The "multiparty democracy system in Taiwan is not seen as a positive thing" by whom? The Taiwanese? The election results from that country have shown quite the opposite.
Taiwan's population is ~23.4 million.
In 2020 there were ~19.3 million registered voters with 74.9% turnout. [1]
In 2024 there were ~19.5 million registered voters with 71.86% turnout. [2]
Note that voter registration appears to be automatic[3] so I believe turnout also represents the percentage of all people 20 years and older who voted.
[1] https://www.cec.gov.tw/english/cms/pe/32471
Westerners need to go out of their comfort zone, and realize that maybe other people don't envy the western political system, just think about the possibility.
you see what's going on in the last few years, westerners are still living like nothing has changed. The ordinary people outside the west sees hypocrisy of your political system, it is a very different time.
I don't know where this idea that CCP thinks Chinese people are unsuitable for democracy comes from except for repeating LIO autocracy vs democracy propaganda that insist so. CCP advertises itself as whole process democracy even, because it likes the idea of having democratic processes. If anything CCP already thinks itself democratic, more/better than 1 person 1 vote. CCP also doesn't give a shit what model is on TW, they once offered TW 1country2systems+ model where TW got to keep their political system AND military in exchange for on paper reuninfication and some foreign policy concessions (security). It matters little how TWnese conduct themselves, PRC wants political reuninfication foremost. It's about land, and always has been.
If Taiwanese people really care about retaining multiparty democracy, then everything you said is a good reason for Taiwan to be wary of PRC attempts to gain more control over Taiwan.
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Second, I don't know what the average person on the street in mainland China thinks about the HK protest movement or Taiwanese democracy. Today, when the successes of the PRC are more salient to most people than its failures, the average person in mainland China may well look down on the perceived disorder of democracy.
What comes up may come down. Mainland China has had some incredible decades as it industrialized and caught up. That is a typical phenomenon (not a uniquely Chinese one) when an authoritarian country introduces liberalization to their economy. It is harder for authoritarian countries to maintain growth when they are already mostly caught up with peers, because decentralized economic decision making becomes much more effective than centralized decision making. Decentralized economic decision making is a form of decentralized political power, and the authoritarian country is eventually forced to choose between maintaining a monopoly of authority or pursuing further growth.
At least, that's the thesis of economists like Daron Acemoglu. And the PRC is currently trending away from economic decentralization and toward a re-centralization of decision making.
Mainland China now faces some severe economic and geopolitical headwinds; maybe the PRC will navigate them wisely and earn yet more prestige. Or maybe the PRC will fail to respond adequately to new challenges because of the weaknesses of its authoritarian model. And since the PRC's authoritarian system relies almost solely on efficacy as a source of legitimacy, its legitimacy may prove extremely fragile in the face of a downturn in fortune.
Whatever comes to pass, it will not be a result of a Chinese exceptionalism. Perhaps centralized, one-party states without elections and with limited free speech will prove the dominant governmental model in the next era of history. But, historically, states like that seem to have been mostly outlasted by more liberal peers.