Apple Photos phones home on iOS 18 and macOS 15
lapcatsoftware.com
lapcatsoftware.com
Trust in software will continue to erode until software stops treating end users and their data and resources (e.g. network connections) as the vendor's own playground. Local on-device data shouldn't be leaking out of radio interfaces unexpectedly, period. There should be a user intent tied to any feature where local data is sent out to the network.
So why didn't Apple just simply ask for user permission to enable this feature? My cynical opinion is because Apple knows some portion of users would instantly disallow this if prompted, but they feel they know better than those users. I don't like this attitude, and I suspect it is the same reason why there is an increasing discontent growing towards opt-out telemetry, too.
Software will continue to spy on people so long as it is not technically prohibited or banned.
I highly suggest everyone else does their darnedest not too either. Don’t do it in your own software. Refuse and push back against it at $dayJob.
I realize that my small contribution as a privacy and data-respecting SWE is extremely small, but if we all push back against the MBAs telling us to do these things, the world will be better off.
Apple iOS provides crash logs via the following navigation path:
Privacy & Security
Analytics Data
AppName-date-time.ips
Notice Apple's choice of top-level menu for crash logs?Normal people don't email support with crash logs, they just grumble about it to their coworkers and don't help fix the problem. You can't fix a problem you don't know about.
And yet we don't have home inspectors coming into our homes unannounced every week just to make sure everything is ok. Why is it that software engineers feel so entitled to do things that no other profession does?
Downloading a torrent isn't the same thing as going to the record store and physically stealing a CD, and regular people can also understand that there's a difference between the invasiveness of a human being entering your house and someone not doing that. So either people can understand torrenting isn't the same as going into a store a physically stealing something and anonymized crash logs aren't the same thing as a home inspector coming into your house, or Napster and torrenters actually owe the millions that the RIAA and MPAA want them to.
I'm not saying that all tracking is unequivocally good, or even okay, some of it is downright bad. But let's not treat people as idiots who can't tell the difference between the digital and physical realm.
To put it in the language of someone who mistakenly thinks you can own information: data about crashes on computers that aren't yours simply doesn't belong to you.
Outside of specifically silicon valley, that level of entitlement is unheard of. Once you put it in human terms what you're asking for, it sounds absolutely outrageous. Because it is - you and I just exist in a bubble.
This can all be avoided and you can have you cake, too. Run the software on your metal. That's what my company does and it's great in many ways. We have a level of introspection into our application execution that other developers can only dream of. Forget logging, we can just debug it.
It’s the prisoner’s dilemma, but one vs many instead of one vs one. So long as someone defects, everyone either defects or goes out of business.
It’s the same as with unethical supply chains. A business using slave labour in their supply chain will out-compete all businesses that don’t. So well-meaning business owners can’t really switch to better supply chains as it is the same as just dissolving their business there and then.
Only universal regulation can fix this. If everyone is forced not to defect, we can win the prisoners dilemma. But so long as even 10% of big tech defects and creates this extremely lucrative business of personal data trade that kills every company not participating, we will continue to participate more and more.
Read Meditations on Moloch for more examples.
It's important to read, and not skim.
This is extracting location based data, not content based data in an image (like searching for all photos with a cup in it).
"Enhanced Visual Search in Photos allows you to search for photos using landmarks or points of interest. Your device privately matches places in your photos to a global index Apple maintains on our servers. "
This feature is intended to spy on the user. Those kinds of features can't be opt-in. (And yeah, holomorophic "privacy preserving" encryption song-and-dance, I read about that when it came out, etc).
> there is an increasing discontent growing towards opt-out telemetry
Really? That's news to me. What I observed is people giving up more and more privacy every year (or "delegating" their privacy to tech giants).
Nowhere in marketing materials or what passes for documentation on iOS we see an explanation of the risks and what it means for one’s identity to be sold off to data brokers. It’s all “our 950 partners to enhance your experience” bs.
No.
The backlash against Microsoft's Windows Recall should serve as a good indicator of just how deeply people have grown to distrust tech companies. But Microsoft can keep turning the screws, and don't you know it, a couple years from now everyone will be running Windows 11 anyways.
It's the same for Android. If you really want your Android phone to be truly private, you can root it and flash a custom ROM with microG and an application firewall. Sounds good! And now you've lost access to banking apps, NFC payments, games, and a myriad of other things, because your device no longer passes SafetyNet checks. You can play a cat-and-mouse game with breaking said checks, but the clock is ticking, as remote attestation will remove what remains of your agency as soon as possible. And all of that for a notably worse experience with less features and more problems.
(Sidenote: I think banking apps requiring SafetyNet passing is the dumbest thing on planet earth. You guys know I can just sign into the website with my mobile browser anyways, right? You aren't winning anything here.)
But most users are never going to do that. Most users will boot into their stock ROM, where data is siphoned by default and you have to agree to more data siphoning to use basic features. Every year, users will continue to give up every last bit of agency and privacy so as long as tech companies are allowed to continue to take it.
I find that the popular apps for basic operation from F-Droid do a very good job of not screwing with the user either. I'm talking about DAVx⁵, Etar, Fossify Gallery, K-9/Thunderbird, AntennaPod etc. No nonsense software that does what I want and nothing more.
I've been running deGoogled Android devices for over a decade now for private use and I've been given Apple devices from work during all those years. I still find find the iOS devices to be a terrible computing experience. There's a feeling of being reduced to a mere consumer.
GrapheneOS is the best mobile OS I've ever tried. If you get a Pixel device, it's dead simple to install via your desktop web browser[1] and has been zero maintenance. Really!
However, how is that supposed to work for your significant other, or your mother, or your indifferent-to-technology friend?
Don't get me wrong, I also strive to keep my device's information private but, at the same time, I realize this has no practical use for most users.
That said. You can order a Pixel with GrapheneOS pre-installed and Google Apps and services can be isolated.
Having said that it doesn't prevent them to check the "enable network" option when installing apps.
The reality is these are no longer mere tools, they are instruments for conducting life. They are a prerequisite to just about any activity, much like driving in the US.
We expect each and every citizen to have an intimate understanding of driving, including nuances, and an understanding of any and all traffic laws. And we expect them to do it in fractions of a second. Because that is the cost of utilizing those instruments to conduct life.
A large amount of work has been put into making Graphene specifically work with banking apps. Mine does, for instance.
GrapheneOS only works on Pixel devices. Pixel devices are fine. We have reached a point where just about every mid-tier device is fine, really. I run my devices until they are FUBAR or can't be updated due to EOL. EOL for Android (and GrapheneOS) is ~7 years from the release date now.
> it locks you out of a ton of apps people rely on such as banking and money transfer apps.
These can be installed and isolated using work or user profiles in GrapheneOS. Also as https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42538853 points out, a lot of work has been put into making Graphene work with banking apps[1].
> You must recognise that it's not a practical solution for most people.
Of course I do. We can act on two levels. We (as a society) can work for regulation and we (computery people) can take direct action by developing and using software and hardware that works in the user's interest. One does not exclude the other.
[1] https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compa...
My budget didn't allow me to buy a brand new one but I could buy a second hand pixel 6a for 200€.
Having said that you can also use an older phone with /e/os or lineageos and avoid apps that tracks you by limiting to android apps without telemetry available on f-droid.
> I think banking apps requiring SafetyNet passing is the dumbest thing on planet earth. You guys know I can just sign into the website with my mobile browser anyways, right?
No, you're not. For logging in, you need a mobile app used as an authentication token. Do not pass go, do not collect $200... (The current state of affairs in Czechia, at least; you still _do_ have the option of not using the app _for now_ in most banks, using password + SMS OTP, but you need to pay for each SMS and there is significant pressure to migrate you from it. The option is probably going to be removed completely in future.)
If people don’t have a choice, then they’re not giving up privacy, like the person you’re agreeing with said, it’s being taken away.
Maybe you need to set an environment variable. Maybe that variable changes. It is pretty exhausting so I can understand people giving up on it.
Is that really giving up on it though? Or are they contorted to it?
If you do anything on the radio without the users explicit consent you are actively user hostile. Blaming the user for not exercising his/her right because they didn't opt out is weird.
It would have been so much easier for them to just send the whole photo as is to a server and process it remotely like Google does.
It's the same way that bills come out to crack people's policy.
Only people don't always know they can demand the opposite so it never gets messed with again, and instead get roped into fatigue of reacting to technology bills written by non-technology people.
Are people giving up their privacy? Looks to me it’s being taken without consent, via enormous legalese and techniques of exhaustion.
Individuals who grew up primarily as consumers of tech, also have consented to a relationship of being consumed, bought, and sold themselves as the product.
Those who grew up primarily as creators with tech, have often experienced the difference.
This creates a really big blind spot potentially.
forced can also mean the whole no privacy by default and dark patterns everywhere.
If you have a smartphone in your pocket, then, for better or worse, you're carrying a location tracker chip on your person because that's how they all work. The cell phone company needs to know where to send/get data, if nothing else.
It seems disingenuous to put a tracker chip in your pocket and be up in arms that someone knows your location.
Unless this kerfuffle is only about Apple.
Aaaaand no.
Even in the case where I’m willing to risk trusting the developer, they have literally zero resources to pen test the software I’ll be running my banking apps on, and in the case of Android roms need to run known vulnerable software (out-of-support source-unavailable binary blobs for proprietary hardware that were never open-sourced).
The same argument was made about TPM’s on PC’s and against Windows 11 for years (that they should just be disabled/sidestepped). It only holds water if you don’t understand the problem the device solves for or have a suitable alternative.
They're the ones allowing you to root your phone or flash a custom ROM in the first place, so that's not a fair characterisation. Banks have a vested interest in reducing fraud, and a rooted Android might allow for easier and additional attack vectors into their apps and thus systems.
The vast majority (>95%) of users does not understand what those pop-ups say, seems fundamentally incapable of reading them, and either always accepts, always rejects, or always clicks the more visually-appealing button.
Try observing a family member who is not in tech and not in the professional managerial class, and ask them what pop-up they just dismissed and why. It's one of the best lessons in the interactions between tech and privacy you can get.
This is everyone, it is universal, I've met many people "in tech" who also click the most "visually appealing" button because they are trying to dismiss everything in their way to get to the action they are trying to complete.
The microcosm that is HN users might not just dismiss things at the 95%+ rate, but that is because we are fed, every day, how our data is being misappropriated ate every level. I think outside of these tiny communities, even people in tech, are just clicking the pretty button and making the dialog go away.
If you do not want it (and that is >90% of people, who never asked for it, never requested it, but was forced upon them these 'enriched' lies and exposure to corporate greed).
By adding that extra step forcing users to be aware of (and optionally decline) the vendors collection of personal data, it adds a disincentive for collecting the data in the first place.
In other words, opt-in can be thought of as a way to encourage vendors to change their behaviour. Consumers who don't see an opt-in will eventually know that the vendor isn't collecting their information compared to others and trust the product more.
I agree that a lot of people don't read, or attempt to understand the UI being presented to them in any meaningful manner. It really is frustrating seeing that happen.
But, think about the "colorful" option you briefly mentioned. Dark patterns have promoted this kind of behaviour from popups. The whole interaction pattern has been forever tainted. You need to present it in another way.
It is definitely true that most users don't know what they're opting out of, they just understand that they have basically nothing to gain anyway, so why opt-in?
But actually, that's totally fine and working as intended. To be fair to the end user, Apple has done something extremely complicated here, and it's going to be extremely hard for anyone except for an expert to understand it. A privacy-conscious user could make the best call by just opting out of any of these features. An everyday user might simply choose to not opt-in because they don't really care about the feature in the first place: I suspect that's the real reason why many people opt-out in the first place, you don't need to understand privacy risks to know you don't give a shit about the feature anyway.
I find that there is a specific niche group of people who care very much about these things. But the rest of the world doesn't. They don't want to care about all these little settings they're just "Oh cool it knows it's the Eiffel tower". The only people who are becoming distrusting of software are a specific niche group of people and I highly suspect they're going to be mad about something.
> So why didn't Apple just simply ask for user permission to enable this feature?
Because most people don't even care to look at the new features for a software update. And let's be serious that includes most of us here otherwise, this feature would have been obvious. So why create a feature that no one will use? It doesn't make sense. So you enable it for everyone and those who don't want it opt-out.
Which is kind of ironic in places like HN, where so many advocate for Chromebooks.
How many people use a web based camera or web based photo album app?
When it’s done default on, I default opt out.
GeoIP is definitely as you say of figuring out the location of an IP.
With photos, geocoding is embedding the gps location in each photo. Those locations are being sent scrubbed but still metadata to Apple.
The more I think of it I’m not sure if it’s useful to me to give that database to Apple for free. If it was presented as it’s being explained in device maybe I’d say cool, yeah.
That’s an interesting question. Something to consider, iOS photos has allowed you to search for photos using the address the photo was taken at. To do that requires the Photos app to take the lat/long of a photos location, and do a reverse-geo lookup to get a human understandable address. Something that pretty much always involves querying a global reverse-geo service.
Do you consider this feature to be a violation of your privacy, requiring an opt-in? If not, then how is a reverse-geo lookup service more private than a landmark lookup service?
But thank you for one more demonstration that even the HN crowd can’t reliably give or deny informed consent here.
I actually couldn't get Photos address search to work right in my testing before writing my previous comment, even with a geotagged photo that I just took. So I'm not sure whether I have some setting disabled that prevents it.
The only match was via character recognition of a printed form that I had photographed.
To be clear, I meant that it was a nonissue for me, because I don't geotag my photos (except in that one test). Whether it's an issue for other people, I don't know.
One of the problems with iPhone lockdown is that it's a lot more difficult to investigate how things work technically than on the Mac.
By saving them from any source other than the camera app you’ve configured to not use geo-tagging.
My Photos library contains camera snapshots and screenshots, nothing else.
For what it’s worth, I’m surprised that you never save photos to your phone that you didn’t take yourself. Do people not send you interesting pictures? Pictures of yourself?
I don't even use Photos app on Mac anymore. They've ruined it compared to the old iPhoto. I just keep my photos in folders in Finder.
I don't personally have a strong feeling for or against this particular feature, since I don't use geotagging at all, so it doesn't affect me. I'm neither endorsing nor condemining it offhand. I'll leave it to other people to argue over whether it's a privacy problem. It could be! I just lack the proper perspective on this specific issue.
The issue is much deeper for anyone who has remotely worked with EXIF data for any creative or professional work they do.
I suppose in some sense it is, as it a reverse-geo lookup service, but it's also no where near to the front in the location privacy war.
Cell phone providers basically know your exact position at all times when you have your phone on you, credit card companies know basically everything, cars track driving directly, etc. etc.
I can see why some people would be up in arms but for me this one doesn't feel like missing the forest for the trees, it feels like missing the forest for the leaves.
But the argument that this specific feature represents some new beachhead in some great war against privacy strikes me as little more that clickbate hyperbole. If Apple really wanted to track people’s locations, it would be trivial for them to do so, without all this cloak and dagger nonsense people seem to come up with. Equally, is a state entity wanted to track your location (or even track people’s locations at scale), there’s a myriad of trivially easy ways for them to do so, without resorting to forcing Apple to spy on their customers via complex computer vision landmark lookup system.
The interesting thing is that Apple has created a cathedral of seemingly objective sexy technical details that feel like security. But since it’s all trust, feelings matter!
So my answer is, if it feels like a privacy violation, it is. Your technical comparison will be more persuasive if you presented it in Computer Modern in a white paper, or if you are an important Substack author or reply guy, or maybe take a cue from the shawarma guy on Valencia Street and do a hunger strike while comparing two ways to get location info.
Apple is building a location database, for free, from user's photos and saying it's anonymized.
It's not a service I want, nor one I authorize. Nor are my photos licensed to Apple to get that information from me.
Encryption is only good relative to computational power to break it available to the many, or the few.
Computational power usually seems always available in 10-20-30 years to generally break encryption for the average person, as unimaginably hard it seems in the present. I don't have interest in taking any technical bait from the conversation at hand. Determined groups with resources could find ways.. This results in no security or encryption.
Where on earth did you get that from? The photos app is sending an 8bit embedding for its lookup query, how are they going to build a location database from that?
Even if they were sending entire photos, how do you imagine someone builds a location database from that? You still need something to figure out what the image is, and if you already have that, why would you need to build it again?
> Encryption is only good relative to computational power to break it available to the many, or the few. > Determined groups with resources could find ways.. This results in no security or encryption.
Tell me, do you sell tin foil hats as a side hustle or something? If this is your view on encryption why are you worried about a silly photos app figuring out what landmarks are in your photos. You basically believe that it’s impossible for digital privacy of any variety is effectively impossible, and that you also believe this is a meaningful threat to “normal” people. The only way to meet your criteria for safe privacy is to ensue all forms of digital communication (which would include Hacker News FYI). So either you’re knowingly making disingenuous hyperbolic arguments, you’re a complete hypocrite, or you like to live “dangerously”.
They’re broadly similar services, both provided by the same entity. Either you trust that entity or you don’t. You can’t simultaneously be happy with an older, less private feature, that can’t be disabled. While simultaneously criticising the same entity for creating a new feature (that carries all the same privacy risks) that’s technically more private, and can be completely disabled.
> The interesting thing is that Apple has created a cathedral of seemingly objective sexy technical details that feel like security. But since it’s all trust, feelings matter!
This is utterly irrelevant, you’re basically making my point for me. As above, either you do or do not trust Apple to provide these services. The implementation is kinda irrelevant. I’m simply asking people to be a little more introspective, and take a little more time to consider their position, before they start yelling from the rooftops that this new feature represents some great privacy deception.
Something to consider - location is geo-encoded already into photos and doesn't need this uploaded to Apple servers. Searching can be done locally on device for location.
Apple goes as far as to offer a setting to allow the user to share photos and remove the geocoding from it.
Offering a new feature is opt-in.
Unfortunately, against my better wishes, this only erodes trust and confidence in Apple that if this is happening visibly, what could be happening that is unknown.
It seems trivially possible to do this in a more privacy preserving way: geocode the search query and filter photos locally.
No idea how Apple implements it though.
Even more dialogs that most users will blindly tap "Allow" to will not fix the problem.
Society has collectively decided (spiritually) that it is ok signing over data access rights to third parties. Adding friction to this punishes 98% of people in service of the 2% who aren't going to use these services anyway.
Sure, a more educated populous might tip the scales. But it's not reality, and the best UX reflects reality.
And if you design software that uses tracking and what not. Go fuck yourself.
The only thing I've found awful is the mindset of the people implementing the banners.
That you feel frustration over that every company has a cookie banner, is exactly the goal. The companies could decide that it isn't worth frustrating the user over something trivial like website analytics, as they could get that without having to show a cookie banner at all.
But no, they want all the data, even though they most likely don't use all of it, and therefore are forced to show the cookie banner.
Then you as a user see that banner, and instead of thinking "What a shitty company that don't even do the minimal work to not having to show me the cookie banner", you end up thinking "What a bad law forcing the company to inform me about what they do with my data". Sounds so backwards, but you're not the first with this sentiment, so the PR departments of the companies seems like they've succeed in re-pointing the blame...
Once that happens, the "originals" will feel the pressure.
But even so, I'd argue that since it's a small business, you'd do much better with qualitative data rather than quantitative, since it's a small business it's hard to make choices based on small amount of data. Instead, conduct user experience studies with real people, and you'll get a ton of valuable data.
All without cookie banners :)
This is why half the web has cookie-consent banners. No amount of developers who know the details screaming up the ladder will fix this. The emergent behavior put in place by the legal profession and corporate politics favors the SAAS companies that sell GDPR cookie banner products and libraries. Even if they're in the right, there is a greater-than-zero percent chance that if they do the wrong thing they'll go to court or be forced to defend themselves. And even then if it's successful, the lawyers still need to be paid, and the company will look at "that fucking moron Joe from the website department" which caused all their hassles and countless hours of productivity as a result of being a "smart ass".
> This is why half the web has cookie-consent banners
Agree, but we as developers can have an impact in this, especially in smaller companies. I've managed to "bark up the ladder" sufficiently to prevent people from mindlessly adding those popups before, and I'm sure others have too.
But those companies have all been companies where user experience is pretty high up on the priority ladder, so it's been easy cases to make.
It’s that simple. That’s the situation with CCPA. Not sure the exact form that GDPR penalties take because I’m not European. But it’s not a complicated issue. you have to display some stupid consent thing if you’re going to have the code that you’re required to have in order to buy ads which take people to your website.
Note that plenty of these cookie banner products don’t actually work right, because they’re quite tricky to configure correctly, as they’re attempting to solve a problem within the webpage sandbox that should be solved in the browser settings (and could easily be solved there even today by setting it to discard cookies at close of browser). However, the legal assistants or interns at the law firm pick their victims based on who isn’t showing an obvious consent screen. When they see one, it’s likely that they will move onto the next victim because it’s much easier to prove violation of the law if they didn’t even bother to put up a cookie banner. A cookie banner that doesn’t work correctly is pretty easy to claim as a mistake.
Nope, that's not how it works. But your whole comment is a great showcase about how these myths continue to persist, even though the whole internet is out there filled with knowledge you could slurp up at a moments notice.
or union workers strike against Imaginary Mail Service Corp. because they are being killed on the job, and people (consumers) get angry at the workers because their package wont show up on time (or the railways arent running, etc...) instead of getting mad at the company inflicting that damage on other people...
or when [imaginary country] puts sanctions on [other poorer country] the people of that country blame the government in power instead of the people directly inflicting harm on them.
I'm not sure why this is the case, but we have been conditioned to be resistant to the inconvenience and not the direct cause. Maybe its because the direct cause tends to be a faceless, nameless entity that directly benefits from not being the target of ire.
This is partially due to the fact that Google Analytics is free and the default for most website/app builders. But, still, it's ridiculous.
Web sites could legally use cookies for non-tracking purposes without cookie banners but considering people have not stopped visiting sites despite the fugly click-through cookie banners makes them a failure.
All it takes is for 50% of the internet users to stop visiting web sites with them, and web site authors will stop tracking users with external cookies.
