowledge to contribute, that'd be most welcome.
I do not imagine it is congruent with the law to simply fire all the staff and shut down USAID (or "merge" it into State).
The laws are all public and people are free to read that a few weeks ago, Congress directed the Executive to spend money as USAID for the statutory purposes behind USAID. That part is pretty clear.
With NSF grants, the question is whether the President can redistribute funding away from applicants affiliated with specific institutions he doesn’t like (my first approximation: probably).
With USAID, the question is whether the President has the authority to disband an entire Agency established and appropriated by Congress (22 U.S.C. 6563) (my first approximation: probably not).
With science funding grants, the administration likely has latitude to make some changes, but the specifics of that latitude are going to be embedded in a thicket of overlapping statutes of different vintages.
Without going through all the specific statutes, I relied on the suggestion that if they are okay breaking the law around USAID funding passed in March, they likely are not going to find religion and adhere to laws governing science funding. But I guess anything's possible.
The Fourth Circuit allowed the administration to proceed: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/28/appeals-court-usaid...
That is not a final word on the constitutionality of dissolving USAID, but it's an indication that the Court didn't believe plaintiffs had a high likelihood of success on the merits to justify the preliminary injunction.
Say a judge dismisses an indictment of an accused murderer because the police didn’t have a proper search warrant. Then the accused murderer kills someone else. That could fall within the letter of “negligent homicide” laws, but the judge can’t be prosecuted for that because judges have absolute immunity for official acts.
Similarly, a red state prosecutor could have tried to prosecute Biden for something like negligent homicide on the theory that his opening of the boarder was a negligent act that resulted in deaths. Obviously you can’t do that, because the President has immunity for official acts. It would be completely insane if the President didn’t have immunity. President do lots of things which cause people to be killed, property to be destroyed, etc. You could prosecute those as crimes if you literally applied the criminal laws.
If the Executive isn’t bound to follow federal appropriations laws, there’s no principled reason why he should have to follow other federal laws. And as you show, the president has full criminal immunity as well.
What other laws are there that might limit his conduct? I’m of the understanding that where we are now is the only potential check on Presidents going forward is impeachment and removal from office. It’s a blunt instrument, but apparently there are no other applicable mechanisms.
The primary check on the President is elections, not “the law.” Secondarily, there’s impeachment, and Congress’s power of the purse. Those are the main checks on the executive.
We have this 20th century conception of “the rule of law,” where we imagine this neutral, independent “justice system” as the base layer on top of which the elected branches operate. Like the lowest level of an operating system kernel. But if you look at the debates at the constitutional convention, and read the federalist papers and anti-federalist papers, that’s not the system the founders actually created. The founders didn’t trust anyone to neutrally enforce the law. You won’t find anywhere in those primary sources where the founders envisioned some “rule of law” where private litigants use the court to micromanage executive policy.
Instead, what we have is a game of rock-paper-scissors, where no branch is assumed to be “independent” and no branch is a “base layer of the operating system.” Courts can declare the law, but can’t force the President to do something. But if the President doesn’t listen to the court, he can be voted out of office, or impeached, or Congress can withhold funding for the administration. That is a complete system of checks and balances as it is.
Marbury vs Madison established the judiciaries authority to review actions of the executive. That was in 1803.
Regarding rule of law, in that opinion:
> When the heads of the departments of the Government are the political or confidential officers of the Executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
1) Isn’t part of the founding sources I mentioned. It was quite controversial at the time.
2) Stands for exactly the opposite of what you’re arguing. Marbury goes to great lengths to disclaim any authority over executive policymaking and discretion, and limit courts to compelling executive officers to act only when the duties are specifically assigned by law and ministerial:
> This is not a proceeding which may be varied if the judgment of the Executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.
And even after determining that delivery of the already executed commission is a ministerial act, the Court went out of its way to invoke a jurisdictional escape hatch to avoid actually enjoining an executive officer. A fair application of Marbury would preclude the sweeping powers courts have asserted to micromanage executive action in response to private litigation.
In Marbury, the court ruled that Marbury had already been appointed when the previous president signed his commission, and the only thing that remained was the purely ministerial act of the secretary of state delivering the signed letter that was sitting in the president’s desk. But even then, the Court found a way to avoid compelling the secretary of state to actually deliver the commission! How would the Marbury court view the prospect of a district court ordering the president to turn around military planes being used to deport an admitted El Salvadoran citizen? Or district courts ordering the President to reach out to a foreign country’s president to demand the return of that foreign country’s citizen! The Marbury court wouldn’t have dreamed of it!
What Marbury stands for is that the judicial branch can declare the legality of laws and executive actions, but should bend over backwards to avoid actually compelling the executive to perform any action.
