> The first point seems just wrong.
I will modify that.
> No citations for the majority of it either.
To exactly what you need citations?
I will modify that.
> No citations for the majority of it either.
To exactly what you need citations?
> The so called ‘rootless’ Podman seems to be advertised as being on the same level of isolation as Jails – but only if You run that Podman with properly configured and enabled SELinux/AppArmor solutions.
That ignores user namespacing, the subsequent namespacing for mounts, networks, etc. So I'm confused as to where the it-only-is-secure-with-selinux comes from.
> Then the Jails are better isolated again
How so.
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> Even ‘rootless’ Podman has full access to all Linux kernel syscalls
from https://podman.io/blogs/2019/10/15/generate-seccomp-profiles...
Most container tools use a default seccomp filter which was initially written by Jesse Frazelle for Docker
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> Jails have restricted use of FreeBSD kernel syscalls without any additional tools
Which ones
> You can NOT dedicate any physical interface to the ‘rootless’ Podman container
I'm confused by what you mean "physical" here.
Can also disable networking, which is mentioned for jails for some reason. So is other VPN-like options, not mentioned for Podman.
https://www.procustodibus.com/blog/2022/10/wireguard-in-podm... as an example
> firewall
https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/how-does-nftables-work...
> comparing CVE counts and nothing else
Come on
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This article seems like it would strongly contribute to people misunderstanding things.