You've written that like it's a plausible and likely scenario.
“The Internet” to someone boycotting cookie banners would basically just be a few self-hosted blogs.
The law has turned out to be useless, agreed — or at least, it has driven hard-to-navigate UX that we live through today. The intent could have taken us in a different direction with some care (i.e. mandating a clear, no-dark-pattern opt-out/opt-in ahead-of-time option a la DoNotTrack header that similarly failed): if web clients (browsers) were required to pass visitor's preferences and if the list of shared-with was mandated to be machine readable with an exact format (so browsers would create nice UIs), maybe we'd get somewhere.
Whoever came up with an idea to attach CSAM scanning provision to it is an evil genius, what an incredible way to make sure it's not going to pass any time soon.
Simply select the sites whose first party cookies you want preserved, triggered only by user actively toggling it on, or prompted for on a user-triggered POST that occurs on a page with a user-filled password field (similar to how popups were killed off, no prompting on a POST done without user interaction). "Do you want to let this site 'ycombinator.com' remember you (stay logged in, etc.)?" [YES] [NO]
Otherwise delete the cookies in X minutes/hours/etc.
Or another way, keep the cookies while a tab is on the site, then once no tabs are visiting it, put them in an 'archive.' Upon visiting the site again, show a prompt "Allow ycombinator.com to recognize you from your previous visit(s)?" <Yes> <No, be anonymous> If yes, restore them, otherwise, delete them.
It is so simple to have browsers be responsible for the user's safety, yet since we left it to politicians to decide, we got all this silliness putting it on the users -- and where the technical implementations are by necessity INSIDE the JS sandbox where it's difficult for users to verify that it's being done correctly.
- Nearly all websites people use day-to-day are commercial
- To run ads in a post-1997 world, you must have a conversion pixel because ads aren't sold by impression, they're sold by clicks and they need to know someone made it to your site
- Therefore, some form of tracking cookies (oooh evil) are required
- Big Tech (Google/Meta/X) controls 99% of the real estate where ads can be run, so... they will know about visitors
Unless browsers simply had a setting by default to only save cookies past one session when users allow it. That would be a wildly more effective and efficient solution than forcing every single random website to implement some byzantine javascript monstrosity which attempts to somehow inhibit other JS it doesn't actually control from dropping cookies -- something that the JS API in a browser doesn't even support.
I work on a product that doesn't even have any ad traffic land on it or want to do any tracking, and setting up a cookie management platform was insane. You have to dive into the docs of every SDK to try to figure out how this particular SDK can be signaled to do the GDPR compliance things.
(If it was likely, it would have already happened)
[0]: https://medium.com/incerto/the-most-intolerant-wins-the-dict...
How would the content creators or news sites earn then? Web is built on ads, and ads are built on tracking as untargeted ads pays significantly lower than targeted.
“Creators” seem to do just fine with the patronage model.
> ads are built on tracking as untargeted ads pays [sic] significantly lower than targeted.
Not my problem. I am not required to prop up your failed business model.
On desktop and Firefox app, I only browse through private browsing so cookies are mostly irrelevant as session ends as soon as all windows close.
I'd bet if you ask people "do you care about privacy?" Close to 100% would say yes.
If you ask "you have to give up privacy to be able to log in to your email automatically. Are you ok with that?" Close to 100% would say yes.
If you ask "we will give you this email service for free but in exchange we get to squeeze every ounce of juice that we can out of it to persuade you to buy things you don't need. Are you ok with that?" Close to 100% would say yes.
It doesn't matter what people say they care about. Their actions say otherwise, if the privacy-friendly option is in any way less convenient.
(The "I don't care about cookies" extension is similarly effective, but since I'm already running u-block origin, it makes more sense to me to enable it's filter.)
Word of caution though, that might silently break some websites. I've lost count of the times some HTTP request silently failed because you weren't meant to be able to get some part of the website, without first rejecting/accepting the 3rd party cookies.
Usually, disabling uBlock, rejecting/accepting the cookies and then enabling it again solves the problem. But the first time it happened, it kind of caught me by surprise, because why in holy hell would you validate those somehow?!
'Nothing is essential until you prove it is' - apply to the cookie ombudsman for €1k to make your case for allowance.
You complete a detailed form including giving your company registration and the reason for use of each cookie. You list each company with access.
You pay into escrow €10 per user per company (eg 10 users, sending data to 1200 companies; 120000€) you wish to gather/keep data on, providing that users details and an annual fee.
Any non trivial infringement and you get DNS blocklisted, the escrow money is paid out, CEO of the registered company is fined one years income (max of last 4 years) and legal proceedings are started against the company and its executives.
On application to the cookie ombudsman I can see all companies who legally have access to my data (and via which gateway company), I can withdraw access, they can withdraw service.
This would have the added benefit of being configurable and work on a bunch of apps instead of just one at a time too
Operating system level controls, though, provide a single control plane. One can very easily imagine OS-level toggles per application of:
[No Internet, No Internet outside your own app-sandbox, Ask me every time, Everything is allowed].
No opt in from apps required -- they might break if the network is disabled, but the user is still in control of their data.
Users had a global way to signal “do not track me” in their browser. I don’t know why regulators didn’t mandate respecting that instead of cookie consent popups.
Apple IDs could easily have global settings about what you are comfortable with, and then have their apps respect them.
There's little to no conscious choice in this. But there is a lot of money in this. Like... a LOT of money. If I were to try to influence society to be okay with it, it would be a no brainer.
So, to me, it's obvious that society has been brainwashed and propagandized to accept it. But doing so generates hundreds of billions if not trillions of dollars. How, exactly, such manipulation is done is unknown to me. Probably meticulously, over the course of decades if not centuries. I know that the concept of privacy during the writing of the constitution was much, much more stringent than it was in the 70s, which is much more stringent than it is today.
But, I am very confident it is happening.
Trust in closed-source proprietary software. In other words: trust in corporate entities. Trust in open-source software is going strong.
Try disabling the motd stuff - it's quite pernicious by design.
And removing the ubuntu-advantage package disables the desktop. lol.
I too want exactly that, which got me thinking, that's what firewalls are for! DROP OUTBOUND by default, explicit allow per-app.
On Andoid, iptables-based firewalls require root, which wasn't a good option for me (no twrp support for my device), so after some searching I stumbled upon NetGuard - open source and rootless, implements a firewall using Android's VPN service (you can configure Android to route all traffic through this "VPN" which is actually a local firewall). The downside is you can't use an actual VPN (except with some complicated setup involving work profiles and other apps). I've been using it for a couple of weeks and am very satisfied, I noticed apps phoning home which I did not want to, like a scanning app I had used to scan private documents in the past, perhaps an oversight on my part.
I want this too, but when even the two most popular base OSes don't adhere to this, I feel like it's an impossible uphill battle to want the software running on those platforms to behave like that.
"Local-first" just isn't in their vocabulary or best-interest, considering the environment they act in today, sadly.
Needless to say, if an Apple employee wanted to stalk someone (say an abusive partner, creep, whatever), the fact that this stuff phones home means that the employee can deduce where they are located. I've heard stories from the early days of Facebook about employees reading partner's Facebook messages, back before they took that kind of stuff seriously.
People work at these places, and not all people are good.
I doubt Apple employees could deduce location from the uploaded data. Having worked at FB I know that doing something like that would very quickly get you fired post 2016
[1] https://www.koffellaw.com/blog/google-ai-technology-flags-da...
And I've been in situations where I noticed a box was checked that I'm sure I didn't check. I want to turn these things off and throw away the key. But of course the vendor will never allow me to. Therefore I use Linux.
I hate to break it to you, but these things happen in Linux, too.
It's not the operating system that's the problem. It's that the tech industry has normalized greed.
The reason why this is the case is because while the tech industry is rotten, the Linux desktop isn't really directly owned by a tech industry company. There are a few tech companies that work on Linux desktop things, but most of them only work on it as a compliment to other things they do.
Distributions may even take it upon themselves to "fix" applications that have unwanted features. Debian is infamous for disabling the KeepassXC networking features, like fetching favicons and the browser integration, features a lot of users actually did want.
Meaning, between the big vendors making the OS, and state-level actors making hardware, I wouldn’t necessarily trust Wireshark on machine A to provide the full picture of traffic from machine A. We might see this already with servers running out-of-band management like iDRAC (which is a perfectly fine, non-malicious use case) but you could imagine the same thing where the NIC firmware is phoning home, completely outside the visibility of the OS.
Of course, it’s not hard to capture traffic externally, but the challenge here would be correlating that external traffic with internal host monitoring data to determine which apps are the culprit.
Still, if you were extra paranoid, it wouldn't be unreasonable or even difficult to check from an external vantage point.
> Are there any tools that enable capturing traffic from outside the OS you’re monitoring, that still allow for process-level monitoring?
Doing both of these things at once would be hard, though. You can't really trust the per-process tagging because that processing has to be done on the machine itself. I think it isn't entirely implausible (at the very least, you could probably devise a scheme to split the traffic for specific apps into different VLANs. For Linux I would try to do this using netns.)
This is a “look at me, Apple bad” story that harvests attention. It sets the premise that this is an unknown and undocumented process, then proceeds to explain it from Apple documentation and published papers.
I'm just not sure why Apple needed to activate this by default, other than not draw attention to it... and doing so that was more important than the user's rights to the privacy they believe they are purchasing on their device.
I don't care what convenience i'm being offered or sold. If the user has decided what they want and the premium they are paying for Apple, it must be respected.
This makes me wonder if there is an app that can monitor all settings in an iPhone both for changes between updates, and also new features being set by default to be enabled that compromise the user's known wishes.
All this AI, and this is still overlooked.
I'm hoping it was an oversight.
Personally I do not believe these popups serve any purpose, because I ultimately cannot (at least in a reasonable way) prove that the website is acting in good faith. Asking me whether the app should phone home doesn't really guarantee me pressing "no" will actually prevent the tracking.
I am continuously surprised at how we convince ourselves privacy at scale will work with a varying amount of yes/no buttons. There are 2 ways to trust software 1. be naive and check whether "privacy first" is written somewhere 2. understand the software you are running, down to the instructions it is able to execute.
The permission popups also lack granularity. When giving access to my contact list, which contacts does it actually access? Can I only give access to contacts name and not phone numbers? Is it for offline or online processing? If online, should we have another popup for internet access? But then, can I filter what kind of internet stuff it does? You go down the rabbit hole and eventually end up with a turing-complete permission system, and if you don't, your "privacy" will have some hole to it.
This is just too much of a coincidence. I know, I know, this "... isn't Apple's fault" blah blah. Bullshit it's not. They can't have it both ways where they say their app store process is great and then they allow this shit.
It exists. I use such software everyday. For example, I am submitting this comment using a text-only browser that does not auto-load resources.
But this type of smaller, simpler software is not popular.
For example, everyone commenting in this thread is likely using a browser that auto-loads resources to submit their comments. HN is more or less a text-only website and this "feature" is not technically necessary for submitting comments. All so-called "modern" web browsers send requests to the internet without explicit intent first. IN addition to auto-loading resources, these browsers automatically run Javascript which often sends further requests never intended by the web user.
Brand new Apple computers now send packets to the internet as soon as the owner plugs them in for the first time. This may enable tracking and/or data collection. Apple proponents would likely argue "convenience" is the goal. This might be true. But the goal is not the issue. The issue is how much the computer owner is allowed to control the computer they buy. Some owners might prefer that the computer should not automatically send packets to remote Apple servers. Often it is not even possible to disable this behaviour. Computer purchasers never asked for these "convenenience" features. Like the subject of this submission, Apple Photos, these are Apple's decisions. The computer owner is not allowed to make decisions about whether to enable or disable "convenience" features.
As the court acknowledged in its opinion in US v Google, default settings are significant. In this case, it is more than a default setting. It is something the owner cannot change.
And for how cheap and trivial syncing photos is, any mandatory or exclusive integration of services between app/platform/device vendors needs to be scrutinized heavily by the FTC.
* Bulletproof
* Privacy Conscious
* Normal (recommended)
That way users are roughly opting in and opting out in a way that aligns with their desires
Opt-in makes the data useless - not just in terms of the huge drop in quantity but because of the fact it introduces a huge bias in the data selected - the people that would opt-in are probably not a good sample of "typical users".
Opt-out - no matter what safeguards or assurances I could provide is unacceptable to a subset of users and they will forcefully communicate this to you.
Don't get me wrong - I understand both the ease at which bad actors abuse telemetry and the ease in which "anonymous data" can prove to be nothing of the kind in a multitude of surprising ways.
But it's hard not to feel a little sad in a "this is why we can't have nice things" kind of way.
Not sure what bias it adds
Like
"hey, we make this app, and we care about privacy, here is the information we have gathered over your usage for the past month, can we send this to ourselves, so that we can use it to improve the app?"
And then show human readable form of what data was collected.
It’s very easy to confuse ‘loud protest from a small minority’ and the majority opinion. If a plurality of users chose to participate in an analytics program when asked and don’t care to protest phone-home activities when they’re discovered, then that’s where the majority opinion likely lies.
You could unbias the data by including the metric determining how long did it took them to click "Ok" and whether they actually reviewed the data before agreeing.
Seems to me like a great implementation.
I have an incentive to see if the Linux desktop share has increased, so I usually run the survey for them to get my data point in. I also suppose the "gamer" crowed likes to show off how powerful their "rig" is, so I would imagine they commonly also run the survey for that reason as well.
I provide telemetry data to KDE, because they default to collecting none, and KDE is an open-source and transparent project that I'd like to help if I can. If I used your app, I would be likely to click yes, since it's open-source. Part of the problem I have with projects collecting user data is the dark patterns used or the illegal opt-out mechanism, which will make me decline sending telemetry every time, or even make me ditch it for an alternative. An app that asks:
Can we collect some anonymized data in order to improve the app?
[Yes] [No]
...with equal weight given to both options, is much more likely to have me click Yes if none of the buttons are big and blue whilst the other choice is in a smaller font and "tucked away" underneath the other (or worse, in a corner or hidden behind a sub-menu).Plus, I would think that SOME data would be better than NO data, even if there's an inherent bias leaning towards privacy-minded/power users.
The GDPR only applies to personal data. You can collect things like performance data without opt-in (or even an opt-out option) as long as you are careful to not collect any data that can be used to identify an individual, so no unique device IDs or anything like that. Of course, you should be transparent about what you collect. You also have to be careful about combinations of data points that may be innocuous on their own but can be used to identify a person when combined with other data points.
1) Opt-in, Opt-survey, Opt-out is the only ternary to build trust. Survey is an active validator of trust and assists in low-bandwith communication. Question should be presented to the end user the first time using it or the next time the application starts and this feature was added.
2) Provide the exact analytical information you want to the end user so they can parse it too. The means to self-evaluate allowed information to be shared with providing the reports or views improves trust.
3) Known privilege to trust leads to more consent. Having priority support with features and bugs could be aligned with those that Opt-in. Analytical history / performance may assisting in solving the recent bug that was reporter.
Apple, Microsoft, Google, and all apply ambiguity to their analytical sharing without details, not how they use it and can abuse it. Most don't even provide an Opt-out. I don't trust these organizations but I must engage with them through my life. I don't have to use Facebook or Twitter and don't. I accept the Steam survey.
RFC with an agreed upon analytical standard could be step to solving the latch of analytical information the open source community would benefit from. Both parties consenting to agreed upon communication.
*My Point of View; meta data is still personal data. Without the user the data and the meta data would not existing. Since the end user is the entropy to meta data they own the meta and the data.
The only way I see moving forward would be community driven effort to build the trust through said means and or other ideas. This not an easy problem to solve and would take time.
*Even the USA agencies like the CDC and FBI must utilize bias data for the decision making since not all states and organizations self-report.
That was probably the best system I'd seen, but I can't remember what site it was.
they did away with that.
Why? I don't think that's obvious. It may also be related to the way the opt-in is presented. In general, I would expect this to be a workable solution. Even if the opt-in group deviates from the "typical user", it's the best data you can get in an honest and ethically sound way. This should certainly be better than no data at all?
For any website/app that presents an opt-in cookie consent banner this is implicitly already the case.
Hardly. It just has some issues with regards to what you also pointed out, bias for one. But it still provides valuable insight into usage patterns, systemic issues, and enables tracking effects of developments over time. Correcting the bias is not a bigger task than it is now - I'm sure you already have an idea about feedback to different features according to reviews, user reports, discussions, and so on. Opt-in is the same, just much better.
> the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device.
> It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations. [...] By enabling the "feature" without asking, Apple disrespects users and their preferences. I never wanted my iPhone to phone home to Apple.
Regardless of how obfuscated or "secure" or otherwise "privacy-protecting" the feature is, the fact is that some information derived from one's personal content is transmitted, without prior consent. Even if the information is protected, all network queries are information. A timestamp that proves you took a certain action at a certain time (like taking a photo, assuming stuff is sent to this service immediately upon adding a new photo), from a certain location (by correlating your location information at that time), etc etc.. and that's just the tip of the iceberg. Transmitting information from a user's device without their explicit consent is a violation of their privacy.
For ex: I sent a friend a photo of my puppy in the bathtub and her Airpods (via iphone) announced "(name) sent you a photo of a dog in a bathtub". She thought it was really cool and so do I personally. That's a useful feature. IDK how much that requires going off-device though.
For comparison Hunyuan video encodes a shit-ton of videos and rudimentary real world physics understanding, at very high quality in only 13B parameters. LLAMA 3.3 encodes a good chunk of all the knowledge available to humanity in only 70B parameters. And this is only considering open source models, the closed source one may be even more efficient.
I’m really curious how this feature is considered useful. It’s cool, but can’t you just open the photo to view it?
There is a large number of people out there who receive hundreds of notifications (willingly but mostly unwillingly) daily from apps they have installed (not just messengers), and nearly all of them can't cope with the flood of the notifications. Most give up on tending to the notifications altogether, but some resort to the notification summaries which alleviate the cognitive overload («oh, it is a picture of a dog that I will check out when I get a chance to, and not a pic of significant other who got themselves into a car accident»).
The solution is, of course, to not allow all random apps to spam the user with the notifications, but that is not how laypeople use their phones.
Even the more legit apps (e.g. IG) dump complete garbage upon unsuspecting users throughout the day («we thought you would love this piece of trash because somebody paid us»).
You can disable IG trash notifications, for example.
Most people using the device will never go into the notification settings, if an app on install tells you they need notifications to tell you about your driver arriving…and then sends you marketing notifications on the same channel most people will just accept that.
Frankly, hundreds of daily notifications is the reality we can't change, and the question is: why do people choose to succumb to the misery of it rather than availing themselves of the proper implements so readily at their disposal?
So you jumped to a conclusion based on an incorrect premise. This is easy to see that this does not happen immediately after taking a photo. One the network traffic will show this (and it won’t), two homomorphic encryption is expensive so it cannot. Photos classically doesn’t sync on demand, as most iPhone users will know by way if it telling you this in the photos app when it does sync. Most expensive operations are queued up for when the device is plugged in (and on WiFi) because it’ll otherwise drain battery.
I could see an argument in the metadata (though there are multiple assumptions involved there, not least that they don't truly do OHTTP but instead conspire to learn at what timestamp a user took a picture), but if you already don't trust in what is essentially math, I'm not sure where the uncertainty and doubt ends
Here, Apple does that for you.
Everybody knows that there is a network infrastructure where your content flows through. You willingly accept that as a connected device user because it is necessary to be connected.
What Apple did is not necessary and users don't know about it.
I do want to point out that Apple doesn’t get to see your photo. Homomorphic encryption is really cool in that way. Apple isn’t able to decrypt the photo and the results they produce are also encrypted. That’s the beauty of homomorphic encryption. I can send you an encrypted spreadsheet and you can compute the sum of a column for me. I’m the only one who can see the actual sum since you can only see the encrypted sum.
1) iOS creates additional fake queries, and all queries pass through scheduler that ensures you can use time-of-lookup to either discriminate real queries from fake queries, or identify when a photo was taken.
2) All queries are performed anonymously, with the use of a third party relaying service. So there’s no way for Apple to tie a specific query back to a specific device, or even IP address.
Between those two mitigating features. Getting hold of an individuals personal data using this feature requires you to first compromise the targets phone, to disable the fake queries. Then compromise the relaying party to correlate queries back to a specific IP address.
If you can manage all that, then quite frankly you’re a fool for expending all that effort. When you could just use your iOS compromise to have the device send you its location data directly. No need to faff about waiting for your target to take photos, then track multiple landmark lookups, carefully collecting a few bits of additional data per query, until you finally have enough to identify the location of your target or targets.
The whole thing reminds me of XKCD 538.
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
[1] https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...
> The server identifies the relevant shard based on the index in the client query and uses HE to compute the embedding similarity in this encrypted space. The encrypted scores and set of corresponding metadata (such as landmark names) for candidate landmarks are then returned to the client.
Even with the server supposedly not knowing the identity of the client, the response could simply include extra metadata like some flag that then triggers an instant send of that photo to Apple's (or law enforcement's) servers unencrypted. Who knows?
[0] https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry..., during the period of generating
The entire point of homomorphic encryption is that it doesn't.
The homomorphic encrypted Wikipedia lookup example is pretty neat.
This one?
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
I find that description perfectly clear for someone who doesn't already know what homomorphic encryption means:
> One of the key technologies we use to do this is homomorphic encryption (HE), a form of cryptography that enables computation on encrypted data (see Figure 1). HE is designed so that a client device encrypts a query before sending it to a server, and the server operates on the encrypted query and generates an encrypted response, which the client then decrypts. The server does not decrypt the original request or even have access to the decryption key, so HE is designed to keep the client query private throughout the process.
Later:
> HE excels in settings where a client needs to look up information on a server while keeping the lookup computation encrypted.
And there's more perfectly layman-understandable in PIR and PNSS sections, complete with real-life examples and simple diagrams.
One just has to read the goddamn thing, which apparently is an insurmountably tall order these days for content that is more than 250 characters.
