But the analogy with computing languages also supplies a practical insight that isnt captured by the academic theory, ie that some concepts are easier to express in one language than another. If I'm inverting a matrix, I'd reach for Python over C for example.
This is why some people would even go as far as classifying Chomsky's theories as pseudo-science (see one of the replies to GP). I wouldn't go as far, but considering the almost toxic disdain Chomsky himself has to every linguist who is not interested in researching his supposed Universal Grammar (he has famously compared structural and functional linguistics to "butterfly collectors"), we should view this theory with more criticism.
His Theory of "Universal Grammar" is more of a pseudo-science. See the "criticism" section here - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_grammar
Also see this article from Scientific American; Evidence Rebuts Chomsky’s Theory of Language Learning - https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/evidence-rebuts-c...
> According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems arise when language is forced from its proper home into a metaphysical environment, where all the familiar and necessary landmarks and contextual clues are removed. He describes this metaphysical environment as like being on frictionless ice: where the conditions are apparently perfect for a philosophically and logically perfect language, all philosophical problems can be solved without the muddying effects of everyday contexts; but where, precisely because of the lack of friction, language can in fact do no work at all.[259] Wittgenstein argues that philosophers must leave the frictionless ice and return to the "rough ground" of ordinary language in use. Much of the Investigations consists of examples of how the first false steps can be avoided, so that philosophical problems are dissolved, rather than solved: "The clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear."