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My understanding of the MCP problem space:

- internal: possibly rogue MCPs: as MCPs are opaque to the user and devs don't take the time to look at the source-code , and even then would need to pinpoint each inspected version.

- external: LLM agent poisoning

> There’s no mechanism to say: “this tool hasn’t been tampered with.” And users don’t see the full tool instructions that the agent sees.

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> MCPs are opaque to the user and devs (unless they look at each source-code and pinpoint each inspected version).

This is true, but also generally true of any npm dependency that developers blindly trust.

The main difference with MCP is that it is pitched as a sort of extension mechanism (akin to browser extensions), but without the isolation/sandboxing that browser extensions have, and that even if you do run them in sandboxes there is a risk of prompt injection attacks.

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