As an aside, your unfounded derision about "RTFA" is unwarranted and unnecessary. That was an unusually-hostile response for like, just talking about things.
caveat: this is not rigorous math, just a rough presentation for one to wrap their head around the keystone principles of it
Say you have a space like natural numbers N and a computation function f: N->R. I'm just using R - as in result - so that it's not confusing below:
Take a n in N, f(n) = r, r in R
That's nice, we compute something, but the "computation place" is going to know both n and r.
Now imagine you have an encryption function g that maps every n in N to another integer. I'll just mark encrypted things with ' e.g the encrypted space is N' for easier trackability, so g: N->N' is encryption and its inverse g': N'->N is decryption.
So take a n in N, g(n) = n' in N', and g'(n') = n back again.
N N'
n --- g ---> n'
n <-- g' --- n'
That's basic encryption.Now back to making f useful: the idea is to have an encryption scheme that allows performing a certain set of operations on the encrypted space and get an encrypted result that results in an identical result once decrypted. From these operations we can have a f' function so that:
for all n in N, f(n) = g'(f'(g(n)))
Visually:
N N' R' R
n --- f --> n' --- g' --> r' --- f' --> r
The whole point is that cheap f and f' happen locally and intensive g' can happen in untrusted places, because all that is seen is an encrypted input n' and encrypted result r'. Only thing it can see is at best that there's A match but not what THE match is, because that all just looks like random numbers; even the no-match case could very well be encrypted and in that case it doesn't even see that.That is the principle of "homomorphic encryption", and it carries the intrinsic property of the computation place not knowing a single thing about neither the input or the output.
> It doesn't actually explain how the server can tell me the Eiffel Tower is in my photo without knowing it's telling me that.
So it depends on what you mean by "explain how":
- "homomorphic encryption" is the high level answer, described and provided in the Apple article
- if that is not a sufficiently detailed answer then you gotta roll your sleeves up and dive much deeper: the swift-homomorphic-encryption implementation, the BFV paper, the Wally paper, and the other bits that help prevent accidental side channel leaking are all both superficially discussed in a synthetic way and deep-linked in the Apple article in "would you like to know more" fashion.
Or maybe you wanted to know how they performed the actual match (g') in the encrypted space?
> With PNNS, the client encrypts a vector embedding and sends the resulting ciphertext as a query to the server. The server performs HE computation to conduct a nearest neighbor search and sends the resulting encrypted values back to the requesting device, which decrypts to learn the nearest neighbor to its query embedding
Which is possible because they
> have implemented the Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) HE scheme, which supports homomorphic operations that are well suited for computation (such as dot products or cosine similarity) on embedding vectors that are common to ML workflows.
My apologies for the harsh words, they were not meant as an ad hominem, more like a general ranty reflection on the state of the web society.
The entire concept of a homomorphic encryption system is a land mine outside of obscure academic discussions. In practice systems marketed to the public as “homomorphic encryption” will result in user data exfil mark my words.
in that case it's the source of common key of "the same account" becomes the threat
and now you have to trust... megacorporation with closed-garden ecosystem... to not access its own servers in your place?
I don't think the feature works perfectly fine on single device. You take a ton of pictures on your iPhone. You search your photos for "Eiffel tower" and it shows you the photos you took of the Eiffel tower. I don't see why you need multiple devices.
They literally own the code to iOS. If they wanted to covertly track their customers, they could just have their devices phone home with whatever data they wanted to collect. Realistically there would be no way to know if this was actually happening, because modern devices emit so much encrypted data anyway, it wouldn’t be hard to hide some nefarious in all the noise.
Time Cook isn’t some Bond villain, sitting in a giant chair, stroking a white cat, plotting to take over the world by lulling everyone into a false sense of privacy (I mean Zuckerburg already did that). Apple is just a large giant corporation that wants to make money, and is pretty damn open about that fact. They clearly think that they can make more money by doubling down on more privacy, but that doesn’t work if you don’t actually provide the privacy, because ultimately, people are really crap at keeping secrets, especially when a media group would happily pay for a story, even at Apple.
Whether such fingerprinting can reliably be limited to public "landmarks" is an interesting question, dependent on unclear implementation details.
Even if the user-visible search is limited to 'landmarks', does the process pre-create (even if only on-device) fingerprints of many other things as well? If so, it suddenly becomes possible for briefly-active non-persistent malware to instantly find images of interest without the wider access & additional processing it'd otherwise take.
is it even that?
I don't see the benefit of this whatsoever
But not beneficial enough to make up for the loss of privacy, so I've disabled it without finding out how useful or not the functionality is.
It is obvious they are monetizing this feature somehow. Could be as innocuous as them training their AI dataset, or feeding into their growing ad business (locations and other things identified in the photos), or collaboration with law enforcement for various purposes (such as notifying the CCP about people's Winnie-the-Pooh memes), or a lot more ominous things.
Erm, you’re aware of the whole Apple intelligence thing right? An entire product that costs Apple money, provided at “no cost” to the user (if you had an iPhone 15). Also every feature in an OS update has a costs associated with it, and iOS updates have cost money for the best part of a decade now.
Has it occurred to you that reason Apple includes new features in their updates is to provide customers with more reasons to buy more iPhones? Just because feature are provided at “no cost” at point of consumption, doesn’t mean Apple won’t make money in the long run, and selling user data isn’t the only way to monetise these features. Companies have been giving out “freebies” for centuries before the internet existed, and the possibility of large scale data collection and trading was even imaginable.
CSAM scanning takes place on the cloud with all the major players. It only has hashes for the worst of the worst stuff out there.
What Apple (and others do) is allow the file to be scanned unencrypted on the server.
What the feature Apple wanted to add was scan the files on the device and flag anything that gets a match.
That file in question would be able to be decrypted on the server and checked by a human. For everything else it was encrypted in a way it cannot be looked at.
If you had icloud disabled it could do nothing.
The intent was to protect data, children and reduce the amount of processing done on the server end to analyse everything.
Everyone lost their mind yet it was clearly laid out in the papers Apple released on it.
Even so a human is in the loop to review what got a hit. Which is exactly currently happens now.
Until someone finds a successful collision attack.
> Even so a human is in the loop to review what got a hit.
Until shareholder/growth pressure causes them to replace that human with an AI.
Indeed, and within hours of the hash function being made available to me I developed a second preimage attack (strictly stronger than a collision attack)... allowing me to modify images in a visually non-objectionable way to match an arbitrary hash value.
> Until shareholder/growth pressure causes them to replace that human with an AI.
Indeed, but more than that:
The "human" is still a dire privacy loss. Perhaps Apple's review might have protected you from some erroneous reports to law enforcement, but does it protect you from an apple-employed stalker ex? does it protect you from paparazzi? Does it protect you from the double thinking ("do I photograph my kids playing in the sprinklers? do I take a nude photo of my spouse?") due knowing that your private activity is being watched?
One could easily argue that some AI second level review is an "improvement", which is another reason why your assumption that even that backstop would eventually be removed is a reasonable one.
The only way to get a successful collision attack is to have a picture/video that is stored in that hash database.
To put it in perspective. You randomly picking the same atom twice in the observable universe has a higher chance than getting a mismatch.
> Until shareholder/growth pressure causes them to replace that human with an AI.
How do you think it will impact shareholders to know that the company is not actively scanning for illegal content.
Also it's Interpol/FBI that get involved.
The 'chance' is 100% -- collisions and even arbitrary second preimages have been constructed.
> The hashes are for some of the worst content out there, its not trying to detect anything else.
You don't know that because apple developed powerful new cryptographic techniques to protect themselves and their data providers from accountability.
The chance of a mismatch is 8.63616855509e-78%
If the hash was an atom then you would have to guess which atom in the observable universe it is. That is how likely a collision will happen.
[1] https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/10/1/tyad020/... see the girl/dog image on page 12 for one of my examples in the academic literature.
If they were to add this anti-CSAM feature, it is not unreasonable to think that Apple would be forced to add non-CSAM stuff to the database in these countries, e.g. anything against a local dictatorship/ etc. Adding the feature would only catch the low hanging CSAM fruit, at the cost of great privacy and probably human life. If it was going to stop CSAM once and for all, it could possibly be justified, but that's not the case.
Apples suggestion would have meant your data would be more protected as even they would not have been able to unencrypt your data.
I know someone whose MS account was permabanned because they had photos of their own kid in the bathtub. I mean, I guess the person could have been lying, but I doubt they would even have been talking about it if the truth was less innocuous.
What Apple wanted to do is do those operations using homomorphic encryption and threshold key release so that the data was checked while still encrypted, and only after having a certain number of high likelihood matches would the possibility exist to see the encrypted data.
So the optimistic perspective was that it was a solid win against the current state of the industry (cloud accounts storing information unencrypted so that CSAM products can analyze data), while the pessimistic perspective was that your phone was now acting as a snitch on your behavior (slippery slope etc.)
Do you have a citation for that as well? I linked you what CSAM is. Where are you getting your information from?
The actual auditing doesn't happen until the file hits the cloud though. Which is what happens now.
Thanks for some voice of reason. I'm still amazed at how many are still upset about this but clearly never actually read the paper on it.
It is actually detailed in Apples paper. Also:
https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Crimes-against-children/I...
It works by generating a hash on known materials. Those hashes are shared with other companies so they can find that material without having to see the horrific stuff. The chance of a hash collision was also detailed in the paper which is so low to be non-existent. Even if a clash occurs a human still reviews the materials, and it normally needs a couple of hits to trigger an audit (again according to apples paper on it).
> I know someone whose MS account was permabanned because they had photos of their own kid in the bathtub
So you ask me for a citation and then give me anecdotal evidence?
Even if that happened it has nothing to do with CSAM.
And people working with CSAM and databases of CSAM have said it was a very bad idea.
The best one I remember is this one: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-On...
> As the latest news suggests the opposite.
What news?
The only thing I see that is wrong in what they claimed is this:
> The problem is that you don't know which pictures will be sent to Apple.
Apple said in their paper that they don't send anything that is flagged. When the cloud sync occurs the files that are flagged get reviewed. All other files remain encrypted.
> What news?
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/technology/apple-child-se...
--- start quote ---
If you sort NCMEC's list of reporting providers by the number of submissions in 2020, then I come in at #40 out of 168. For 2019, I'm #31 out of 148
I repeatedly begged NCMEC for a hash set so I could try to automate detection. Eventually (about a year later) they provided me with about 20,000 MD5 hashes that match known CP. In addition, I had about 3 million SHA1 and MD5 hashes from other law enforcement sources.
--- end quote ---
Somehow this isn't "working with CSAM or CSAM databases", oh well.
> Apple said in their paper that they don't send anything that is flagged.
This is literally addressed in the article you pretend you read.
> https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/technology/apple-child-se...
I don't have access to this article. How does it show that people working with CSAM say Apple's implementation is a good idea?
If it’s for the children, then giving up our civil liberties is a small price to pay. I’d also like to give up liberties in the name of “terrorism”.
When we willingly give up our rights out of fear, these evil people have won.
All your pictures and videos are currently scanned. What civil liberty did their approach change in that?
Can you provide documentation demonstrating this requirement in the United States? It is widely understood that no such requirement exists.
There's no need to compromise with any requirement, this was entirely voluntary on Apple's part. That's why people were upset.
> I can't believe how uninformed
Oh the irony.
PROTECT Act of 2003 - Details CSAM materials as being illegal which is enforced by FBI + ICE.
Also NCMEC which is a non-profit created by the US government that actively works in this area.
There is absolutely no such legal requirement. If there were one it would constitute an unlawful search.
The reason the provider scanning is lawful at all is because the provider has inspected material voluntarily handed over to them, and through their own lawful access to the customer material has independently and without the direction of the government discovered what they believe to be unlawful material.
The cryptographic functionality in Apple's system was not there to protect the user's prviacy, the cryptographic function instead protected apple and their datasources from accountability by concealing the fingerprints that would cause user's private data to be exposed.
This is not the revelation you think it is. Critics understood this perfectly.
People simply did not want their devices scanning their content against some opaque uninspectable government-controlled list that might send you to jail in the case of a match.
More generally, people usually want their devices working for their personal interests only, and not some opaque government purpose.
If you never uploaded those files to the cloud, the scanning wouldn't catch any files that are only local.
People simply don't want their device's default state to be "silently working against you, unless you are hyperaware of everything that needs to be disabled". Attacks on this desire were felt particularly strongly due to Apple having no legal requirement to implement that functionality.
One also can't make the moral argument that the "bad content" list only included CSAM material, as that list was deliberately made opaque. It was a "just trust me bro" situation.
That was the misconception of what was happening though.
Nothing happens on your device. Only when it gets to the cloud. It just puts a flag on the picture in question to have the cloud scan it.
Which is exactly what happens before Apple suggested it and happens now. Except it does it for all your files.
> One also can't make the moral argument that the "bad content" list only included CSAM material, as that list was deliberately made opaque. It was a "just trust me bro" situation.
CSAM database is run by Interpol. What evidence do you have that they are not being honest?
Your phone is your most trusted agent-- it's a mandatory part of your life that mediates your interactions with friends, family, lovers, the government, your doctors, your lawyers, and your priest. You share with it secrets you would tell no other person. It's always with you, tracking your location and recording your activities. And in many cases its use is practically mandated. I think it's inappropriate for such a device to serve any interest except your own.
While it is true that the original proposal operated only on images that you would upload to icloud many people assumed the functionality would be applied more widely over time. This article seems to have proved that point: Apple is now applying essentially the same scanning technology (this time they claim the databases is of "landmarks") to otherwise entirely local photos.
What makes you think your phone is the most trusted device? Do you know everything that is running on your phone and what it does?
If a government wanted to enforce it then none of what Apple suggested mattered.
In fact they wouldn't even need to release a paper explaining what they planned to do.
This has been the fallacy against the whole argument.
> If a government wanted to enforce it then none of what Apple suggested mattered.
Perhaps you live in a dicatorship. If so, I'm sorry. In the united states the power of the government is limited by the constitution. The kind of automated surveillance performed nominally 'consensually' via corporations would be unambiguously unlawful for the government to perform.
Again I feel like many people just didn't read/understand the paper.
As it stands now all your files/videos are scanned on all major Cloud companies.
Even if you get a hit on the database the hash doesn't put you in jail. The illegal materials do and a human reviews that before making a case.
The cynical reason: consider that you can’t plan engineering features of this scale without written documentation, which will always surface in court.
The prima facie reason: Apple genuinely wants to provide useful features requiring server participation.
If this was a feature on its own then it would not be popular.
Citing national security, some danger will justify its existence.
Apple alone does not control and dictate what goes in, once you reach their level of size and wealth that exceed even developed countries, you ultimately cannot be the controller of your destiny purely as a profit orientated corporation.
ex) Meta, Microsoft, Google
I did understand the cited bits, and sorry to say but this could have been an optimistic post ("look at this cool new thing!")
I dislike Apple's anti-hacker (in the HN sense of the word) practices as much as the next person and don't own any Apple device for that and other reasons, but saying "it doesn't matter how you solved the privacy problem, I feel it's not private" doesn't make it true. Because most other people don't understand the cited words either, if they read that far down anyway, this seems like unfair criticism
In a bit of personal news, in a previous job I once worked on doing something similarly private to user's browsing history, that is, the browsing history is sent to the server without the server being able to capture or store it. I was the tech lead for writing a prototype, but the whole idea was then vetoed by a VP.
So would it be unfair criticism?
But this is the fundamental issue. The author has no idea if personal data is being shared, they’ve made an assumption based on their lack of understanding. It’s entirely possible that all this service does (and arguably likely), is provide a private way for your phone to query a large database of landmark fingerprints, then locally try and match those fingerprints to your photos.
It doesn’t require send up private data. The phone could perform large geographic queries (the size of countries) for batches of fingerprints to be cached locally for photo matching. The homographic encryption just provides an added layer of privacy, allowing the phone to make those queries in a manner that makes it impossible for Apple to know what regions were queried for.
iOS photos already uses databases to convert a photo location into an address, so you can do basic location based searching. That will involve doing lookups in Apple global address database, do you consider that a violation of people’s privacy?
Back then I understood that an operation like SUM would be able to compute the sum of a list of numbers where each number was encrypted. The way the encryption worked made it possible to add all the values together without decrypting them, and the result ended up being encrypted too in such a way that the owner could decrypt it and have a number with a certain known accuracy.
If Apple is using homomorphic correctly then there should be no way for them to see the data they get from your phone. The other things they mention in the post as ways to prevent leaking of other information through metadata or a side channel.
The fact that this feature was enabled by default isn’t exactly great. Definitely should have been something that the user should have been asked if they wanted to enable after upgrading.
https://www.swift.org/blog/announcing-swift-homomorphic-encr...
> don't own any Apple device
So you don't have any skin in the game, but you're criticizing someone who does?
My blog post is written from the perspective of an Apple user whose trust has been violated. It's nice that you think—from a safe distance—the technology is neat, and maybe it is, but that's irrelevant to the main issue, which is the lack of user consent.
It's tragic, because computing is in a professedly imperfect place right now. Digital privacy is under fire, many payments see a 30% digital service surcharge that is wholly arbitrary, and revolutionary cross-platform standards are being supplanted with proprietary and non-portable solutions that does not benefit any user.
As an American, I am ashamed that our government's dysfunction extends to consumer protection.
It seems likely to me that concerns like those of the article or some of the comments in this thread are irrelevant to Apple’s bottom line. A concern some customers may actually have is data usage, but I guess it’s likely that the feature is off if in low data mode.
I wonder if this particular sort of issue would be solved by some setting for ‘privacy defaults’ or something where journalists/activists/some corporate IT departments/people who write articles like the OP can choose something to cause OS updates to set settings to values that talk less on the network. Seems hard to make a UI that is understandable. There is already a ‘lockdown mode’ for iOS. I don’t know if it affects this setting.
I mostly think the reaction to this article is overblown because it appeals popular ideas here about big tech. I think one should be wary of Apple’s claims about privacy: the reason is competition with Google and so they want users to be distrustful of the kinds of features that Google are better at implementing (I don’t want to say Apple isn’t trying to do the right thing either – if you look at accessibility, the competition was very bad for a lot of things for a long time and Apple was good despite the lack of commercial pressure). But I think one should also be wary of articles that make you angry and tell you what you suspected all along. (eg see the commenter elsewhere who doesn’t care about the details and is just angry). It’s much easier to spot this kind of rage-bait piece when it is targeting ‘normal people’ rather than the in-group.
The article was published by an Apple developer and user, i.e., myself, on my personal blog, which is followed mainly by other Apple developers and users. My blog comprises my own personal observations, insights, and opinions. If you see any rage, it would be my own personal rage, and not "bait". Bait for what?
The headline is defensible but, in my opinion, quite sensationalised. People are likely to interpret it as being for an article making much stronger claims than the article actually does. I think a lot of the interactions people had with this submission, especially early on, were because the headline made them mad, rather than because of its contents. I think if one is interacting with some submission here due to a maddening headline, one should be wary about such interactions being driven by emotion, leading to poor discussion that is not particularly anchored to the topic of the article, rather than being driven by curiosity.
How would you write the headline?
There's always a criticism of headlines, but headlines are necessarily short. It's like critics want the entire article text to appear in the headline, which is impossible.
I don't know what defensible but sensationalized is supposed to mean.
> I think a lot of the interactions people had with this submission, especially early on, were because the headline made them mad, rather than because of its contents.
That's pure speculation on your part, because the headline is very short and vague. In any case, it's not my fault if people read the headline but not the article. I want people to read the article, not just the headline.
I think the early comments on this submission were because the headline made them mad because they were incurious and not particularly related to the topic of the article making – most could be under any article about Apple Photos. One early comment was about switching to alternatives to Photos and another was, paraphrasing, ‘I’m so angry. I don’t care about homeomorphic encryption or differential privacy’. Others seemed to follow the theme of the latter. After a while a comment attempted an overview of some of the technical details, which I thought was better.
Perhaps a more precise complaint is that many of the early comments didn’t really depend on the contents of the article – they could go under many Apple submissions – and I think it’s more likely for comments like that to be written while incensed.
I don’t think you’re to blame for the comments people choose to leave.
In my opinion, these are actually misleading headlines that don't represent the content of the article. In fact, I've never used the Enhanced Visual Search feature, nor do I know exactly how much data is sent to Apple.
My article was never intended as a kind of feature introduction that you might see in the news media. The main point was always about user consent for uploading data to Apple. To be clear, my article is and has always been a complaint. Thus, I think the headline is accurate. I am complaining, and readers should know that.
> another was, paraphrasing, ‘I’m so angry. I don’t care about homeomorphic encryption or differential privacy’.
> many of the early comments didn’t really depend on the contents of the article
The headline of the article didn't mention homeomorphic encryption or differential privacy, so they must have read the contents.
And I care "why" exactly? It was turned on by default on my phone without my consent, it's a privacy violation, nothing else matters in that case.
(And to be clear I’m not even bothered by the signature check)
At a certain point you have to figure that they realize it doesn’t matter short of some government entity forcing them to stop. At the very least the protections they put in place (homomorphic encryption, etc) are more than I think most other companies would ever bother doing.
Shit like this, reasonable in isolation or not, undermines that story completely. If they are so willing to just outright lie on a massive billboard, what else will they do when profits demand it?
Going into Settings -> Search there's an option now for "Help Apple Improve Search", enabled by default.
>Help improve Search by allowing Apple to store the searches you enter into Safari(!!), Siri and Spotlight in a way that is not linked to you. Searches include lookups of general knowledge, and requests to do things like play music and get directions.
If it was there before then it was switched on again.
From deanonymization work even a decade ago it was clear that your search history will completely unmask you.
I would need lots of details before I believed that their method of storing the data reliably protected my privacy. (But of course that is not what the quote claims.)
It seems Apple are very passionate about analysing your photos for some reason, regardless if you yourself are.
A lot of Apple's defaults are just plain bizarre. Why the hell is Spotlight seeing source code mimetypes and feeding it to the search index?
Why is this even a question, do people not look at the settings at all?