Right, that's where this discussion started. What we are looking at right now is the erosion of that second piece, Congress's power of the purse. The Constitutional checks and balances (not the 20th-century stuff you detail) doesn't work as well without this key Article I power. I have not seen it explained under what principle this power of Congress has been arrogated instead to the Executive.
If he chooses to continue to ignore the law, the solution isn't the courts. It's the Second Amendment, which was added to the Bill of Rights as a check on exactly this (though the Founders intended for it to be exercised through the States' militias, not the citizens directly, based on the text of the first half of the amendment).
And, to be honest, I’m not really sure that a bunch of unorganized wingnuts that slobber all over their big-man toys are going to prevail over the National Guard, if the latter remain loyal to the President, and a lot of innocent lives will probably be lost due to militia incompetence.
Trump isn't following the laws at all. He's simply issuing "executive orders" without regard to the powers or limitations of the executive as stated by the Constitution or the U.S. Code. Almost every single one of his executive orders during his second term violates a Constitutional prohibition in some way, and now that the initial shock to the system is over you're seeing judges overturn almost all of his orders...Even judges appointed by Trump during his first term are starting to overturn his executive orders.
So Trump's response was to call for the arrest of these judges. And to hint that violence would be appropriate way of removing them from.
What's good for the goose is good for the gander. If Trump gets killed by a mob this term, it's going to be because he kept suggesting that violence was the way to deal with his opponents.
Why do you assume that the person you're responding to is "jumping to conclusions." Feels like you're just ignoring what they have to say in the guise of "asking for more knowledge" when you don't actually know if they don't have the knowledge because of your own lack of expertise.
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Po...
Because they said “Trump is literally breaking the law.” That hasn’t been established yet.
I happen to be an attorney as well as a hacker, and I worked in a Federal district court, so perhaps give me the benefit of the doubt that I just might know what I’m talking about. If you have legitimate questions of your own, I’d be happy to try to answer them.
This is not true. They can also stop him if what he is doing is illegal. Statute can absolutely constrain the executive.
This is an open question. The judicial branch has authority, on paper. But without means of enforcing that authority, it cannot truly constrain the executive.
It's not. Statute has constrained the executive for all of American history.
To put a finer point on it: if the president orders somebody to do something in violation of federal law, and then pardons them, can the law be enforced?
I wouldn't be surprised if trump has in some way violated statute in relation to freedom of speech or academic independence but unless somebody makes a compelling argument that he has, he is a representative of the people operating under the authority granted to him as president, and being a wreckless fool doesn't change that.
I don't particularly like what he's been doing in his second term so far but in online discourse I've seen this worrying trend recently where people think that unelected bureaucrats who were hired because other unelected bureaucrats liked their resumes should be able to hamstring the president and overrule him (i think the strangest thing i've seen was people opining that the CIA should be getting involved). I think it's important to remember that the checks and balances in the US constitution are between the three branches of the federal government, and most of the big bureaus/departments/etc are under the executive branch which he is the sole executive of for the next four years.
The mechanism that Trump is using to deny funding for the universities he hates is through statute. Courts can conclude that this action does not match the statute.
> I don't particularly like what he's been doing in his second term so far but in online discourse I've seen this worrying trend recently where people think that unelected bureaucrats who were hired because other unelected bureaucrats liked their resumes should be able to hamstring the president and overrule him
I'm very sorry, but this is the law. This is not just vibes. If you do not like this, then advocate for changing the law. But you are doing the precise thing that you are insisting that others are doing here.
That omits a crucial issue that many amazingly overlook: The bar isn't constitutional but legal. Congress makes the laws, not the President. The President is bound by those laws, and in fact their job is to enforce the laws that Congress makes. They cannot do things unless empowered by the law.
It's quite clear that the current President does not give a damn about the constitution, know anything about it, or have any compunction about blatant violation of the constitution.
> Otherwise, all authority in the executive branch effectively belongs to the president and random midlevel bureaucrats can only exercise it on his behalf.
This is factually wrong.
> This is factually wrong.
It’s literally the first sentence of Article II! “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Article II doesn’t even talk about an “executive branch.” It assigns powers and responsibilities to the President.
It’s an extremely easy to understand structure that has been obfuscated during the 20th century. The constitutional actors are: the President, the 100 senators and 435 Congressmen, the 9 Justices, and Article III judges. They hold all the powers of their respective offices.
Can Congress appoint employees to be part of the Supreme Court, and provide for them to exercise judicial powers independently of the Justices? Of course not! Can Congress delegate to a staff of employees the power to make laws independently of the Congressmen? No! Obviously not! That would be absurd.
