https://www.csoonline.com/article/571797/the-apache-log4j-vu...
What was the other package that had the mysterious .?
You say this as if being shamed into patching the occasional vuln is equivalent to security best practices.
Open code which can be independently audited is only a baseline for trustworthy code. A baseline none of those three meet. And one which by itself is insufficient to counter a reflections on trusting trust style attack. For that you need open code, diverse open build toolchains, and reproducible builds. None of which is being done by those three.
Are you getting your ideas about security from the marketing department?
1: https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/03/hackers-can-extract... 2: https://www.wired.com/story/google-android-pixel-showcase-vu... 3: https://blog.morphisec.com/5-ntlm-vulnerabilities-unpatched-...
OSS is not the panacea that everyone touts it to be.
I'm not aware of any major open source projects that haven't experienced some level of auditing. Coverity alone scans everything you're likely to find in a distribution like Debian or Fedora: https://scan.coverity.com/o/oss_success_stories
> How many packages have you audited?
Several on which I depend. And I'm just one pair of eyeballs.
> Personally, I don't have the skillz to do that.
Then why are you commenting about it?
> OSS is not the panacea that everyone touts it to be.
I don't know who's touting it as a panacea, seems like a strawman you've erected. It's a necessary pre-requisite without which best practices aren't possible or verifiable.
https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/30/22410164/linux-kernel-uni...
A non-advertized feature, which is not independently verified, which about image contents? I would be prefer independent verification of their claims.