No, I expect defaults that aren't asinine from a company that bills themselves as a premium experience for software developers. It should be common sense, for the purposes of providing software to both ordinary users and software developers, to omit source files that aren't relevant search results. It's one of the most annoying features on Windows too, you'd hope Apple would see the writing on the wall and just fix it.
Harboring hope was my mistake, though. Sold my Mac in 2018 and haven't felt a desire to daily-drive MacOS since.
Isn’t this fragile to pollution from end users?
What if we all ran A local Image generator trained on our own photos… But slightly broken… And just flooded their photo hash collection with garbage?
Now what ?
This would be a very good flushing action. Lot would be learned by seeing who got angry about this and how angry they got…
They are also not using your personal photos to feed the location database, most likely public sources and/or Apple Maps data. If they are relying on GPS-tagged public photos alone, you could probably mess up a system like this by spoofing GPS location en-masse and posting them online for years, but for what purpose?
https://kozubik.com/items/FlushingAction/
Flood that system with garbage and let's see who gets upset and how they communicate their upset.
If the system is architected as advertised it shouldn't be a problem ...
It's directly tied to features they provide in their photo app. This is hardly obscure.
Similarly here, it feels like the author is leaning into a knee jerk reaction about invasion of privacy without really trying to evaluate the effectiveness of the technologies here (client side vectorization, differential privacy, OHTTP relays, and homomorphic encryption).
Though I 100% agree Apple should ask the user for consent first for a feature like this.
Someone reply with a link to the source code so I can see exactly what it is doing, without having to take an internet rando's word for it.
Better yet, let me compile it myself.
After all, you wouldn’t actually be trusting the source code given to you to match what’s running on your device, would you?
> After all, you wouldn’t actually be trusting the source code given to you to match what’s running on your device, would you?
That's why the best practice in the industry follows reproducible builds.
Of course it is not the whole technology stack, but it is something at least. If your evaluation leads to potential problems, you can create issues right there on the github project!
I do:
- Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash).
- Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is quite good privacy.
- OHTTP relay: it's sent through a 3rd party so Apple never knows your IP address. The contents are encrypted so the 3rd party never doesn't learn anything either (some risk of exposing "IP X is an apple photos user", but nothing about the content of the library).
- Homomorphic encryption: The lookup work is performed on server with encrypted data. Apple can't decrypt the vector contents, or response contents. Only the client can decrypt the result of the lookup.
This is what a good privacy story looks like. Multiple levels of privacy security, when any one of the latter 3 should be enough alone to protect privacy.
"It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations." -> The author themselves looks to be an Apple security researcher, and are saying they can't make an informed choice here.
I'm not sure what the right call is here. But the conclusion "Thus, the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device." isn't true. There are other tools to provide privacy (DP, homomorphic encryption), while also using services. They are immensely complicated, and user's can't realistically evaluate risk. But if you want features that require larger-than-disk datasets, or frequently changing content, you need tools like this.
This would be easily solvable: On first run show a window with:
> Hey, we have this new cool feature that does X and is totally private because of Y [link to Learn More]
> Do you want to turn it on? You can change your mind later in Settings
> [Yes] [No]
You don’t use iCloud for anything? When you change phones do you start fresh or use your computer for backups? Do sync bookmarks? Browsing history?
Do you use iMessage?
edit: I will just add, even if we accept the argument that it's extremely secure and impossible to leak information, then where do we draw the line between "extremely secure" and "somewhat secure" and "not secure at all"? Should we trust Apple to make this decision for us?
Apple IS just another cloud provider / centralized backup service. It's not fundamentally different than others, and if you're not in select group of whatever the respectful term is for those who stay strictly inside apple ecosystem, you will have multiple clouds and multiple data sets and multiple backups that all interact with each other and your heterogeneous devices in unpredictable ways. Icloud will not help you with that any more than google cloud or Samsung cloud etc. They all want to own all of your stuff, neither is simply a hyper helpful neutral director.
Even if you use Microsoft Office or GSuite and save using the standard file picker, you can save to iCloud. iCloud has a native app for Windows and plug ins on Windows to sync browser bookmarks for Chrome, Edge and Firefox
And the alternative people are proposing are four or five self hosted solutions?
Iphone is "just another device". I don't feel Icloud is any better integrated with my Samsung note, than google is integrated with my iPhone - in fact, the opposite. Google, for example, CAN sync my photos across iphone and Android and windows devices. Whereas my wife knows the primeval scream from the home office every 6 months I try to claw photos out of apple's greedy selfish hands :-)
For people who JUST use iphone, sure, Icloud is the boss just like for people who JUST use e.g. Samsung galaxy the Samsung cloud is awesome. But that's not a high bar. I feel we are still lacking empathy here for people like original poster who may have more than one device in their lives.
And I wouldn’t have the same arguments if they weee using Google cloud. But they are concerned about “privacy” and trust Google?
But my argument is about people thinking that Apple or Google should care about the minuscule number of people who are hosting their own syncing services
Or as the GP suggested, forego the cloud entirely. iCloud and Apple’s built in iOS backup is not a magic bullet unfortunately.
No, if you enable Advanced Data Protection for iCloud[1], the photos stored in Apple Photos are end to end encrypted.
Yes, I always start with clean installs, both on iOS and on macOS. Sometimes I even restart fresh on the same device, as I make sure my hardware lasts. I don’t sync bookmarks, I keep them in Pinboard and none of them has any private or remotely identifiable information anyway. I don’t care about saving browser history either, in fact I have it set to periodically auto-clear, which is a feature in Safari.
To a first approximation, everyone in 2024 expects their data and settings to be transferred across devices.
People aren’t working as if it is 2010 when you had to backup and restore devices via iTunes. If I’m out of town somewhere and my phone gets lost, damaged or stolen, I can buy another iPhone, log into my account and everything gets restored as it was.
Just as I expect my watch progress to work when I use Netflix between my phone, iPad, Roku devices etc.
How many people are going to say in 2024 that they don’t want continuous cloud backup? You want Windows Vista style pop ups and permissions?
I don’t have Netflix but neither is that relevant to the point, you’re obviously and embarrassingly grasping at straws.
No one is arguing against continuous cloud backups, they’re arguing about sending data without consent. Which, by the way, is something Apple used to understand not to do.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39iKLwlUqBo
Apple’s OS are already filled with Windows Vista style popups and permissions for inconsequential crap, people have been making fun of them for that for years.
Isn’t it bad enough that I have a popup every time I copy and paste between apps?
For me, not really no. It reminds me I am copying information and not from some phishing app, I find it informative.
And I'm probably one of the few who actually click "Reject" to the cookie pop ups having to click no on 3742 legitimate consents.
The simple answer is everything should be opt-out. I'll opt-in if I require it because frankly, regardless to how Fort-Knox my data is $CORP still cannot be trusted.
Video conferencing instead of FaceTime are made via self-hosted Jitsi and if I am to brag all running on FreeBSD.
Out of Apple or Google I trust neither however will align with Apple more than Google. It's as close as I can get from not having data collected from mongrels.
Computers should not be sneakily doing things in the background without my commanding them to do so. But if they insist that the only way they can work is by doing things in the background, then I expect the computer to at the very least obtain my consent before doing those things. And computers should definitely not be exfiltrating anything over to the network without my explicit command to do so. This shit world we are living in where your computer just does whatever the application developer wants it to do rather than what the user wants it to do has to come to an end!
With PIR, an Apple phone recieving a phone call queries Apple's database with that phone number, but because it's using homomorphic encryption, Apple doesn't know the number that called despite looking it up in their database to provide caller id info, so they can't tie your phone number and the callers phone number together.
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
"Ah, I see you care about privacy, but you own a phone! How hypocritical of you!"
I also don’t run a private chat server that people log into - I’m like most of the iPhone and Android using world
The problem with this feature is that we cannot verify that Apple’s implementation of the math is correct and without security flaws. Everyone knows there is security flaws in all software, and this implementation is not open (I.e. we cannot review the code, and even if we could review code we cannot verify that the provided code was the code used in the iOS build). So, we have to trust Apple did not make any mistakes in their implementation.
They could just have the OS batch uploads until a later point e.g. when the phone checks for updates.
The point is that this is all about risk mitigation not elimination.
Other than their entire reputation
https://www.csoonline.com/article/571797/the-apache-log4j-vu...
What was the other package that had the mysterious .?
You say this as if being shamed into patching the occasional vuln is equivalent to security best practices.
Open code which can be independently audited is only a baseline for trustworthy code. A baseline none of those three meet. And one which by itself is insufficient to counter a reflections on trusting trust style attack. For that you need open code, diverse open build toolchains, and reproducible builds. None of which is being done by those three.
Are you getting your ideas about security from the marketing department?
1: https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/03/hackers-can-extract... 2: https://www.wired.com/story/google-android-pixel-showcase-vu... 3: https://blog.morphisec.com/5-ntlm-vulnerabilities-unpatched-...
OSS is not the panacea that everyone touts it to be.
I'm not aware of any major open source projects that haven't experienced some level of auditing. Coverity alone scans everything you're likely to find in a distribution like Debian or Fedora: https://scan.coverity.com/o/oss_success_stories
> How many packages have you audited?
Several on which I depend. And I'm just one pair of eyeballs.
> Personally, I don't have the skillz to do that.
Then why are you commenting about it?
> OSS is not the panacea that everyone touts it to be.
I don't know who's touting it as a panacea, seems like a strawman you've erected. It's a necessary pre-requisite without which best practices aren't possible or verifiable.
https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/30/22410164/linux-kernel-uni...
A non-advertized feature, which is not independently verified, which about image contents? I would be prefer independent verification of their claims.
Hey! That’s wrong.
But I promise I won’t do anything wrong with it.
Well ok then.
And at that point all the opt-in dialogs in the world don't matter and you should not be running iOS but building some custom Android ROM from scratch.
>Let’s say you wanted to count how many of your online friends were dogs, while respecting the maxim that, on the Internet, nobody should know you’re a dog. To do this, you could ask each friend to answer the question “Are you a dog?” in the following way. Each friend should flip a coin in secret, and answer the question truthfully if the coin came up heads; but, if the coin came up tails, that friend should always say “Yes” regardless. Then you could get a good estimate of the true count from the greater-than-half fraction of your friends that answered “Yes”. However, you still wouldn’t know which of your friends was a dog: each answer “Yes” would most likely be due to that friend’s coin flip coming up tails.
Quantum computers will make breaking RSA and Diff-Hellman public key encryption easier. They will not effect things like AES, nor things like hashing:
> Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash).
And for RSA and DH, there are algorithms being deployed to deal with that:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Post-Quantum_Cryptography...
Anyway, back to the subject at hand; here's Apple on that subject:
> We use BFV parameters that achieve post-quantum 128-bit security, meaning they provide strong security against both classical and potential future quantum attacks
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
Where are the boundaries in this scenario?
I'm asking: what does an opt in for that really look like? You're not going to be able to give the user enough info to make an educated decision. There's ton of risk of "privacy washing" ("we use DP" but at very poor epsilon, or "we use E2E encryption" with side channel data gathering).
There's no easy answer. "ask the user", when the question requires a phd level understanding of stats to evaluate the risk isn't a great answer. But I don't have another one.
Don't do things without my consent!!! How hard is it for Silicon Valley to understand this very simple concept?
Should Apple insist that every end user consents to the user agent string sent on every HTTP request?
You've succinctly identified a (maybe the) huge problem in the computing world today. Computers should not do anything without the user's command/consent. This seems like a hopeless and unachievable ideal only because of how far we've already strayed from the light.
Even Linux, supposedly the last bastion of user control... it's a mess. Do a fresh install and type ps ax at a shell. You'll see dozens of processes in the background doing god knows what. I didn't consent to any of this! The distribution's maintainer simply decided on my behalf that I want the computer to be running all these processes. This is totally normalized!
I don't expect my computer to ask for consent again and again for every byte sent over the network, but I do expect it to obtain my consent before generally accessing the network and sending bytes over the network.
To me, there's never been a case, except maybe in the first decade or so of the hobby/tinkering PC movement, where most users had this ability.
Should we just not use computers?
I don't think "should we just give up?" is a reasonable question to anything.
And getting downvoted for saying it, which is a fascinating incongruity.
If the world was a nightclub, “Silicon Valley” would be a creepy guy who walks up to every woman and says “You’re now dating me. To stop, you need to opt out using a form that I will do my best to make sure you can’t read.”
Choosing an Apple product is consent to trusting Apple. Continued use their products represents ongoing consent. This is an objective fact about all complex connected devices and it cannot possibly be otherwise.
Or signal of non-named stakeholders.
Yes you did. You purchased a computer, put this software on it and executed it. If you didn't want it to do whatever it's doing you should have determined what it would do beforehand and chose not to do it.
Even assuming that running the software implies my consent (which I would dispute), how do I make the decision about whether I should execute the software if I don't know what it is doing?
This all-or-nothing approach is also problematic. I should not have to allow the developer free rein to do whatever he wants, as a condition of using the software. This is why operating systems are slowly building granular permissions and consent checks.
I agree that all-or-nothing is problematic but even with a flexible permission system the best you can hope for is for all the things apps do to be itemized and set to sane defaults. But even then sanity is subjective. For every person like you (and me fwiw) who values privacy there are 1000 people who will never find the settings, don't care about privacy, and will wonder why stuff isn't working.
Ultimately privacy is similar to security in that it comes down to trust. If you don't trust your OS you're screwed. Your choices are try to exert as much control over it as possible, or don't use it.
How would that make any difference in this case? Presumably, you'll have long-ago checked the "allow general access to the network" setting, so you've given consent to the "send my photo data" action. Heck, surely connecting to the internet in the first place is implicit consent that you want to send stuff over the network?
Every NTP session leaks time desync information, which reveals—on modern hardware—relativistic travel, including long airplane trips.
Every software update leaks a fortune about what you run and when you connect.
I don’t think it’s reasonable to ask that people consent to these; I don’t think they can. I absolutely agree that photo metadata is different and at a way higher level of the stack.
Sure, you can ask users "do you want to use this". But why do we ask that? Historically it's user consent (knowingly opting in), and legal requirements around privacy. We don't have that pop up on any random new feature, it's gated to ones with some risk. There are questions to ask: does this technical method have any privacy risk? Can the user make informed consent? Again: I'm not pitching we ditch opt-in (I really don't have a fix in mind), but I feel like we're defaulting too quickly to "old tools for new problems". The old way is services=collection=consent. These are new privacy technologies which use a service, but the privacy is applied locally before leaving your device, and you don't need to trust the service (if you trust the DP/HE research).
End of the day: I'd really like to see more systems like this. I think there were technically flawed statements in the original blog article under discussion. I think new design methods might be needed when new technologies come into play. I don't have any magic answers.
Such as?
You're presenting it as if you have to explain elliptic curve cryptography in order to toggle a "show password" dialogue but that's disingenuous framing, all you have to say is "Allow Apple to process your images", simple as that. Otherwise you can argue many things can't possibly be made into options. Should location data always be sent, because satellites are complicated and hard to explain? Should we let them choose whether they can turn wifi on or off, because you have to explain IEEE 802.11 to them?
Then don’t run someone else’s software on your device. It’s not your software, you are merely a licensee. Don’t delude yourself that you are morally entitled to absolute control over it.
The only way to have absolute control over software is with an RMS style obsession with Free software.
Want a phone that doesn’t spy on you? Make it yourself. If you can’t, find some like-minded people and incentivise them (with money or otherwise) to make it for you. If they can’t (or won’t) perhaps contemplate the possibility that large capitalist enterprises might be the only practical way to develop some products.
To suggest that customers are "morally entitled" to a Samsung phone with zero tracking and zero telemetry is similarly absurd. If you don't like Samsung's product, don't buy it.
Why not? What gives McD the right to make such a decision unilaterally, other than might?
In fact, this is how disability legislation (for example) already tends to work. You don't get to tell disabled people to just go somewhere else, you have to make reasonable accomodations for them.
This cannot be a serious question.
Restaurant have a legal obligation to warn the customers. AKA "opt-in" which is NOT what Apple is doing. And it's the whole issue with their behavior.
That doesn't stop consumers from engaging in Info Wars style paranoia, and grandstanding about the aforementioned paranoia.
We can regulate these problems.
If the EU can regulate away the lightning connector they can regulate away this kind of stuff.
No EU regulation could regulate away all "moral" concerns over software. More specifically, they EU could regulate, but the overwhelming majority of software companies would either strip significant features out for EU customers, or exit the market altogether.
This isn't rocket surgery.
I mostly agree. I'm just annoyed "this new privacy tech is too hard to explain" leads to "you shouldn't do it". This new privacy tech is a huge net positive for users.
Also: from other comments sounds like it might have been opt-in the whole time. Someone said a fresh install has it off.
It's a positive compared to doing the same "feature" without the privacy tech. It's not necessarily a positive compared to not forcing the "feature" on the user at all.
The privacy tech isn't necessarily a positive as a whole if it leads companies to take more liberties in the name of "hey you don't need to be able to turn it off because we have this magical privacy tech (that nobody understands and may or may not actually work please don't look into it too hard)".
However, "my data is being sent off my device" is incorrect, as GP explained. Metadata, derived from your data, with noise added to make it irreversible, is being sent off your device. It's the equivalent of sending an MD5 of your password somewhere; you may still object, but it is not factually correct to say your password was transmitted.
Hackers love to have MD5 checksums of passwords. They make it way easier to find the passwords in a brute force attack.
> Hackers love to have MD5 checksums of passwords.
Hackers love not understanding analogies. :)
a) MD5 is reversible, it just cost GPU time to brute force
b) It is unproven that their implementation is irreversible
Sounds like my data is being sent off my device.
> It's the equivalent of sending an MD5 of your password somewhere
Sounds even worse lol
There is plenty of data on your device that isn’t “your data” simply due to existing on your device.
Owning a phone is a privacy failure by default in the United States.
Care to provide a pointer to what device they are using? I would absolutely get my real estate license for this.
Unfortunately, the knee-jerk reaction of many defense industry pundits (and VCs, for that matter) is that US intelligence is an unparalleled moral good, and the virtues of privacy aren't worth hamstringing our government's work. Many of these people will try to suppress comments like yours because it embarrasses Americans and American business by association. And I sympathize completely - I'm dumbfounded by the response from my government now that we know China is hacking our telecom records.
It's apparent it has been kept in place because of all of the value it provides to the 5 eyes.
Maybe they should lump its default state into something that already exists? E.g. assume that if you already have location access enabled for Photos (it does ask!), you've already indicated that you're okay with something about this identifying being sent to Apple whenever you take a picture.
My understanding is that Location Services will, among other things, send a hash of local WiFi network SSIDs and signal strengths to a database Apple maintains, and use that to triangulate a possible position for you. This seems loosely analogous to what's going on here with the compute-a-vector thing.
It could be tied to iCloud Photos, perhaps, because then you already know that your photos are getting uploaded to Apple.
(We could argue about it, but personally I think some kind of hash doesn't qualify.)
In fact, I'm willing to bet that if they'd added this feature and gated it behind iCloud Photos being enabled, we'd have different articles complaining about Apple making a cash grab by trying to get people to pay for premium storage. :P
As the article notes, this new feature is so "popular" that neither Apple nor the Apple media have bothered to mention it. AFAICT it's not even in Apple's document listing all the new features of iOS 18: https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-18/pdf/iOS_18_All_New_Features...
No, I didn't ask for a hypothetical set. I wanted the actual set of people.
I can try to turn down my natural inclination towards cautious phrasing, if you'd like? Get us on the same level. :D
Large set? Yes. Majority? No. CIRP says 2/3 of US Apple users pay for iCloud storage[0]. It's this popular for the exact reason you mentioned. Almost no one can fit their photo library into 5GB so they opt in to the cheap 50GB for $0.99/month. 50GB is enough for a lot of people.
[0] https://wccftech.com/paid-icloud-subscription-is-apples-most...
Well, I'll take back what I said about the majority. I do still think that the remaining 1/3 of users who don't have enough storage to turn on iCloud Photos qualify as what lapcat was asking for, though.
I know users who would prefer not to trust Apple for anything, and only pay for and use iCloud to backup the Desktop [and similar locations]. If they were to hear that their opt-in for iCloud means that Apple starts copying random things, they would not be happy.
[OT, I use Arq. But admit that iCloud is simpler, and it is not apples to apples.]
IMO, the fact that Apple backs up your keychain to the Mothership; and that this is a "default" behavior that will re-enable itself when shut off, reflects an attitude that makes me very distrustful of Apple.
Then why lie and mislead customers that your data stays local?
Apple patting itself on the back.
1)sending my personal data to them in any way is not a "feature." It's especially not a feature because what it sets out to do is rather unnecessary because every photo has geotagging, time-based grouping, and AI/ML/whatever on-device keyword assignments and OCR. I can open up my phone right now and search for every picture that has grass in it. I can search for "washington" and if I took a picture of a statue of george washington that shows the plaque, my iPhone already OCR'd that and will show the photo.
2)"minor" is not how I would ever describe sending data based off my photos to them, regardless of how much it's been stuffed through a mathematical meat grinder.
3)Apple is usually very upfront about this sort of thing, and also loves to mention the most minor, insignificant, who-gives-a-fuck feature addition in the changenotes for "point" system updates. We're talking things like "Numbers now supports setting font size in chart legends" (I'm making that up but you get the point.)
This was very clearly an "ask for forgiveness because the data we want is absolutely priceless and we'll get lots of it by the time people notice / word gets out." It's along the lines of Niantic using the massive trove of photos from the pokemon games to create 3d maps of everywhere.
I specifically use iOS because I value my privacy (and don't want my cell phone data plan, battery power, etc to be a data collection device for Google.) Sending data based off my photos is a hard, do-not-pass-go-fuck-off-and-die line in the sand for me.
It's especially shitty because they've gated a huge amount of their AI shit behind owning the current iPhone model....but apparently my several generation old iPhone is more than good enough to do some AI analysis on all my photos, to upload data for them?
Fuck everyone Apple who was involved in this.
It's very clearly not, since they've gone to huge lengths to make sure they can't actually see the data themselves see the grandparent post.