The executive branch isn’t any different.
Also the law must be followed.
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
> The dissents’ positions in the end boil down to ignoring the Constitution’s separation of powers and the Court’s precedent and instead fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals about a future where the President “feels empowered to violate federal criminal law.” Post, at 18 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see post, at 26, 29–30; post, at 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 20–21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). The dissents overlook the more likely prospect of an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive President free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly and fearlessly carry out his duties for fear that he may be next. For instance, Section 371—which has been charged in this case—is a broadly worded criminal statute that can cover “‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.’” United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172 (1966) (quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479 (1910)). Virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law (such as drug, gun, immigration, or environmental laws).
Look at section 371! If President didn’t have immunity for official acts, Trump could easily have relied on that broad statute to prosecute him for opening the border and thus “impairing” the function of ICE. Our criminal laws are breathtakingly broad in their wording, and a contrary ruling from the Supreme Court would’ve meant that the Presidency would become subordinate to prosecutors.
Trump still wants to do this and the court will let him because you have to be incredibly naive or willingly ignorant to think that that this Supreme Court will apply the laws equally without regard to political party.
> t would’ve meant that the Presidency would become subordinate to prosecutors
Oh no, the President would have to follow the same laws as everyone else, how horrible!/s
“Laws” aren’t magic. If you could just have “laws” and trust prosecutors to enforce them fairly and neutrally, then the entire constitutional structure, with three branches and checks and balances, is pointless. You would just have prosecutors as basically the government’s “microkernel” and then the other three branches on top.
The framers didn’t create that system because they understood that you can’t trust prosecutors either—they’re political too! Our system is designed like a game of rock-paper-scissors, where the checks on each branch come from the other branches, not prosecutors enforcing “the law.”
The check on prosecutorial power lies both with the Judicial branch and, in cases of a jury trial, the People. Prosecutors are not judge, jury, and executioner.
The Legislative branch gets a say by writing, passing, repealing, or amending laws.
So the three branches check each other, no need to "just trust me, bro" with prosecutors.
If the President cannot faithfully execute the laws without BREAKING them then that either means the Judicial branch should strike down the laws that are preventing that or the Legislative branch should pass laws that contain a carve out for the President. The President is not above the law, so the half-measure of the Supreme Court deciding that they are in official acts is both ahistoric and enabling despotism.
In practice they are. Criminal laws are written extremely broadly. And as they say, prosecutors can indict a ham sandwich. Then all it takes is putting the case in front of a favorable jury: trying a republican in new york city or a democrat in rural iowa. In that way, a handful of people can undo the will of the electorate.
The framers would have easily understood this. At the time, the states were trying to kill the federal government. You think they envisioned say a Virginia prosecutor trying the federal president before a Virginia judge and jury?
> The President is not above the law.
But not every legal wrong has a legal remedy!
Choices. Congress can overturn any president's order, but they do nothing.
What a turn of phrase! Love it.
Let's imagine that completely legitimate circumstances lead to the US Government stopping the stream of grants to the Ivy League universities. How would they cope, given their enormous endowments that generate significant interest? This question is asked much less, and the answer is much less obvious. Hence the value of TFA.
Additionally, the follow-on questions are irrelevant. There are a million better questions to ask on the other side of this as well, before we ask why someone can't live without the money that they've been acquiring entirely above board and legally. "Why does the gov't think it has the authority to do this?"
Why do we need to have theoretical debates about legitimate circumstances, when there are real debates about illegitimate circumstances happening? having this irrelevant follow-on discussion is doing the gov't's work for them.
In a different setting I can see asking this question, but there is no need to ask this question while the circumstances are clearly illegitimate.
1) Fight the administration in the legal system.
2) Plan for the case where some of those legal fights are lost.
Were they being denied? It might well be the case that grants were never denied except when the grant spigot ran dry waiting for the next year. I don't necessarily believe that is the case, but is there some evidence that it doesn't work like that?
Then that person should not be a politician or political appointee who judges on the merits and not on the votes it will bring.
We can argue about the basis for terminating the grants until the cows come home, but this administration through DOGE has made it clear that they're not otherwise going to be spending this money, which is something the president cannot do.
Clawing back and terminating grants without due process is what dictators do; it's the opposite of what supporting and defending the Constitution is.
Moreover, faceless bureaucrats risk criminal and financial punishments for things like self-dealing. The president faces no such risk. And when they're a lame duck, they (theoretically) face zero risk, period.