Hear hear. As if they can do this but not Visual Intelligence, which is just sending a photo to their servers for analysis. Apple has always had artificial limitations but they've been getting more egregious of late.
Then perhaps the system is of poor design and needs further work before being unleashed on users…
Anything that leaves my devices should do so with my opt-IN permission.
This is not how you launch a privacy-preserving product if your intentions are good, this is how you slip something under the radar while everyone is distracted.
The choice probably looks to them like:
A - play the game, give everyone a heads up, respond to all feedback, and never ship the feature
B - YOLO it, weather the storm, have people forget about it after the holiday, and go on with their life.
Wether B works is up to debate, but that was probably their only chance to have it ship from their POV.IMO giving up on having it widely used and just ship it turned off would be the best choice. But it's so obvious, there must be other ceitical reasons (good or bad) that's not an option.
"we had to sneak it out because people wouldn't consent if we told them" isn't the best of arguments
Or is it better to just trust that mathematics works and thus encryption is a viable way to preserve privacy and skip the dialog?
This is a much greater level of security than what you would expect from a bank, for example, who needs to fully decrypt the data you send it. When using your banking apps over HTTPS (TLS), you are trusting the CA infrastructure, you are trusting all sorts of things. You have fewer points of failure when a key for homomorphic encryption resides only on your device.
"Opting-in by default" is therefore not unsafe.
People won't trust homomorphic encryption, entropy seeding or relaying when none of it is transparent and all of it is enabled in an OTA update.
> This is what a good privacy story looks like.
This is what a coverup looks like. Good privacy stories never force third-party services on a user, period. When you see that many puppets on stage in one security theater, it's only natural for things to feel off.
What is happening, is that people make tradeoffs, and decide to what degree they trust who and what they interact with. Plenty of people might just 'go with the flow', but putting what Apple did here in the same bucket as what for example Microsoft or Google does is a gross misrepresentation. Present it all as equals just kills the discussion, and doesn't inform anyone to a better degree.
When you want to take part in an interconnected network, you cannot do that on your own, and you will have to trust other parties to some degree. This includes things that might 'feel' like you can judge them (like your browser used to access HN right here), but you actually can't unless you understand the entire codebase of your OS and Browser, all the firmware on the I/O paths, and the silicon it all runs on. So you make a choice, which as you are reading this, is apparently that you trust this entire chain enough to take part in it.
It would be reasonable to make this optional (as in, opt-in), but the problem is that you end up asking a user for a ton of "do you want this" questions, almost every upgrade and install cycle, which is not what they want (we have had this since Mavericks and Vista, people were not happy). So if you can engineer a feature to be as privacy-centric yet automated as possible, it's a win for everyone.
People aren't making tradeoffs - that's the problem. Apple is making the tradeoffs for them, and then retroactively asking their users "is this okay?"
Users shouldn't need to buy a new phone to circumevent arbitrary restrictions on the hardware that is their legal property. If America had functional consumer protections, Apple would have been reprimanded harder than their smackdowns in the EU.
As for vectorised and noise-protected PCC, sure, they might have an opinion about that, but people rarely are informed enough to think about it, let alone gain the insight to make a judgment about it at all.
I did read the article, yes :) Maybe our photos are not sent bit-by-bit but enough data from the photos is being sent to be able to infer a location (and possibly other details) so it is the same thing: my personal data is being sent to Apple's servers (directly or indirectly, partially or fully) without my explicit consent.
At least the last time they tried to scan everyone's photos (in the name of the children) they pinky promised they'd only do it before uploading to iCloud, now they're doing it for everyone's photos all the time - it's disgusting.
You can imagine it as hashes (created locally), some characters of that hash from some random positions being used to find out if those can be turned into a query (which is compute intensive so they use PCC for that). So there is no 'data' about what it is, where it is or who it is. There isn't even enough data to create a picture with.
Technically, everything could of course be changed, heck, Apple could probably hire someone with binoculars and spy on you 24/7. But this is not that. Just like baseband firmware is not that, and activation is not that, yet using them requires communication with Apple all the same.
So it does it multiple ways:
- Finite sets and added noise, doesn't hurt performance too much but does make it nearly impossible to ID/locate a photo
- Encryption at rest and in transit
- Transit over hops they don't own
- Homomorphic Encryption during remote compute
The data it finds was available in two ways: the "result" and the vector embedding. Not sure which one you end up consuming since it also has to work on older models that might not be able to load the embeddings and perform adequately, but it doesn't matter since the data itself will be unique so you can't do parallel reconstruction, but it is also uniquely meaningless to anyone without a key. They are essentially computing on needles that aren't in a haystack, but in a needle stack.
The primitives all this is built on have been around for quite a while, including their HBONE implementation, the cryptographically hidden data distribution and the SEP. So far, it has been the only one of its kind outside of disjointed options like buying and operating your own HSM, a large TOR network and a yet to-be-invented self-hosted PCC solution (AMD was supposed to release something but they failed at that, just not as bad as Intel messed up with SGX).
Technically, even with everything else removed, just some good TLS 1.2+ and homomorphic encryption would have been more than any other mass market manufacturer has ever done in an effective way. But by adding the additional factors such as degrees of separation so they couldn't get in themselves (without breaking it for everyone in the process) is what makes this so much more robust.
I would be ok with this being a local feature, where I can download the signature database to my device and run the search locally (as you say), but as it stands some information about my photos (enough to detect places at least, possibly more in the future) is being sent out of my device. I want zero information about my photos to leave my device.
I mean, this is just wrong. Baseband firmware and carrier activation can be managed entirely independently of Apple, they just choose to manage it themselves. The number of places where Apple chooses to insert their own services as arbitrary middlemen has been a perennially worrying topic among Apple enthusiasts. It's not just disrespectful to people that pay a premium for fewer service advertisements, it's downright unsafe and does not reflect the sort of forward-thinking security that people in the industry respect.
There was a time when Apple focused on real and innovative product differentiation, but I'll be damned if you can give me a post-Wozniak example that isn't under antitrust scrutiny. Apple relies on marketing and branding to make people feel unsafe in a fundamentally insecure system - I don't respect that as a proponent of innovation and competitive digital markets.
Perhaps you are thinking about subscription activation (be it GSM or CDMA) and parameters for cell networks (which can indeed be consumed by the baseband, which will be running firmware supplied by the manufacturer, sometimes re-packaged in system images as done in OEM feature phones and many android phones).
Either way, macOS devices do the same thing (activation) as do iPads without cell networking. Same goes for radio firmware loading and updates. You'll find most wintel laptops doing the same for things like WiFi (regardless of softmac/halfmac/hardmac chips).
That’s starting to veer into unreasonable levels of conspiracy theory. There’s nothing to “cover up”, the feature has an off switch right in the Settings and a public document explaining how it works. It should not be on by default but that’s not a reason to immediately assume bad faith. Even the author of the article is concerned more about bugs than intentions.
Since they cannot convince users to enable this feature in good-faith, they are resorting to subterfuge. We know that Apple is vehement about pushing client-side scanning on users that do not want it, I do not believe for a second that this was a mistake or unintended behavior. If this was a bug then it would have been hotfixed immediately to prevent the unintended behavior from reaching any more phones than it already had.
This is illogical. If Apple wanted to engage in subterfuge they would simply compromise the OS.
When a company controls the entire stack either you trust everything they do. Or nothing.
If anything, the lesson Apple might take from this could be "adding the settings toggle was a bad idea, because nobody would have cared about this at all otherwise".
They worked very hard on security these past few months, so it should be all good, right?
I am not claiming for one moment that enabling this by default is OK. In fact, I have explicitly said it is not.
What I am saying is that it is ignorant to call this a cover up, because a cover up requires subterfuge. This feature has a freaking settings toggle and public documentation. Calling it a cover up is the type of uneducated rhetoric that makes these issues being brushed off by those in power as “it’s just a bunch of loonies conspiracy theorists complaining”.
Clearly you have not. If you did, you wouldn’t continue to give an example which is not equivalent.
No, it would not be “perfectly fine”, I just said it wouldn’t. You can do something wrong without it being a cover up.
Irrelevant.
This is Apple's proprietary software, running on Apple's computers, devices which use cryptography to prevent you from inspecting it or running software they don't control. Very few people have any idea how it actually works or what it actually does.
That there's some "public document" describing it is not evidence of anything.
> that’s not a reason to immediately assume bad faith
The mere existence of this setting is evidence of bad faith. The client side scanning nonsense proved controversial despite their use of children as political weapons. That they went ahead and did this despite the controversy removes any possible innocence. It tells you straight up that they cannot be trusted.
> Even the author of the article is concerned more about bugs than intentions.
We'll draw our own conclusions.
This is a dumb take. They literally own the entire stack Photos runs on.
If they really wanted to do a coverup we would never know about it.
This is a useful, harmless feature that does not comprise security or privacy in any way.
Users are smart enough to decide for themselves. Let them.
If someone wanted to get a hold of your cloud hosted data at that point, they would use their capacity to simply extract enough key material to impersonate a Secure Enclave. That that point, you "are" the device and as such you "are" the user. No need to make it more complicated than that.
In theory, Apple and other manufacturers would already use PQC to prevent such scenarios. Then again, QC has been "coming soon" for so long, it's doubtful that any information that is currently protected by encryption will still be valuable by the time it can be cracked. Most real-world process implementations don't rely on some "infinite insurance", but assume it will be breached at some point and just try to make it difficult or costly enough to run out the clock on confidentiality, which is all that really matters. Nothing that exists really needs to be confidential forever. Things either get lost/destroyed or become irrelevant.
They’re not. Jeff Johnson develops apps (specifically Safari extensions) for Apple platforms and frequently blogs about their annoyances with Apple, but they’re not a security researcher.
I would be surprised if doing noisy vector comparisons is actually the most effective way to tell if someone is in front of the Eiffel tower. A small large language model could caption it just as well on device, my spider sense tells me someone saw an opportunity to apply bleeding edge, very cool tech so that they can gain experience and do it bigger and better in the future, but they're fumbling their reputation by doing this kind of user data scanning.
Not really, it's been around for a bit now. From 2021:
> The other major reason we’re talking about HE and FL now is who is using them. According to a recent repository of PETs, there are 19 publicly announced pilots, products, and proofs of concept for homomorphic encryption and federated analytics (another term for federated learning) combined. That doesn’t seem like a lot … but the companies offering them include Apple,7 Google, Microsoft, Nvidia, IBM, and the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, and users and investors include DARPA, Intel, Oracle, Mastercard, and Scotiabank. Also, the industries involved in these early projects are among the largest. Use cases are led by health and social care and finance, with their use in digital and crime and justice also nontrivial (figure 1).
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/technology...
I do wonder why we don't hear about it more often though. "Homomorphic encryption" as a buzzword has a lot of headline potential, so I'm surprised companies don't brag about it more.
As far as why it's not more of a buzzword, it's far too in the weeds and ultimately consumers either trust you or they don't. And even if they don't trust you, many of them are still going to use Apple/Google/Facebook system anyway.
homomorphobia ?
Which 3rd party is that?
b) If we follow your tortured logic then every hop along the path from your phone to Apple will have one more data point on you. That's thousands of companies a day.
I'm also griping that "the data is encrypted !" is not a good enough excuse seeing as how we've known for years that the metadata is a bigger pot of gold for intelligence agencies. That my mac address is taking a photo and hitting a particular cell tower is pretty detailed information, even without knowing the content of the photo.
Consider these points:
1. Users don't need a PhD to understand "This feature will send data about your photos to Apple's servers to enable better search."
2. The complexity of the privacy protections doesn't justify removing user choice. By that logic, we should never ask users about any technical feature.
3. Many privacy-conscious users follow a simple principle: they want control over what leaves their device, regardless of how it's protected.
The "it's too complex to explain" argument could justify any privacy-invasive default. Would you apply the same logic to, say, enabling location services by default because explaining GPS technology is too complex?
The real solution is simple: explain the feature in plain language, highlight the benefits, outline the privacy protections, and let users make their own choice. Apple already does this for many other features. "Default off with opt-in" is a core principle of privacy-respecting design, regardless of how robust the underlying protections are.
Closest I come to presenting an opinion on the right way UX was "I'm not sure what the right call is here.". The thing I disagreed with was a technical statement "the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device.".
Privacy respecting design and tech is a passion of mine. I'm pointing out "user choice" gets hard as the techniques used for privacy exceed the understanding of users. Users can intuitively understand "send my location to Google [once/always]" without understanding GPS satellites. User's can't understand the difference between "send my photo" and "send homomorphicly encrypted locally differentially private vector of e=0.8" and "send differentially private vector of e=50". Your prompt "send data about your photos..." would allow for much less private designs than this. If we want to move beyond "ask the user then do it", we need to get into the nitty gritty details here. I'd love to see more tech like this in consumer products, where it's private when used, even when opted-in.
Apple can try to explain as best it can how user data is protected when they use the online service, and then the user makes a choice to either use the service or not.
In my case, I have don't even have a practical use for the new feature, so it's irrelevant how private the online service is. As it is, though, Apple silently forced me to use an online service that I never wanted.
1. The technical excellence of Apple's privacy protections (which you've explained well and seem robust)
2. The ethical question of enabling data transmission by default
Even with best-in-class privacy protections, the principle of user agency matters. A simplified prompt like "This feature will analyze your photos locally and send secure, anonymized data to Apple's servers to enable better search" would give users the basic choice while being technically accurate. The technical sophistication of the privacy measures, while commendable, doesn't override the need for informed consent.
I don’t think that that’s what the author is saying at all, I think he’s saying that Apple should let the user decide for themself if they want to send all this shit to Apple, freedom for the individual. They’re not saying “I dunno”
And the claims that this is good privacy/security are not at all obvious either. And who are those third-parties anyway? Did you verify each one of them?
Well I want them to fuck off.
Hidden in your commentary here is the fact that the vector representation of the image is _the contents of the image_. It very well may be that they cannot reverse the exact image. But it’s still a representation of the image that has to be good for something. Without being too familiar I would be willing to hazard a guess that this could include textual labels and classifications of what is in the image.
I don’t give a shit how good your internal controls are. I don’t have anything particularly interesting to hide. I still do not want you taking my pictures.
A private corporation has no business reading my files for its own benefit.
that's what i'm saying!! because of all these special privacy measures it's genuinely impossible for them to get any benefit from this. it is only used for your benefit to improve photo search on your local device.
they don't see any of the data, they simply perform computations blindly over the encrypted data that are then returned to your device to then decrypt the results locally and use them to improve local photo indexing for you.
Furthermore, Apples privacy stance is generally a sham as their definition of “human rights” doesn’t extend to China. Which either means Apple doesn’t respect human rights, or they don’t view Chinese people as human.
The Chinese government are debatably inhuman. They've literally censored the word "censorship." (Then they censored what people used euphemistically for censorship--"harmonious.") It's funny from the outside but also a miserable state of affairs in 2024.
Apples version of “human right” includes suicide nets as an alternative to treating people humanely. That’s why their stance is pure marketing - they have blood on their hands.
And guess what? You can’t use Google in China, and while Google isn’t by any means perfect, they aren’t Apple.
Now, that happened under a different type of Google (I’m sure they’ll go back now that they torched the culture), but Apple employees who walk around SV like they are better than everybody else - which people on their privacy teams very much do - are pathetically deluded.
All the megacorps are evil, and while Apple likes to put on a holier-than-thou act, it’s just as much bullshit for them to claim they value human rights as it is for Google to say they value privacy.
They value money, that’s it.
It's no longer a conspiracy. I think we are all over past that time(i.e with Snowden and Wikileaks). We live in a surveillance world and "They're guarding all the doors and holding all the keys".
It is simple for any user to evaluate risk the risk of their data being breached on 3rd party servers when their data isn't being sent off the device - there is none. It is only when corporations insist that they are going to send the data off your device whether you like it or not that evaluating risk becomes necessary.
A good privacy story actually looks like not sending any info to anyone else anywhere at any time.
There are way more egregious privacy concerns than sending non-reversibly encrypted noisy photos to Apple. Why draw the line here and not the far worse things happening on your phone and computer right now?
Almost every single app today interacts with the network in some way.
You would be constantly annoying the user with prompt after prompt if you wanted to get consent for sending any relatively harmless data off the device.
My Calculator app does not need to call home.
A good portion of the apps I use fall into this category, and a straightforward mechanism to opt them out of access would be welcome.
They have option to disble if they care.
"Computer, I command thee to send this and only this information over the channel of my choosing, using following encryption scheme, for here be my seal of approval for anyone who might want to verify, and here be the key"
"Sicut Vult"
On Apple's scale, most people care about the things they can do, not about how it happens. For that reason, default matters when the option is only about the internal process pipeline and privacy.
As a result, it is enough to showcase that in case some expert investigates the matter, they show that privacy is considered in a reasonable level.
Maybe some day in the future these things are common knowledge, but I fear that the knowledge gap just increases.
Debian has popcon, which must be enabled explicitly and that is it. It sends the list of the installed packages.
Of course it's fine to not desire privacy, or to desire a privacy level that is less than private. That's up to you. I liked the privacy of my old Canon digicam that had no internet. A photo app on a phone that sends stuff over the network might bring some useful functionality in return, but it can only be considered a regression in terms of privacy.
What Apple has implemented is a LOT closer to "private" than "not private"
Between the quote you pointed out and:
"One thing I do know, however, is that Apple computers are constantly full of privacy and security vulnerabilities, as proved by Apple's own security release notes" which just reeks of survivorship bias.
I think the final call of what is right here _shouldn't_ be informed by the linked article.
IMO, enabled by default without opt-in is absolutely the right call when judging between 1: Feature value 2: Security risk 3: Consent Fatigue.
If you're data-conscious enough to disagree with my prior statement, you should consider having lockdown mode enabled.
If you disagree with my prior statement because of how Apple locks you into Photos, :shake_hands:.
If Enhanced Visual Search is still enabled by default in lockdown mode, then I think that's worth a conversation.
Why in the world am I supposed to be an expert on homomorphic encryption? How many people in the world are experts on homomorphic encryption?
> which just reeks of survivorship bias.
What does that even mean in this context?
> 1: Feature value
What is the value of the feature? As the article notes, this new feature is flying so low under the radar that Apple hasn't bothered to advertise it, and the Apple media haven't bothered to mention it either. You have to wonder how many people even wanted it.
> If you're data-conscious enough to disagree with my prior statement, you should consider having lockdown mode enabled.
That's ridiculous. Apple itself has said, "Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people are never targeted by attacks of this nature." https://support.apple.com/105120
Lockdown mode is basically for famous people and nobody else.
No one, at any point, implied you had to be an expert on homomorphic encryption. But if you're going to evaluate the security risk of a feature, and then end up on the front page of HN for said security risk, I think it's fair to criticize your lack of objectivity (or attempt at objectivity) by way of not even trying to understand the technical details of the blog.
I will say I think my word choice was unnecessarily harsh, I'm sorry. I think I meant more indifference/inattention.
> What does that even mean in this context?
Apple's list of Security releases is long and storied. By comparison, the Solana Saga Web3 phone's list of security releases is short and succinct. Therefore, the Solana Saga must be more secure and has better security than an Apple device!
> What is the value of the feature? As the article notes, this new feature is flying so low under the radar that Apple hasn't bothered to advertise it, and the Apple media haven't bothered to mention it either. You have to wonder how many people even wanted it.
The marketability of a feature is not necessarily correlated with its value. Some features are simply expected and would be silly to advertise, i.e. the ability to check email or text friends. Other features are difficult to evaluate efficacy, so you release and collect feedback instead of advertising and setting false expectations.
> Lockdown mode is basically for famous people and nobody else.
Similar to Feature value, that audience of that statement is your average person (read: does not read/post on hacker news). Based off the your pedigree, I feel as though you probably know better, and given your "no tolerance for risk" for such a feature, it's something worth at least considering, and definitely isn't ridiculous.
I think it's great you started this conversation. I disagree with your opinion, and that's okay!! But I don't think it's particularly beneficial to any discourse to 1. Imply that you are evaluating security risk 2. Be given a well written technical article so that you are able to make an informed decision (and then share that informed decision) 3. Ignore relevant information from said article, make an uninformed decision 4. Be surprised when someone says you made an uninformed decision 5. Imply the only way to make an informed decision would be to be an expert in the relevant fields from the technical article
Anyway - thanks for writing and replying. Creating and putting yourself out there is hard (as evidenced by my empty blog that I promised I'd add to for the past 2 years). And my criticism was too harsh.
I wouldn't characterize that as the point of my blog post. It's primarily about user consent, or lack thereof.
> and then end up on the front page of HN for said security risk
I have no control over that. I didn't even submit the article to HN.
> Apple's list of Security releases is long and storied. By comparison, the Solana Saga Web3 phone's list of security releases is short and succinct. Therefore, the Solana Saga must be more secure and has better security than an Apple device!
This is a red herring. I wasn't comparing Apple security to any other company's security. I was merely pointing out the possibility of bugs and vulnerabilities in Apple's new feature.
> Other features are difficult to evaluate efficacy, so you release and collect feedback instead of advertising and setting false expectations.
Well, I've now given my feedback on the new feature.
> Similar to Feature value, that audience of that statement is your average person (read: does not read/post on hacker news). Based off the your pedigree, I feel as though you probably know better
I'm not sure I understand. Are you claiming that Apple, in its support document, is deliberately mischaracterizing Lockdown Mode?
> But I don't think it's particularly beneficial to any discourse to 1. Imply that you are evaluating security risk
As I've said above, I wasn't.
> 3. Ignore relevant information from said article
I didn't ignore the relevant information from said article. I read the article, but some of the technical details are beyond my current knowledge.
> make an uninformed decision
What uninformed decision are you talking about?
> 4. Be surprised when someone says you made an uninformed decision
I'm surprised because I have no idea what "uninformed decision" you mean.
> 5. Imply the only way to make an informed decision would be to be an expert in the relevant fields from the technical article
I didn't imply that at all. To the contrary, I insisted that the decision to enable the feature should be up to the user, not up to Apple.
I don't think I need to specify that by uninformed decision I mean evaluating the security risk of the feature. I think I criticized too harshly, and you're (understandably) not engaging with me fairly in retaliation. If you actually want to engage with me and discuss this further, feel free to shoot me an email (in my about section). Otherwise, obligatory https://www.paulgraham.com/vb.html.
I'm trying, but obviously I'm failing.
> I don't think I need to specify that by uninformed decision I mean evaluating the security risk of the feature.
For the third time, that wasn't what I was trying to do with the blog post.
> you're (understandably) not engaging with me fairly in retaliation
I don't think you're understanding me either. I'm not retaliating. I was trying to clarify.
A good privacy story starts with "Do you consent" and not transmitting a byte if you answer "no"
It sounds like it only needs a few extra lines of code to get exactly what they wanted before, they just packaged it differently and we all fell for it like frogs getting boiled in water.
The CSAM filtering was a best of class implementation. I'm pretty sure I'm one of maybe a dozen people who actually read the spec before throwing a hissy-fit about "muh privacy!"
The only actual "flaw" was that maybe a state-level actor could make it scan for bad stuff on your device.
BUT they can do it to your cloud data _today_. And if you disabled cloud uploads, the local scanning was disabled too.
No, they can't if you enable ADP[1].
Not at all. A good privacy story is not sending this data anywhere.
how about they don't send anything about my photos to their servers and i get to keep my shit on my own device
i suppose we're past that to the point where techbros like you will defend personal data exfiltration because.. uhh idk? trillion dollar corporation knows best?
I am sure.
The right call is to never send any data from the device to anyone unless the user explicitly tells the device to do it.
The only thing the device should do is whatever its user tells it to do.
The user didn't tell it to do this. Apple did.
> But the conclusion "Thus, the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device." isn't true
Irrelevant. It was never about privacy to begin with. It was always about power, who owns the keys to the machine, who commands it.
Vectorization, differential privacy, relays, homomorphic encryption, none of it matters. What matters is the device is going behind the user's back, doing somebody else's bidding, protecting somebody else's interests. That they were careful about it offers little comfort to users who are now aware of the fact "their" devices are doing things they weren't supposed to be doing.
Let's look at the primary alternative, Android. It generally does not provide you this level of granular control on network access either without rooted hacks. Apps and the phone vendor can do whatever they want with far less user control unless you're a deep Android nerd and know how to install root-level restriction software.
No one's advocating for granular opt in either. There are much better ways. We have to make it so that data is toxic to corporations. Turn data into expensive legal liabilities they don't want to deal with. These corporations should not even be thinking about it. They should be scrambling to forget all about us the second we are done with them, not covertly collecting all the data they possibly can for "legitimate" purposes. People should be able to use their computers without ever worrying that corporations are exploiting them in any way whatsoever.
The Android situation is just as bad, by the way. Rooting is completely irrelevant. You may think you can hack it but if you actually do it the phone fails remote attestation and the corporations discriminate against you based on that, usually by straight up denying you service. On a very small number of devices, Google's phones ironically, you can access those keys and even set your own. And it doesn't matter, because the corporations don't trust your keys, they only trust the keys of other corporations. They don't care to know your device is secure, they want to know it's fully owned by Google so that you can't do things the corporations don't like.
It's not something that can be solved with technology. Computer freedom needs to become law.
What a good privacy story looks like is that my photos aren’t sent anywhere in any way shape or form without explicit opt in permission.
Most people broadcast their lives on social media, happily opt in to all sorts of schemes that track them just for minor conveniences. For people like that, the idea that the privacy protection outlined by the OP isn't enough rings really hollow.
Or to put it bluntly, at some point this really stops feeling like a practical debate, and more of an ideological one.
If only you and three other people have a unique file, Apple knows you are a group.
I have an idea: send an encrypted, relayed, non-reversible, noised vector representation of your daily phone habits and interactions. That way you can be bucketed, completely anonymously of course, with other user cohorts for tracking, advertising, and other yet-to-be discovered purposes.
It's a great privacy story! Why would you have a problem with that?
I don't know, I'm sure we'll figure something out once we have your data!
Restating the layers above, in reverse:
- They don't see either your data or the results of the query (it's fully encrypted even from them where they compute the query -- this is what homomorphic encryption means)
- Even if they broke the encryption and had your query data / the query result, they don't know who "you" are (the relay part)
- Even if they had your query hash and your identity, they couldn't reverse the hash to identify which specific photos you have in your library (the client-side vectorization + differential privacy part), though by the this point they could know what records in the places database were hits. So they could know that you took a photo of a landmark, but only if the encryption and relay were both broken.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption
> Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without first having to decrypt it. The resulting computations are left in an encrypted form which, when decrypted, result in an output that is identical to that produced had the operations been performed on the unencrypted data. Homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preserving outsourced storage and computation. This allows data to be encrypted and outsourced to commercial cloud environments for processing, all while encrypted
And the way the data comes back to you is via the third-party relay which knows your IP but nothing else
So, while Apple doesn't know the ID of the person sending the data, they have a 'room number' that links back to an ID.
If Apple were to decide to scan photos for pictures of 'lines of white powder' they couldn't tell the police your name but they could say that the 3rd party knows who you are.
> Then somehow magically, the pictures on your phone are updated with tags based on Apple's processing....but Apple doesn't know who you are.....
Yes, this is the whole point.
If apple were to add additional clusters that match "sensitive" content and endeavour to put them in their own shards distinct from landmarks, they defeat the homomorphic encryption part while still technically doing it.
The DP part can be defeated with just statistics over time; someone with any volume of sensitive content will hit these sensitive clusters with a higher likelihood than someone generateing noise injected fake searches.
The OHTTP part can be defeated in several ways, the simplest of which is just having a clause in a non-public contract allowing apple to request logs for some purpose. They're paying them and they can make up the rules as they go.
It is new. It is fancy. It is not clear where HE/DP is being used, it depends if the code is written using the Swift toolkit, but even that has paths for exfiltration if used incorrectly. They claim they are using DP in Photos as stated in the article here:
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/scenes-differenti...
But the fact remains they are looking at your pictures. I do not trust them for one fleeting fart in the wind on this. Think about it for a hot second: HE/DP allows you to perform operations on the data without knowing the data, but what if someone goofs an operation and it ends up returning the actual data?
Sorry, not buying it. Crypto is hard to get right, and when it is monetized like this for "new features", it is wildly unnecessary and exposes users to more risk.
That's kind of like saying "they can take a picture of your face and transmit it, but what if someone goofs an operation and sends your actual head instead".
Any encrypted data the server has cannot 'accidentally' be decrypted, and as someone else explained in this thread they only send encrypted vectors describing features of the image (building, tree, etc) and not the actual image. It's certainly not a fact that "they are looking at your pictures" [1].
[1] "they" being Apple; the other guys could have backdoored the whole OS and Apple employee's computers for all I know
Is the complexity and security risk really worth it for such a niche feature?
It's also funny that Apple is simultaneously saying "don't worry the photo is encrypted so we can't read it" and "we are extracting data from the encrypted photo to enhance your experience".
How many landmarks are there to justify sending your data off? Can't the database be stored on the device?
The usual context is "oh I saw some dolphins forever ago. let me see if I can find the photos..."
But now you suddenly need the cloud to have it recognize the Eiffel tower.
Last night I was able to find the image using the single word "creme". Definitely saved the story.
Locally, a small ML model identifies potential POIs in an image.
Another model turns these regions into a series of numbers (a vector) that represent the image. For instance, one number might correlate with how "skyscraper-like" the image is. (We don't actually know the definition of each dimension of the vector, but we can turn an image that we know is the eiffel tower into a vector, and measure how closely our reference image and our sample image are located)
The thing is, we aren't storing this database with the vectors of all known locations on our phone. We could send the vector we made on device off to Apple's servers. The vector is lossy, after all, so apple wouldn't have the image. If we did this, however, apple would know that we have an image of the eiffel tower.
So, this is the magic part. The device encrypts the vector using a private key known only to it, then sends this unreadable vector off to the server. Somehow, using Homomorphic Encryption and other processes I do not understand, mathematical operations like cosine similarity can be applied to this encrypted vector without reading the actual contents of the vector. Each one of these operations changes the value, which is still encrypted, but we do not know how the value changed.
I don't know if this is exactly what Apple does, I think they have more efficient ways, but theoretically what you could do is apply each row in your database to this encrypted value, in such a way that the encrypted value becomes the name of the POI of the best match, or otherwise junk is appended (completely changing the encrypted value) Again, the server has not read the encrypted value, it does not know which row won out. Only the client will know when it decrypts the new value.
Apple has a database trained on multiple photos of each landmark (or part of a landmark), to give a likelihood of a match.
Homomorphic encryption means that the encrypted mathematical form of a potential landmark from the phone can be applied to the encrypted set of landmark data, to get an encrypted result set.
The phone can then decrypt this and see the result of the query. But anyone else sees this as noise being translated to new noise, including Apple's server.
The justification for this approach is storage - the data set of landmarks can only get larger as the data set gets more comprehensive. Imagine trying to match photos for inside castles, cathedrals and museums as examples.
seems to me at that point, the server knows what segment of the overall dataset is being returned.
Here's a theoretical way I wrote in another comment:
> I think they have more efficient ways, but theoretically what you could do is apply each row in your database to this encrypted value, in such a way that the encrypted value becomes the name of the POI of the best match, or otherwise junk is appended (completely changing the encrypted value) Again, the server has not read the encrypted value, it does not know which row won out. Only the client will know when it decrypts the new value.
They do something like this, using homomorphic encryption. Whatever they do, there is no doubt they incur serious performance hits.
You may also be interested: https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.06761
Right, I've seen similar engineering efforts to target this sort of functionality fail because of the computational cost and resulting latency. I'm curious to read the paper for the tradeoffs they made toward practicality at Apple's scale of users.
As a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, each query releases some bits of information on what you searching for to avoid using the whole database. Subsequent queries from a given user will generally be correlated enough to build a tracer. Governments or other powerful enough actors can pierce the proxy veil, heck the tracer will be able to deanonymize you with enough queries recorded.
How many queries? For me it is too tedious to work out the math from the differential privacy definitions and I already know the landmarks around me: I don't want such a feature.
Very curious here as I haven’t seen any papers demonstrating attacks against the differential privacy systems proposed by Apple or Google that successfully deanonymize data. Such an attack in even a test database would be very interesting.
Do you have any papers you can cite about this entropic leakage you’re describing?
So if you are curious, just read up in general about differential privacy, or this classic: https://gwern.net/death-note-anonymity Discussed here (possibly in other places too): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9553494
Then why is it happening to me?
Your “photos” aren’t shipped off-device without your knowledge, just an arbitrary blob of ”metadata” that you can’t audit describing everything about that photo. :)
It’s sort of like “I don’t want my WiFi router uploading my house online!” And someone replying “it’s not your physical house, just a map of the house and the real time location of everyone in it! The house never moves!”
Both the search and photos settings were on for me in both iOS and MacOs. Completely unacceptable Apple
Perhaps this is marketing genius (from an AAPL-shareholder POV)?
----
I'm laughing at the insanity of all this interconnectivity, but an NDA prevents me from typing the greatest source of my ironic chuckles. Described in an obtuse way: a privacy-focused hardware product ships with an undisclosed phone-home feature, letting the feds see every time you use the product (to produce a controversial product, at home).
Kick in my fucking door / sue me: it'll just re-enforce that I'm correct about concessionary-allowances...
----
Even privacy-focused hardware manufacturers will allow undisclosed usage tracking (in order to continue existing, themselves). In my example, the OEM delivers a physical product which allows users to make tangible objects, at home. Every time you launch the hardware's control software (to make more controversial objects), it phones home.
This does not happen.
You are saying that every network request is going to a target controlled by the US government.
Why yes, I did happen to work in US data centers throughout the 2010's... including during Snowden's [then adamently-denied] revelations.
"If you're taking flak, you're near the target."
Particularly among "controversial" product manufacturers.
----
Entirely unrelated: I recently visited my favorite hometown (Austin) museum, UT's Harry Ransom Center. Their P.E.N. exhibit has an exposé on how various mid-20th Century authors were in fact funded by The Ford Foundation (a known CIA "investment vehicle"), including Aldous Huxley (author of Brave New World). One of the exhibits features multiple author signatories adamently denying this CIA-funding, over the 1950's decade... ultimately this conspiracy theory ended up being true/revealed. Adds an entirely new dimension to The Savage's [BNW's main character] decision to hang himself.
For context, stationary desktop machines comprise single-digit percentages of Mac sales: https://appleinsider.com/articles/24/03/06/macbook-pro-and-m...
Every other product sold by Apple (Mac notebooks, iPhones, watches, etc) are designed to be carried around with you, happily beaconing your presence to every network and to every other Apple device that will listen. I have seen this with my own eyes where my M3 MBP showed up on my WiFi AP status page as soon as I got home even though it was supposedly “““asleep””” in my bag.
You can randomize your MAC address. Built in OS feature.
What I mean is, an M3 MacBook has essentially the same processor as a cell phone. Of course it’s able to perform activities when the system is “asleep.” It even has specific online behavior labeled as a feature that can be turned on/off (Power Nap).
https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/turn-power-nap-on-o...
This is behavior that is desired by Apple’s users.
I sometimes wish that more Apple users who aren’t satisfied would stop complaining while continuing to throw money at Apple and buy themselves a Linux laptop. If you want a laptop with special features like a WiFi kill switch you should buy one of those, not buy a consumer appliance device that is marketed toward convenience-oriented home users.
My work machine — not my choice. Don't let reality get in the way of your smug assumptions about me though.
Now they probably don't care about you personally, but you'd be surprised how many people are connected indirectly to a person of interest. Google "Maher Arar" for the horrific consequences of false positives.
I get called "paranoid," often, but I'm being honest when responding to people requesting my phone number: "you don't want my number in your phone, because it'll associate you with people you probably don't want to be associated with" [see Five Eyes' 3-Degrees of Separation].
On Android, NetGuard uses a "local VPN" to firewall outgoing traffic. Could the same be done on iOS, or does Apple network traffic bypass VPNs? Lockdown mentions ads, but not Apple servers, https://lockdownprivacy.com/.
Apple does publish IP ranges for different services, so it's theoretically possible to block 17.0.0.0/8 and then open up connections just for notifications and security updates, https://support.apple.com/en-us/101555
Why is NetGuard more trustworthy than Apple?
On iOS, Lockdown firewall is open-source, https://github.com/confirmedcode/Lockdown-iOS
But even blanket blocking of all Apple IP ranges probably wouldn't do anything here. As documented, your device sends noise injected image vectors to OHTTP relays and doesn't contact Apple directly. By definition those relays are operated by 3rd parties. So if you consider this type of data "phoning home" you'll need to find the IPs of all of OHTTP relays iOS uses. (or block the traffic that looks up the OHTTP relays).
Since iOS was derived from macOS, perhaps Apple could restore the link between network traffic and process.
I do not assume that Apple managers are that degenerate idiots pushing through trust eroding marginal idiocy like this.
There's also LibrePhotos which is packed with features but doesn't have as much polish as immich. They do however have a list of python libraries that can be used for offline/local inference for things like having an image model create a description of a photo that can benefit the full text search. [2]
[1] https://github.com/alangrainger/immich-public-proxy/blob/mai...
[2] https://docs.librephotos.com/docs/user-guide/offline-setup
* Haven't actually tried this plugin yet, my weekend project is setting up my caddy VPS to tunnel to the immich container running on my Synology NAS
100% private is nice but not practical for something like photos in my opinion. unless you have someone in the family that can take over after you’re gone and is very technical.
https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
The homomorphic code is available in Swift
https://www.swift.org/blog/announcing-swift-homomorphic-encr...
I have concerns about how women would be affected by law enforcement who might use the location data to target abortions.
I believe this risk already exists in the form of LE request with court order to see the contents of an iCloud account, such as conversations and photo metadata. Advanced Data Protection exists to eliminate this particular vector - Apple no longer has account recovery information like private keys escrowed, so there's no way they can provide it if requested.
This would not increase such a risk since the network traffic is effectively VPN'd for anonymization, clients send false data periodically to break profiling or behavioral analysis, and the requests and corresponding results are not comprehensible to Apple's server due to the HE.
What? How?
you've really been shilling apple and even obnoxiously giving multiple replies to the same comment, what's your problem?
How would they access that information? Under this feature, no location information for the user would be held by Apple's servers. Plus, Apple would have to divulge it somehow to law enforcement, which they don't do as a matter of course until compelled by a court. Courts have a high bar for accessing that information.
Even so, having compelled Apple, they cannot give up what they do not have.
> you've really been shilling apple
I am not "shilling" for Apple, I am commenting about a technology Apple has adopted and which I have decided to trust.
> giving multiple replies to the same comment
Sometimes I prefer to break my replies up so they are easier to consume. I don't agree with the premise that this is obnoxious and so far none of my counterparties has complained. Why are you complaining?
> what's your problem?
What's your problem?
Obsessively. I wouldn't do that for free.
Just because no one complained (except, you know, I did...) doesn't mean no one else found it obnoxious, but rather not worth arguing about. It reads like a redditor trying to add on to their reply after the fact to sound better than they did originally. I'm sure that's part of the reason why HN's edit window is so short.
You're annoying, easy as.
Apple has implemented homomorphic encryption[2], which they can use to compute distance metrics such as cosine similarity without revealing the original query/embedding to the server. In the case of photos, an on-device model is first used to detect if a landmark may be possibly present in the image, and then sends an encrypted embedding[3] for the image region containing said landmark, which is evaluated on the server using HE techniques and then the encrypted results are sent back.
I'm sure someone will come along and say Apple does none of these things; in which case, said commenter should probably not use Apple devices since, there is no reason to trust the toggles for "Enhanced Visual Search", and perhaps more importantly, the one for "Advanced Data Protection" either. However, I rarely see any other major company researching ML and HE together, so that alone is a sufficient positive indicator in my eyes.
(It's interesting that this is also being downvoted. Please go ahead, I can't stop you :P but please also write the parts that you disagree with. Thank you.)
[1] https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption
[3] https://mlr.cdn-apple.com/video/HE_Fig_3_PNNS_889f3a279c.m4v
The very same blog post is linked in the submitted article.
To be clear, I don't care about any encryption scheme they may be using, the gist is that they feel entitled to reach into their users' most private data (the photos they explicitly said they don't want to upload to iCloud) and "analyze" them.
This is the same as that time Microsoft enabled OneDrive "by mistake" and started slurping people's private documents and photos saved in default locations (arguably worse since no one takes pictures with their PC's webcams).
You bring up the example of Onedrive, but there is no use of e2e encryption or HE techniques there.
I'd want an explanation of why they want to send this data. They need to seek informed consent, and the default needs to be no data collection. Opt-in, not opt-out.
If I do opt-in, I can withdraw that consent at any time.
I can also expect them to delete any collected data within a reasonable (to me) time frame, tell me what they do with it, who they share it with, supply me with any personally identifying data they have colllected, and allow me to correct it if it's wrong. And if they use the data to make important decisions automatically, e.g. bank loan yes/no, I have the right to make them use human reasoning to reconsider.
There is no reason to let businesses non-consensually collect any data from you, even if that's their entire business model. Don't let their self-serving lies about "you can trust us" or "it's normal and inevitable" swindle you out of your privacy.
Incidentally,"a completely randomly generated integer" could describe Apple's Advertising Identifier, which allows third parties to track the bejesus out of you.
No. That would never be acceptable to me.
Yes it does and the blogpost specifically explains why.
In short, both iOS and macOS are full of bugs, often with the potential of exposing sensitive information.
Also, it’s on by default - nobody in their sane mind would have bits of their photos uploaded somewhere, regardless of “we promise we won’t look”.
Finally, Photos in iOS 18 is such a bad experience that it seems the breach of privacy was fundamentally unjustified as no meaningful improvement was introduced at all.
AIUI, even if Apple's servers tried to look, they cannot, because of the encryption.
Do you also distrust TLS for example, and therefore refuse to use the internet? What about AES/Chacha for full-disk encryption?
As a corporation, they “calculate” what they can say without getting into more trouble than they’re willing to entertain.
Yes! For so many reasons!
If an adversary is able to intercept encrypted communications, they can store it in hopes of decrypting it in the future in the event that a feasible attack against the cryptosystem emerges. I don't know how likely this is to happen against homomorphic encryption schemes, but the answer is not zero.
I'm not suggesting everyone should spend time worrying about cryptosystems being cracked all day long, and I'm not saying Apple's encryption scheme here will prove insecure. Even if this particular scheme is cracked, it's very possible it won't reveal much of great interest anyways, and again, that is simply not the point.
The point is that the correct way to guarantee that your data is private is to simply never transmit it or any metadata related to it over a network in any form. This definitely limits what you can do, but it's a completely achievable goal: before smartphones, and on early smartphones, this was the default behavior of taking pictures with any digital camera, and it's pretty upsetting that it's becoming incredibly hard to the point of being nearly impractical to get modern devices to behave this way and not just fling data around all over the place willy-nilly.
And I know people would like Apple to get credit for at least attempting to make their features plausibly-private, but I feel like it's just the wrong thing right now. What we need today is software that gives agency back to the user, and the first part of that is not sending data off to the network without some form of user intent, without dark patterns to coerce said intent. At best, I can say that I hope Apple's approach to cloud services becomes the new baseline for cloud services, but in my opinion, it's not the future of privacy. The future of privacy is turning the fucking radio off. Why the fuck should we all buy mobile devices with $1000 worth of cutting edge hardware just to offload all of the hard compute problems to a cloud server?
I'd also like to ask a different question: if there's no reason to ever worry about this feature, then why is there even an option to turn it off in the first place?
I worry that what Apple is really doing with pushing out all these fancy features, including their maligned CSAM scanning initiative, is trying to get ahead of regulations and position themselves as the baseline standard. In that future, there's a possibility that options to turn off features like these will disappear.
I mean for one, because of people like you that are concerned about it. Apple wants you to have the choice if you are against this feature. It's silly to try to use that as some sort of proof that the feature isn't safe.