Bureaucracies are slow. They're costly. Like democracy generally, they're inefficient. They're worthwhile because, at least as far as government is concerned, they're a necessary element to maintain rule of law and avoiding dictatorship. The solution to government bureaucracy isn't to remove the bureaucracy, it's to remove the government involvement. Otherwise, you're just inviting dictatorship. This has happened countless times. When the people get upset about perceived government ineffectiveness and its democratic institutions are too slow to respond (e.g. gridlocked Congress), there are two routes: privatization (i.e. reducing the role of government, not merely something like syndicalism) or dictatorship.
What's the difference between Donald Trump's rise to power and approach to governance, versus Huge Chavez's? Not much. The parallels are amazing. Both came to power promising radical overhauls of perceived sclerotic institutions, including broken legislatures. Like Trump, Chavez was a media whore who spent most of his time talking on television, making impossible promises and blaming everyone and everything else for his own failures. (Castro was like this, too.) They both spout so much B.S. that most people can't even keep up; they just start taking them at their word, which is why Chavez was popular until the day he died. His successor has zero charisma; the policies haven't changed, but now people hate the exact same kind of government they had during Chavez, but have no power to change it. That's what happens when you choose government of men rather than government of law.
Trump with help of various groups makes political appointees who either individually oversee grant reviews or administrate individuals that do. These people are just as faceless and unaccountable as with any other president ...
The difference here is that Congress who is much more accountable to voters deliberated and wrote laws authorizing various funding which is being completely overridden by the branch of government that is supposed to carry out the law.
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/04/24/who-will-...
Addressing the other question is a pre-requisite to considering the one included in this piece. And given that they are ignoring the presumable answer to the other question, they have not justified the existence of this article.
Yet here we have tacit acceptance that the president can fuck with citizens' money just because he's in his feels about something. Absolute clownery.
In April 2011, the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) established new mandates requiring colleges and universities receiving federal funding to dramatically reduce students’ due process rights. Under the new regulations, announced in a letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali, colleges and universities were required to employ a “preponderance of the evidence” standard—a 50.01%, “more likely than not” evidentiary burden—when adjudicating student complaints concerning sexual harassment or sexual violence. The regulations further required that if a university judicial process allows the accused student to appeal a verdict, it must allow the accusing student the right to appeal as well, resulting in a type of “double jeopardy” for the accused. Additionally, OCR’s letter failed to recognize that truly harassing conduct (as defined by the law) is distinct from protected speech. Institutions that did not comply with OCR’s new regulations faced federal investigation and a potential loss of federal funding.
The innovation in these letters was realizing OCR could just come to a new understanding of what civil rights law required, then tell universities that since this is what civil rights law means, following the guidance would be a mandate for institutions to receive federal funding. So now Trump's come in and reinterpreted civil rights law once again.
At this point probably a supermajority of the country thinks this innovative idea for enacting ad-hoc nationwide policy changes has been abused by one or more administrations, but I haven't heard anyone seriously working on a generalized solution. Everyone's mostly given up on Congress and just hopes their team can take control of the magic pen.
https://www.thefire.org/cases/us-department-educations-offic...
When Orange Man exercises a power he presumes to have, it's "dictatorial", but when "Pen and a Phone" Obama exercised that same power -- together with the people, follow where Obama leads.
What does the Duke lacrosse case have to do with it?
When the same exact power is used in a way that leftists by fiat deem "bad", there is no limit of the amount of pettiness, name calling, obstruction, and general ill will they will put to use to stop the president from doing something. in this case, it is to uphold Civil Rights law against a clear and ongoing violation.
This poster should have realized though that the way to win in politics hasn't been "debating the left" or crying "what if the roles were reversed?!" for some time now. Thats the way to be a principled loser, and be called all sorts of names in the process.
> Thats the way to be a principled loser, and be called all sorts of names in the process.
Your argument is baseless attacks and your victimhood. Is there anything substantive that supports your claims?
For those who don’t know: Under Title IX, in summary, accusers of rape have all rights for their case to be treated by internal boards in the uni, which means no due trial with merits or proof, which is blatantly unconstitutional but the left didn’t care at the time. Oh yeah and not only seizing the girl’s phone as evidence is forbidden too, but even showing the man’s phone with the conversation with the girl, because it would impede on the girl’s privacy. So some poor Lacrosse players got accused, adulthoods were already ruined, the women admitted to lying, and this is the case with probably all accused without due process during the 2013-2025 period.
And Title IX is still enforced.
Prosecutors in every other circumstance wield almost unchecked power - except when the children of the powerful might end up in court. Name another prosecutor treated in this way.
Regardless, it happens all the time everywhere - witholding evidence, fabricated evidence, forced confessions, black site torture, endless harassment, etc. etc. What this DA allegedly did was relatively nothing.
What have these elite institutions contributed to the 1990+ world order?