My iPhone has a button to disable the flash in the camera app. Does that imply that somehow using the camera flash is dangerous and Apple is trying to hide the truth from us all? Obviously not, it simply means that sometimes you may not want to use the flash.
They likely chose to make it opt-out because their research shows that this is truly completely private, including being secure against future post-quantum attacks.
> If an adversary is able to intercept encrypted communications, they can store it in hopes of decrypting it in the future in the event that a feasible attack against the cryptosystem emerges. I don't know how likely this is to happen against homomorphic encryption schemes, but the answer is not zero.
Also, if you're going to wildly speculate like this it is at least (IMO) worth reading the research press release since it does answer many of the questions you've posed here[0].
> it's pretty upsetting that it's becoming incredibly hard to the point of being nearly impractical to get modern devices to behave this way and not just fling data around all over the place willy-nilly.
And honestly, is turning off a single option in settings truly impractical? Yes, it's opt-out, but that's because their research shows that this is a safe feature. Not every feature needs to be disabled by default. If most users will want something turned on, it should probably be on by default unless there's a very strong reason not to. Otherwise, every single iPhone update would come with a 30 question quiz where you have to pick and choose which new features you want. Is that a reasonable standard for the majority of non tech-savvy iPhone users?
Additionally, the entire purpose of a phone is to send data places. It has Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Cellular for a reason. It's a bit absurd to suggest that phones should never send any data anywhere. It's simply a question of what data should and should not be sent.
[0] https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry...
If they know some people will be against the feature, why not ask instead of enabling it for them?
> My iPhone has a button to disable the flash in the camera app. Does that imply that somehow using the camera flash is dangerous and Apple is trying to hide the truth from us all? Obviously not, it simply means that sometimes you may not want to use the flash.
Do you really not see how this is not a good faith comparison? I'm not going to address this.
> They likely chose to make it opt-out because their research shows that this is truly completely private, including being secure against future post-quantum attacks.
So basically your version of this story is:
- Apple knows some users will not like/trust this feature, so they include an option to turn it off.
- But they don't bother to ask if it should be turned on, because they are sure they know better than you anyway.
I agree. And it's this attitude that needs to die in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.
> Also, if you're going to wildly speculate like this it is at least (IMO) worth reading the research press release since it does answer many of the questions you've posed here[0].
I don't need to, what I said generalizes to all cryptosystems trivially. The only encryption technique that provably can never be cracked is one-time pad, with a key of truly random data, of size equal to or greater than the data being encrypted. No other cryptosystem in any other set of conditions has ever been proven impossible to crack.
Homomorphic encryption is very cool, but you can't just overwhelm the user with cryptosystem design and mathematics and try to shrug away the fact that it is not proven to be unbreakable. The fact that homomorphic encryption is not proven to be unbreakable is absolutely not wild speculation, it is fact.
> And honestly, is turning off a single option in settings truly impractical?
We all just learned about today! We don't even need to speculate about whether it is impractical, we know it can't be done, and that's before we consider that loss of privacy and agency over devices is a death-by-a-thousand-cuts situation.
> Additionally, the entire purpose of a phone is to send data places. It has Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Cellular for a reason. It's a bit absurd to suggest that phones should never send any data anywhere. It's simply a question of what data should and should not be sent.
Clearly I don't think the internet is useless and I don't disable networking on all of my devices because I'm talking to you right now. But the difference is, when I reply to you here, I'm never surprised about what is being sent across the network. I'm typing this message into this box, and when I hit reply, it will send that message over the network to a server.
The difference here is agency. Steve Jobs had a quote about computers being "bicycle[s] for the mind". Well, if you just found out today that your device was sending meta information about your private photos over the network, you would be right to feel like it's not you controlling the bike anymore. The answer to this problem is not throwing a bunch of technical information in your face and telling you its safe.
> If they know some people will be against the feature, why not ask instead of enabling it for them?
Honestly I would just say this is because you can only ask so many things. This is a hard to explain feature, and at some point you have to draw a line on what you should and shouldn't ask for consent on. For many people, the default reaction to a cookie popup is to hit "accept" without reading because they see so many of them. Consent fatigue is a privacy risk too. Curious where you'd choose to draw the line?
> Do you really not see how this is not a good faith comparison? I'm not going to address this.
Yes, my point is that your reasoning isn't good faith either. We both know it's silly and a bit conspiratorial to imply that Apple adding a setting for it means they know a feature is secretly bad. If they wanted to hide this from us, neither of us would be talking about it right now because we wouldn't know it existed.
> We all just learned about today! We don't even need to speculate about whether it is impractical, we know it can't be done, and that's before we consider that loss of privacy and agency over devices is a death-by-a-thousand-cuts situation.
That's fair, but there's honestly no perfect answer here. Either you appease the HN crowd on every feature but overwhelm most non-technical users with too many popups to the point they start automatically hitting "yes" without reading them, or you make features that you truly consider to be completely private opt-out but upset a small subset of users who have extremely strict privacy goals.
How do you choose where that dividing line is? Obviously you can't ask consent for every single feature on your phone, so at some point you have to decide where the line between privacy and consent fatigue is. IMO, if a feature is genuinely cryptographically secure and doesn't reveal any private data, it probably should be opt-out to avoid overwhelming the general public.
Also, how would you phrase the consent popup for this feature? Remember that it has to be accurate, be understandable to the majority of the US population, and correct state the privacy risks and benefits. That's really hard to do correctly, especially given "21 percent of adults in the United States (about 43 million) fall into the illiterate/functionally illiterate category"[0].
[0] https://www.libraryjournal.com/story/How-Serious-Is-Americas...
Cookie consent fatigue is both good and bad. Before cookie consent, you just simply had no idea all of this crap was going on; cookie consent took something invisible and made it visible. I agree it sucks, but learning that basically everything you use collects and wants to continue to collect data that isn't essential has opened a lot of people's eyes to how absurdly wide data collection has become.
> Yes, my point is that your reasoning isn't good faith either. We both know it's silly and a bit conspiratorial to imply that Apple adding a setting for it means they know a feature is secretly bad. If they wanted to hide this from us, neither of us would be talking about it right now because we wouldn't know it existed.
Apple doesn't add options for no reason. It's useful to control whether the camera flash goes off for potentially many reasons. Similarly, if this option was absolutely bullet-proof, it wouldn't need an option. The option exists because having derivatives of private data flowing over to servers you don't control is not ideal practice for privacy, and Apple knows this.
And of course Apple isn't trying to hide it, they're currently trying to sell it to everyone (probably mainly to regulators and shareholders, honestly) that it's the best thing for user privacy since sliced bread.
> That's fair, but there's honestly no perfect answer here. Either you appease the HN crowd on every feature but overwhelm most non-technical users with too many popups to the point they start automatically hitting "yes" without reading them, or you make features that you truly consider to be completely private opt-out but upset a small subset of users who have extremely strict privacy goals.
> How do you choose where that dividing line is? Obviously you can't ask consent for every single feature on your phone, so at some point you have to decide where the line between privacy and consent fatigue is. IMO, if a feature is genuinely cryptographically secure and doesn't reveal any private data, it probably should be opt-out to avoid overwhelming the general public.
> Also, how would you phrase the consent popup for this feature? Remember that it has to be accurate, be understandable to the majority of the US population, and correct state the privacy risks and benefits. That's really hard to do correctly, especially given "21 percent of adults in the United States (about 43 million) fall into the illiterate/functionally illiterate category"[0].
I honestly think the answer is simple: All of this cookie consent bullshit exists because the real answer is relatively simple, but it's inconvenient. If online behavioral tracking is so bad for our privacy, and we can't actually trust companies to handle our data properly, we should full-on ban it under (almost?) any circumstances. There. Cookie consent fixed. You can't track users for "non-essential" purposes anymore. And no, they don't need to. There was a time before this was normal, and if we can help it, there will be a time after it was normal too. Protecting someone's stupid business model is not a precondition for how we define our digital rights.
This is exactly why I worry about Apple's intentions. For what it's worth, I don't believe that the engineers or even managers who worked on this feature had anything but good intentions, and the technology is very cool. Obviously, nobody is denying that Apple is good at making these "privacy" technologies. But Apple as a whole seems to want you to think that the root cause of the privacy problem is just that our technology isn't private enough and it can be fixed by making better technology. Conveniently, they sell products with that technology. (I do not think that it is any shocker that the first uses of this technology are as innocuous as possible, either: this is a great strategy to normalize it so it can eventually be used for lucrative purposes like advertising.)
But that's wrong, and Apple knows it. The privacy problem is mostly just an effect of the loss of agency people have over their computers, and the reason why is because the end user is not the person that software, hardware and services are designed for anymore, it's designed for shareholders. We barely regulate this shit, and users have next to no recourse if they get pushed and coerced to do things they don't want to. You just get what you get and you have to pray to the tech gods that they don't turn the screws even more, which they ultimately will if it means they can bring more value to the shareholders. Yes, I realize how cynical this is, but it's where we're at today.
So yes, it's nice to not inundate the user with a bunch of privacy prompts, but the best way to do that is to remove and replace features that depend on remote services. And hell, Apple already did do a lot of that, it's Google who would have absolute hell if they had to put an individual prompt for every feature that harms your privacy. Apple devices don't have very many privacy prompts at all, and in this case it's to the point of a fault.
(P.S.: I know I used the term and not Apple, but even calling it "privacy" technology feels a bit misleading. It's not actually improving your privacy, it's just making a more minimal impact to your privacy stature than the leading alternative of just sending shit to cloud services raw. It's a bit like how electric vehicles aren't really "green" technology.)
Appeal to bandwagon; opinion discarded
[0] https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/Differential_Privacy_Over...
What is so surprising about this? If you make big claims about anything, you are held to your own standards.
It doesnt' seem this way at all. It is rare to see someone talking about current behavior, they are always talking about the slippery slope - such as landmark detection obviously being the first step in detecting propaganda on a political dissident's phone.
This isn't driven by trying to hold them to a higher standard; it is an emotional desire of wanting to see them caught in a lie.
Should photo info be sent to Apple/Google in this case?
The system is essentially scanning for the signature for some known set of images of abuse so that it aims to capture abusers who would naively keep just these images on their machines. (It can't determine if a new image is abusive, notably).
It's conceivable some number of (foolish and abusive) people will be caught this way and those favoring a long dragnet for this stuff will be happy. But this opens the possibility that a hacker could upload an image to an innocent person's computer and get that person arrested. Those favoring the long dragnet will naturally say the ends justify the means and you can't make an omelet without cracking a few eggs. Oh, "think of the children".
Edit: Also worth adding that once a company is scanning user content to try to decide if the user is bad, it makes it that much easier to scan all kind of content in all kind of ways for all kinds of reasons. "for the good", naturally.
Huh? The system is scanning for landmarks, not images of abuse.
>people will be caught this way
Due to the homomorphic encryption, I don't think Apple even knows whether the image matches a landmark in Apple's server database or not. So even if Apple put some images of abuse into its server database (which Apple claims only contains pictures of landmarks), I don't think Apple would know whether there was a match or not.
Or only that they don’t know which landmark it matched?
The bigger privacy risk would be that the device routes the request to a specific database shard based on whichever has a center-point closest to the image embedding on the device. They take steps to protect this information such as third-party proxying to hide user IP addresses, as well as having devices send fake requests so that the server cannot tell which are real user data and which are fake data.
This is totally different.
The CSAM tech detected matches against particular photos captured by law enforcement, and provided external evidence of the match (e.g. enough positive matches reconstructed a private key). It was not meant to do topical matches (e.g. arbitrary child in a bathtub), and had some protections to make it significantly harder to manufacture false positives, e.g. noise manipulated in kitten photos to cause them to meet the threshold to match some known image in the dataset.
This gives a statistical likelihood of matching a cropped image of a landmark-like object against known landmarks, based on sets of photos of each landmark (like "this is probably the Eiffel Tower"), and that likelihood is only able to be seen by the phone. There's also significantly less risk about around abuse prevention (someone making a kitten photo come up as 'The Great Wall of China')
The problem invoked by the article is that data is being sent back to Apple by default. Saying "it's fine because it's encrypted" and "don't use apple if you're not fine with that" doesn't help.
The post complains about a product that stored sensitive customer content locally now sends that data to Apple, and given the combination of abuse on privacy and horrendous, generalized security failures that we've seen across the industry, those concerns seem genuine. Your comment is very dismissive of these concerns, which would explain why it's being down voted.
If someone is willing to take a hardline stance that a vendor should inform the user and require opt-in consent for every type of exchange, they are going to have to run platforms specifically targeted toward that mindset.
Let's break this down:
1. Nobody is questioning whether Apple's technical implementation is sophisticated or secure. It clearly is.
2. Nobody is suggesting the privacy toggles don't work. They do.
3. The issue is about Apple deciding that automatically sending data about users' photos (regardless of how securely) is an acceptable default for a feature many users may never want or need.
Consider the value proposition here: Apple invested significant engineering resources into complex homomorphic encryption and differential privacy... so users can search for landmarks in their photos? And they deemed this feature so essential that it should be enabled by default?
This feels like using a golden vault with military-grade security to store grocery lists. Yes, the security is impressive, but that's not the point. The point is: Why are my grocery lists being moved to the vault without asking me first?
A privacy-respecting approach would be: "Hey, would you like to enable enhanced landmark search in your photos? We've built some really impressive privacy protections to make this secure..."
Instead of: "We've already started analyzing your photos for landmarks because we built really impressive privacy protections..."
The sophistication of the technology doesn't justify making it the default for what is ultimately an optional convenience feature.
Are you assuming that Apple did not perform a market analysis when implementing this feature? I think that is unlikely, considering the effort.
https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2023/client-si...
The Internet Society makes the following recommendations based on the European Commission’s proposal:
That the European Committee introduce safeguards for end-to-end encryption.
That the European Committee prohibits the use of scanning technologies for general monitoring, including client-side scanningSummary: "Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a cryptographic technique that enables computation on encrypted data without revealing the underlying unencrypted data to the operating process. It provides a means for clients to send encrypted data to a server, which operates on that encrypted data and returns a result that the client can decrypt. During the execution of the request, the server itself never decrypts the original data or even has access to the decryption key. Such an approach presents new opportunities for cloud services to operate while protecting the privacy and security of a user’s data, which is obviously highly attractive for many scenarios."
I understand it is doing feature matching on the image, but if you were taking a picture of the statue of liberty, the phone would already know that from existing signals.
Let go of the freaking tether.
And let me choose my own photo editing service provider.
Um, because that is what their customers are asking for?
Years ago I went to a concert with some friends. We took pictures standing in front of the stage while the staff was setting up. There were some additional pictures of the show. Nothing in any of the pictures had any information regarding the band names. This was taken with an iPhone 6s, so no "intelligence". In the past year or two I had a new "memories" album. The album title was the artist name that we went to see. At first I thought this was cool, then I was concerned, like, wait, how did they get this information?
My guess, the "intelligence" used the GPS info to pull up the venue and with the date figured out who the artist was. The album was the headliner, the group photo was of one of the opening bands.
I'm still on iOS 17, and I don't see any other way to turn this feature off. I have an option to reset suggested memories, but that's it.
It sounds more like a users are given a choice now, which would be a good thing. If it was enabled pre iOS 18 that kind of makes sense that it's enabled by default now.
What if, in addition to storage, I'd like to use some form of cloud compute on my data? If my device preprocesses/anonymizes my data, and the server involved uses homomorphic encryption so that it also can't read my data, is that not also good enough? It's frustrating to see how much above and beyond Apple has taken this simple service to actually preserve user privacy.
I get that enabling things by default triggers some old wounds. But I can understand the argument that it's okay to enable off-device use of personal data IF it's completely anonymous and privacy preserving. That actually seems very reasonable. None of the other mega-tech companies come close to this standard.
I think there’s some weird impulse to control others behind these decisions — and I oppose that relationship paradigm on its own grounds, independent from privacy: a company has no business making those choices for me.
You are free to use such services if you wish; others are free not to use those services.
Making it “private” with clever encryption is their job since Apple wants to sell privacy. They aren’t doing it because they are nice or care about us. Plus, code is written by people and people write bugs. How can you tell this is truly bug-free and doesn’t leak anything?
Ultimately, making it opt-in would be painless and could be enabled with a simple banner explaining the feature after the update or on first boot, like all their opt-in features. Making it opt-out is irresponsible to their branding at best and sketchy to their users at worst, no matter how clever they say it is.
What metadata about the image do they get?
Are images from the web or social media or device screenshots accessible too?
Seems at the very least they are getting a database of things, objects and shapes. Can cohorts of users be identified? Useful for ad targeting?
They should be able to determine how many devices have a photo of a particular person. Or have a photo of a piece of art. Useful for capturing wanted people and stolen goods! They should see how many times users take a photo of another phone. When and how many users take a photo of a protest. Which side has which colour. Do people take selfies of themselves when sick with a novel pandemic.
Do people take more photos of dogs at Christmas than cats.
Anything that can be vectorized can be identified. But what data do they get and what could they do with it?
It's like telemetry and database of images.
> To uphold our commitment to privacy while delivering these experiences, we have implemented a combination of technologies to help ensure these server lookups are private, efficient, and scalable.
Efficiency and scalability have nothing to do with "upholding one's commitment to privacy". This shows they're insincere.
But, is privacy achievable today? I doubt it. People desperately want (or think they want) features that are opposite to privacy, and if you don't give it to them, they're unhappy. I think Apple's fault is in promising something they can't deliver. (That also goes for Brave, Kagi, Duck Duck Go, etc.)
Scott McNealy famously said "You have zero privacy. Get over it." This was in January 1999. 25 years ago!
"private, efficient, and scalable" means "private AND efficient AND scalable". What makes you think they are being insincere about the privacy aspect?
When they add that server lookups are also "efficient and scalable", it means that they have had to ponder the privacy aspects with technical concerns regarding efficiency and scalability, and that therefore, privacy is mitigated.
I think a fair reading of this sentence would be: "we provide a version of 'privacy' that we feel is acceptable, within reasonable efficiency and scalability constraints".
They're not going to dedicate a server per customer for example. Would it make sense to do it? No. But it would be honest to say "because of efficiency and scalability limits, the 'privacy' we provide is relative and subject to breaches". (I actually think that's exactly what their wording is trying to say.)
And herein lies the problem, because they are literally saying what they say - private AND efficient AND scalable. You are the one adding hypothetical caveats.
They are talking about offloading functionality that cannot occur on device. The scalability and efficiency is not being used as a reason to take privacy away, it is simply an additional requirement of how they must meet their pledge.
The quote you are referencing is literally about how these features are implemented using homomorphic encryption to perform lookups on anonymously accessed black boxes: https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encry... . Which part of that is them sacrificing privacy to make it scalable and efficient, and how would using a dedicated server per user increase privacy? Is there some specific privacy issue you can see with their implementation?
Why would they need to add these qualifiers if not to explain/justify that privacy isn't the only concern, there are technical matters to consider as well.
They have thoroughly documented the architecture, so if you have a concern about that, then state it.
At the moment you are saying that because it’s efficient and scalable it must be at the cost of privacy - but have stated no reason for that to be true.
Sadly privacy is not a marketable feature, or at least it does not have the ROI as Apple originally believed. I feel the only way to level the play field is to reconsider our regulation framework and treat privacy as a fundamental benefit for consumers.
The problem is the granularity. How do millions of people recover damages when a corporation knowingly (knows or should know) it is acting to enrich itself in a significant manner in small amounts. Let us suppose that an abstraction of the damage from this offense can be quantified at $1 per customer. A significant question is whether this action has any possible benefit to Apple. If it does not then once notified of this action, Apple would immediately (as in the next update of IOS or Sequoia) remedy this feature.
So step #1 is someone to send an official letter, perhaps with just a link to this article. Or perhaps someone from Apple is reading these comments and can inform us whether they are aware.
Next state is that Apple is aware of this problem (knows or should know) and ignores it. So are you helpless? Or could you file a claim in small claims court seeking to recover $1 for each photo that Apple has unloaded, requesting that Apple delete all photos as well as all data derived from the photos, plus filing fee.
Next state. You comment on this post as to how to improve the process and make it faster and easier. [And if you oppose this idea, could you please explain your position in a way that helps others understand?]
I switched to https://immich.app/docs/features/command-line-interface and import all of my photo into it. 1.3TB and it's damn fast with all the face detection and ml features.
If it works how I think it works, I actually don't see an issue here. I don't think anyone here expects there phone to not "phone home" to check for OS updates by default?
My gut feeling has always been that it's returning digested machine learning feedback for Photos' facial/object recognition.
(add.: since moving from the iPhone 8 and iOS 16 to a modern iPhone and iOS 17/18 this behavior has gone away - at least the network activity spinner doesn't gossip anymore...)
Couldn't they just make a k/v database that has coordinates of landmarks and then just pass the lat/long from the picture's EXIF in an API call for lookup in said DB when the user wants to make use of this feature? Isn't this part of why we have geotagging?
What happened to old HN?
Maybe this is exactly what the GDPR does. But it is what I would appreciate as a user.
I have seen how sending metrics and crash dumps from a mobile device can radically improve the user experience.
I have also seen enough of the Google bid traffic to know how much they know about us.
I want to enable sending metrics, but most of the time it's a radio button labeled "metrics" and I don't know what's going on.
It's a recurring theme in the modern IT industry that the user can somehow never trusted to take their own responsibility for anything. Like, can I please not have the "added security" on my Android phone where it would sometimes ask me for the pattern instead of the fingerprint? I know my own risks, thank you very much, Google. Same for macOS occasionally making me enter the password instead of letting me unlock with touch ID. Same for a bunch of other random software treating me as a complete technologically illiterate idiot with no way to opt out of this hell.
Remember how our devices used to serve us, not the other way around?
Am I missing something or is it just hypocrisy?
People will say that at least Apple don't have a vested interest in their data since they are not an advertising company like Google or Meta. But Apple collects an absurd amount of data, it is phoning home every second. Some Apple traffic is hard-coded to go through VPNs.
Apple has already experimented with ads in Maps. Shareholders demand infinite growth, so it is only a matter of time before Apple dives into ads themselves.
The only valid point is that Apple does protect your privacy – only towards other companies.
I switched to Apple around 3 years ago because I don't like having my data coupled to Google. But I am regretting my decision, I will probably switch back to Android + Linux instead of IOS + Mac at this rate.
Settings -> Siri -> Apps (Siri app access) -> [an app] -> Learn from this app
This is on by default for all apps and it “Allows Siri to learn from how you use [an app] to make suggestions across apps”. I found no global setting for all apps.More details: https://support.apple.com/en-mn/guide/iphone/iph6f94af287/io...
1. Take the biggest downside of your product
2. Advertise the opposite
3. Profit
Related blog post: https://www.convalesco.org/notes/2024/09/29/setup-photoprism...
Yet, people perception on Apple bloatware here seem to be, "that's fine".
+1
However I do see that Apple marketing campaign tried to fool people into thinking somehow non Apple are not private and only Apple provides privacy.
At least that proves the service is accessible anonymously (i.e., without an identifying iCloud token)
Sadly, I'm one of them.
This is probably done to compete with Google Photos which has a great photo search by word feature.
With that said, Apple can use whatever privacy measures to protect user data. But at the end of the day, a subpoena can easily force them to hand over data.
The best privacy measure is to just not have the data. I guess indexing photos offline in phone is not very feasible yet.
It's right there in the help text:
> Allow this device to privately match places in your photos with a global index maintained by Apple so you can search by almost any landmark or point of interest.
They are saying that they match your photo against their global index.
They are not saying that they will add your photo to their global index.
Nobody said that except you.
Apple Photos is already capable of searching your photos by word/content fully offline on-device.
Google Photos is unable to search your photos by word/content fully offline on-device. Hell, it can't even search by file name if you don't sync your photos to the cloud!
I don't think Apple has to worry about Google at all.
There has been a form of on device indexing since at least iOS 12. My understanding is it performs a basic indexing typically overnight when the phone is charging and allows one to perform searches like "dog" or "car" and pull up matching images.
https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/search-in-photos-iph3...
Hence why Apple started sending photo hashes to their servers for indexing by default.
There's only so much offline computing power.
> Allow this device to privately match places in your photos with a global index maintained by Apple so you can search by almost any landmark or point of interest.
I guess it's useful if you get very lost and don't recognize the pyramids right in front of you, and forgot you have a GPS in the phone.
We trust TLS with our SSNs and CC numbers, hopefully one day we can trust secure multiparty computation too.
Is this really an apt comparison? I understood the trust in TLS to be built on open RFCs and implementation stacks. Even then, whenever I send private data, I take specific steps to verify I am using that trusted stack. That is not the experience described in the article.
I would be very interested to hear what these specific steps are. How do you make sure that this TLS stack really does implement the RFC? How do you know that each connection is indeed encrypted, and it doesn't start sending plaintext after, say 30 days of usage?
Now what would you have done differently if you were in charge of rolling out such a feature? While I don’t like Apple phoning home without my consent, in this case my photos are not being sent to Apple; only anonymized hashes used to match well known landmarks.
The author of the article goes on to show his bias against Apple with phrases like “You don't even have to hypothesize lies, conspiracies, or malicious intentions on the part of Apple to be suspicious of their privacy claims” or “Apple's QA nowadays is atrocious.”
Or this rich quote “I never wanted my iPhone to phone home to Apple.” What smartphone or computing device never communicates back to their company servers? Even when I use open source libraries I have to communicate with repositories to check for dependencies. Does the author hide every online transaction he makes? Never using email or text messages or cloud services which will leak his private information? Unlikely. He just wants to grind his axe against Apple.
So let’s step back and look at it reasonably and see if Apple is trying to erode our privacy with this feature. I personally don’t see this particular feature as being harmful, but I will thank the overzealous author of bringing it to my attention and I’ll be disabling the feature since I don’t need it. This feature is no where near as invasive as the CSAM detection tool that was proposed, which did warrant critical discussion.
Let’s let the team, undoubtedly one of many with the unenviable task of making Apple Intelligence relevant, who rolled out the feature get their yearly bonus and move on to discuss more enlightening topics such as as the merits of keeping tabs on the urination habits of the crew on the ISS via the Mac menubar.
My bias against Apple, as someone who exclusively uses and develops software for Apple products? I've been a loyal Mac user for over 20 years.
It's so ridiculous when people make an accusation like this. For better or worse, I'm married to Apple platforms.
But I do not think so by and large.
Keep on fight and Lee on pushing. At least Apple has a slogan you can push on.
Who would have thought the amoral money making machine would want to make more money? :-)
They make it impractical for anyone to NOT use iCloud.
It's all reality distrotion field marketing bs.
Comparing Apple and Google, or Apple and Microsoft, it seems to me that Apple's track record on these issues is actually not as bad as public opinion might suggest. Meta doesn't even make the list for comparison, and neither does Amazon.
It makes me wonder if picking privacy as a strategy is workable in the first place. People trust TLS; people use banking apps on their phone now without thinking. I remember in 2008 or so when people still didn't quite trust SSL.
I'm not sure if Apple will be able to bridge the gap here, though, if _all_ of their competition simply chooses not to ship those features. Do customers know the difference? Do they... care? In theory they want their data to be private, yes. But if they are not willing to educate themselves to perform their counterparty obligation in fulfilling "informed consent," there may be no action Apple could take to avoid catching the same bad rap everyone else does.
Personally, I don't shy away from criticizing Google, but that's not the point. Apple makes big claims about their privacy practices that neither Google nor Microsoft make, it would be bizarre to hold Google or Microsoft to claims and standards that Apple set for themselves.
> Comparing Apple and Google, or Apple and Microsoft, it seems to me that Apple's track record on these issues is actually not as bad as public opinion might suggest. Meta doesn't even make the list for comparison, and neither does Amazon.
> It makes me wonder if picking privacy as a strategy is workable in the first place. People trust TLS; people use banking apps on their phone now without thinking. I remember in 2008 or so when people still didn't quite trust SSL.
> I'm not sure if Apple will be able to bridge the gap here, though, if _all_ of their competition simply chooses not to ship those features. Do customers know the difference? Do they... care? In theory they want their data to be private, yes. But if they are not willing to educate themselves to perform their counterparty obligation in fulfilling "informed consent," there may be no action Apple could take to avoid catching the same bad rap everyone else does.
I've said this elsewhere, but what I really dislike about Apple's strategy regarding privacy is that they treat privacy as a purely technological problem that could be solved if only we had better technology, but they ignore that a huge component of why users have been subjected to so many flagrant privacy violations is because they have zero visibility and zero real control over their computing experiences. Apple would very much like to retain their iron grip on what users are allowed to do on their platforms, as they make a ton of money off of their control of the platforms in various ways, so they have a huge incentive to make sure we're all arguing about whether or not Apple is better or worse than Google or Microsoft. Because sure, I do believe that if we held Google to the same privacy standards that Apple currently has, it would probably kill Google. However, if Apple and Google were both forced to give more transparency and control to the users somehow, they'd both be in a lot of trouble.
Despite all of this effort, I think that user trust in the privacy of cloud computing and pushing data out to the internet will only ever go down, because attacks against user privacy and security will only ever continue to get more and more sophisticated as long as there are resourceful people who have a reason to perform said attacks. And there certainly always will be those resourceful people, including in many cases our own governments, unfortunately.
(Note: a Safari webview with a Firefox logo on it does not count.)
You can; or, at least, the APIs are available for this, and have been for some time.
> or install Firefox
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/firefox-private-safe-browser/i...
Inb4 "you cannot replace the built-in browser engine"
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/browserenginekit
> Or even just side load apps without pay $100/year
Then use an Android. Apple has taken a stance on this since it was formed. If you don't know by now that Apple is actively hostile toward hobbyists with their approach to computing, I can't help you. That is why there are alternatives from Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and so many others.
To others (me), this is a feature. I would rather the $100/yr fee exist for several reasons.
Why is there no citation on this one? iOS has a (fairly limited) VPN API but it is woefully insufficient to make an application-level firewall and I don't think any exist.
> https://apps.apple.com/us/app/firefox-private-safe-browser/i...
That's Safari in a trenchcoat.
> Inb4 "you cannot replace the built-in browser engine"
> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/browserenginekit
That requires an entitlement that A.) is only available in the EU for apps distributed in the EU and B.) as far as I know, has never been granted to anyone. Mozilla for example does not have it.
If it weren't for EU regulations we would probably still not even be able to change the default browser in iOS, so realistically it appears regulating Apple works great. It's hard to argue against regulating Apple while also defending it by showing the fruit bore from regulating them.
> Then use an Android.
I own both iOS and Android devices for what it's worth. Anyway...
> Apple has taken a stance on this since it was formed.
Since... it was formed? Really? I don't remember the Apple II requiring a $100/year developer license to "side load" software.
> If you don't know by now that Apple is actively hostile toward hobbyists with their approach to computing, I can't help you.
This is a frankly insane thing to say to someone who is in middle of criticizing Apple for this exact hostility. Of course framing it as a developer problem is a convenient way to ignore that developers are users and users are developers, and that these restrictions also have negative impacts on even users who aren't developers.
> That is why there are alternatives from Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and so many others.
Apple is the same company that ran a tirade about how Android was a stolen product, so I find it amusing that in just ten years it has become the crutch to defend any and all bad practices Apple holds dear. Don't like it? Just use something else!
Of course, I do use other devices, but I can't magically not be impacted by Apple's persistent brain-death. For years I have had to deal with the utter stupidity that is the fact that Apple refused to support patent-unencumbered video formats like WebM, and devices that can't play WebM natively and in Safari are still plentiful in the wild. So I can't just pretend Apple doesn't exist.
Not that it matters: I am free to criticize Apple however I want, even if Apple fans do not like it. Even just because I feel like it, but even moreso as a paying customer of Apple, and a developer who has dealt with the impact of Apple being involved in the ecosystem. (Thank you Apple, for refusing to support SPIR-V in WebGPU, we love having an additional standard for something for basically no reason.)
> To others (me), this is a feature. I would rather the $100/yr fee exist for several reasons.
I know. I don't think highly of this position, but I am well aware of it.
Clearly none was needed since you know what I was referring to. I disagree that the APIs are not sufficient, since I've used them in enterprise contexts and found them to be comprehensive. The same APIs are available via consumer means. There are tons of VPN and filtering apps for iOS.
From [0]:
- Change the system’s Wi-Fi configuration
- ...
- Create and manage VPN configurations, using the built-in VPN protocols (Personal VPN) or a custom VPN protocol
- Create and manage network relay configurations
- Implement an on-device content filter
- Create and manage system-wide DNS configurations
- ...
And continues with:
- Configure your VPN to include and exclude some network traffic
- "... built-in proxying for TCP and UDP traffic over HTTP/3 and HTTP/2..."
- Use the Network Extension framework to allow or deny network connections
- ...
> That's Safari in a trenchcoat.
Only if you consider the core of Firefox to be Gecko, and not the entire product experience created around Gecko, which is merely an engine.
The security surface area of a JIT-enabled browser engine is significant and complex (see: Chrome). Apple arguably keeps phones safer by maintaining this restriction. Isn't that what you want in the first place?
> That requires an entitlement that A...
See note about Apple's active hostility toward hobbyists. This is considered a feature from their perspective, and reasonable minds could differ about whether they are right, but it is a choice nonetheless.
> I own both iOS and Android devices for what it's worth
So do I. I don't understand why this is mysterious to you, then.
> Since... it was formed? Really?
Yes, really. "Since it was formed" as in, Apple has always taken a stance (after well documented disagreement between the Steves) to build a "walled garden." Whether that wall is a $100/yr fee, or special screws in a tower case, or what not, they have consistently implemented that opinion with action since their inception.
Apple II aside, macOS is actively hostile toward 3rd party software. See: Notary, signing, and so on.
> This is a frankly insane thing to say to someone who is in middle of criticizing Apple for this exact hostility
Being hostile toward hobbyists is a feature to them, not a bug, and it is orthogonal to privacy at best (at worst, in their view, openness is harmful to privacy). If we are arguing about privacy, then we might agree on this point, but for different reasons.
> [Apple is the same company that ran a tirade]... [Don't like it? Just use something else!]
Yes, that is your right. I don't claim to defend everything Apple produces, but, focusing again on the topic at hand (privacy/security), I personally think they do a better job than most. Their choices to get there can be argued over, of course, which is what we are doing now. I see their choices are part-and-parcel of a larger cohesive strategy; apparently you do not?
> So I can't just pretend Apple doesn't exist
Sure, I never suggested you could, merely that other devices will be naturally better for people who want to use them as enthusiasts or hobbyists outside the Blessed Apple Path(tm).
> I know. I don't think highly of this position, but I am well aware of it.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯ I think highly of your position to argue with it in good faith, so I'm sad to hear that.
[0]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension
> That's Safari in a trenchcoat.
Then so is Chrome, or, where do you draw the line? WebKit bad, Gecko good? Why? Blink is a fork of WebKit. Ultimately who cares which JIT-enabled browser engine runs your JS?
So Apple kneecaps Meta's cross-app advertising, something that literally makes them no direct revenue to implement, and protects users (it famously reduced Facebook cross-app analytics traffic to a significant degree), and you think this is business as usual?
Then you should reconsider my comment at the top of this thread, because it is 100% speaking to this exact phenomenon.
The people giving “poor reports” are often the hardcore tech users (or LARPers) who grew up in a different era and mindset and are slowly being shoved out.
If they managed to do it, they should open-source the code. If they made a research breakthrough, they should publish. Doing either of those things would give me the peace of mind that I need.
I take it that it is implicitly assumed that code running on the server (which I cannot spot the source for) doesn't need to be available, to be trusted? (That there's no way you could come up with an attack through cryptanalysis, involving what the server does, since the security of the data coming from the client is all that matters?)
And this blog post is how I find out the Photos app mysteriously turned iCloud Photos back on. What the fuck? At least "Keep Originals" was still set.
“Enhanced Visual Search in Photos allows you to search for photos using landmarks or points of interest. Your device privately matches places in your photos to a global index Apple maintains on our servers. We apply homomorphic encryption and differential privacy, and use an OHTTP relay that hides IP address. This prevents Apple learning about the information in your photos. You can turn off Enhanced Visual Search at any time on your iOS or iPadOS device by going to Settings > Apps > Photos. On Mac, open Photos and go to Settings > General.”
But - ever tried to DOswLOAD your photos back to phone, and downgrade your storage? You can't. I'm almost impossible. The various instructions online don't work. You can do it with dedktop or laptop but even then they will try to reload and further even THEN there are ALZl kinds of bugs and glitches to getting photos back locally only.
So first part - they set all to upload and make local only imposssible and downgrading storage impossible. I had to take screenshots and file fraud claims to get them to downgrade m and stop charging me 9.99 and 1.99 each month.
But even then. I'm pretty sure they ARE keeping all those photos we supposedly download back OFF iCloud and don't want their storage for AND of course everyone else photos and videos--Why? Second part of strategy (my opinion) - bc they are using ALL our collective photos and videos to Train Large AI models and computers and to run simulations, to prepare for future robots that are more like like, etc. yes U sound a bit conspiracy theorish - but it IS what they are doing! Plus aggregating all the data itself within our devices in photos/videos and other meta data - they can also run that through and sell it, store, make profiles on us, profilers on regions and correlations, etc - all of which is sellable now to various companies AND will be sellable in new ways in the future. So they benefit triple on us. I think there should be federal laws saying -1) All settings must be defaulted to highest privacy (ie closed) and 2) requiring Intentional option in, 3) Plain explanations of what "features and settings do, or how could be used, with clear warnings and subject to Lawsuits for fraudulent inducement and invasion of privacy if those descriptions are understandable by an ordinary reasonable person - NOT an ordinary TECHNICAL engineer. If they can't explain what it does to an ordinary person, it probably is doing stuff that ordinary person WOULD not consent to. And 4 and 5) of new federal laws I wish there - 4) they can't reset or change your privacy settings to make them MORE open after each update, and again req opt-in not opt-out, 5) anyone who does Opt-In - should get metrics of all data disclosed - with a price per amount and data type - PAID back to them. So for example - there should some Global Standards of Data Types - Levels - some more valuable than Others. EXAMPLE/Hypo If it collect "100MBs/amount" of Valuable Level 1 Data, which is Valuaed at $.005/MB then it owes you 100x.005= 5cents. And so on. There should be classifications of data, with Intl standards on the Value of that DATA, and if you did OPT-IN, you get an accounting each month of what data and how much of it did THEY collect, and theyOWE you for collecting it. Bc let's face it - how are they building the powerful computers and AI things they will trillions on? It's on us. Our data. How are making billions in sass and sales- on us, our data.
As it stands NOW they ought to pay us even for data we don't opt-in to but try to Opt out of and can't!! And for all past data they've collected. And for my own time, and everyone else's time - Each month when a new update comes out - THAT EACH TIME resets all those settings I spent hours to reset back to close - and to research those hundreds of "Feature Flags" to find out which are good, which probably are NOT good and which Are in between or who know so roll the dice either way.
I set all settings to closed bc they auto default to everything open, everything sharing, Bluetooth on, public WiFi on, etc everything "uploading" to iCloud. It takes me HOURs. The Accessibility commands and options alone take me an hour to reset. Yet - even when it's turned off - sometimes my phone turns back on something even without updates bc of bugs of hidden features Apple isn't disclosing. Yet after each update all those settings I spent hours on on phones and Mac and iPad, etc- they default BACK to open. And I spend hours again. And it's taking longer each time, and updates while good for other things- for this it sucks, and updates are WAY more frequent. Makes me crazy. I'm not a hacker or a tech like y'all probably are. So I apologize for my long rant by a novice such as myself. I'm just a normal person who likes to read and research and teach myself things so even though I'm not technical I doread a lot and so I'm not an idiot either. I've been a Mac user for over 20 years. Use to an @mac, then @me, and of course now @icl - things starting really going to shit and having sync/corruption issues and bugs, etc in 2019, got way worse in 2021, and now it's all the time. It's so frustrating though bc everything - is Mac-it's the invested infrastructure of our lives - to use an analogy: it's like Apple/Icloud is a Hotel California. It's used to be a nice hotel though. Now it's a Zombie Apocalypse Hotel California. But there aren't any other "hotels" out there that are any better either I'm afraid.
LOL No you don't
I hate to jump to conspiracy theories, but the mechanism seems like a more effective version of their prior CSAM scanning scheme[1]. Best part? It doesn’t even require iCloud usage.
1: https://www.macworld.com/article/1428633/csam-photo-scanning...
if (setting_1 && setting_2 && !setting_3)
{
new_setting = true
}
Mine was also enabled by default.Apple's competition: Steals your data outright
Most of this thread: How could Apple act this way
That's what their marketing says. I'm not sure how far you can actually trust that. They're an ad and media company as well.
Yet they enabled this feature by default. Disabled by default would be easier than a backflip?
It is entirely possible to create a business where others ignore user demands, like, say, privacy. Apple does not have a massive advertising incentive to process user data as others do. I am not a huge Apple fan (typing this from my Windows machine), but I am not ashamed to admit that some companies are good at some things, and others at other things (insane idea I know)
Apple does not have to homomorphically encrypt your data. They do so because they have "made privacy a feature," as they say in their marketing. You can also just read the research papers or code if you want, since they have published those, too. Have you read those?
I'm asking these questions because I'm definitely not going to read the manual, for the reason I've already said, you seem to have read the manual, and I find it hard to believe. I'm only aware that apple offers advanced protection on your uploaded data, which you have to opt into, which might be what you're talking about...?
Correct. iMessage already delivered the features you are describing. The features described here are even stronger, since there is no centralized key escrow.
This is to store your data within iCloud. You can turn it off or on at your convenience, but end-to-end encryption prevents other features, which is why they leave the decision up to users.
In contrast, the article linked here does not involve your actual data leaving your device in any way. Even the metadata is encrypted and hashed and then compared in obfuscated form. Homomorphic encryption allows these computations to take place _on the encrypted form of the data_, _without_ revealing the results. Only you can make sense of the result.
Thus, data can be exchanged with a foreign computer while provably keeping your _actual_ data safe, since the computation was performed on an obfuscated form of it. Apple can't even track you down to gain your device's cooperation in decoding it, since you are hidden behind a proxy.
(1) Do you trust iCloud? iMessage?
If so, then you already trust weaker technologies than the ones in use here. In my opinion, trusting iMessage is sensible, and it has been tested (see: FBI and San Bernardino shooter's phone).
(2) Do you trust TLS (i.e. HTTPS)?
If so, then you already trust weaker encryption architectures than the ones in use here. Your counterparty over TLS necessarily needs to _decrypt_ the data you send it. That is not the case here; homomorphic encryption means Apple processes the data in _encrypted form_.
(3) Do you consider opaque derived data as risky as plaintext metadata?
If so (i.e. if you feel an MD5 hash of your phone number is just as risky as your actual phone number), then you may take issue with this feature. If not (you are OK with hashes of your data because you understand how encryption works, and that it must be transmitted either way, so a salted hash is obviously a strictly better choice), then you already trust weaker protections than the ones in use here.
(4) Do you trust Face ID/Touch ID?
Hardware-secured keys are a necessary root of trust which underpins all these features. If you don't trust these, you won't like this feature, and, in fact, all bets are off.
Thus, the feature is secure enough to be defaulted to an active state.
The writer of the post admits that he doesn’t understand the very tech lite explanation of Apple nor read about Apple AI in general and the way it was setup. A lot of people are upset that (maybe, but unlikely) Apple knows that you made the 10 billionth photo of the Golden Gate Bridge. But continu using all sorts of services, living in sec camera heavy cities etc.
Not an apple fan but from all big tech corporations they have the least amount of interest in mining user data from a business perspective
We're way passed the point where things are accidently opt-out instead of opt-in, if you want to dig the point, it's something you should touch upon.
I think it's more that they realised they couldn't beat google at that game and hoped to see personal or governmental push back like GPDR in the EU that would then give them an advantage. Which would then give them an advantage. The day they stop having that belief they will invade your privacy.