I think you're conflating separate phenomena:
* Boeing is a consequence of the "Jack Welch" effect - gutting the core in service of short term gains for stock-holders.
* The MBA type, typified by John Sculley at Apple is about calcifying the current offerings presuming market segments supported by historicals with predictable demand. This works well for defensives such as utilities, consumer products and health care but not for markets with dynamic consumer relationships such as technology.
* The Google Cloud example is the Xerox Parc phenomena. Xerox was organizationally structured for investment payoffs only characteristically similar to their mainline products thus they couldn't properly allocate resources to things, such as desktop computing, with different kinds of curves. This is similar to how the franchise retailer Blockbuster so slowly responded to the centralized mail-order subscription Netflix. The institutional structure is only-so-flexible. This is similar to Conway's Law.
* The "ruin everything else" is a generalized form of a "brand extension failure". Examples include Harley Davidson perfume, Bic underwear, McDonalds Pizza, and Heinz cleaning vinegar - an over-leveraged commitment to a wildly successful core offering makes other ventures impossible.
This is not that. It's yet something else. Abstractly it's "X is a wild success, let's make Y another X instead of working on X+1"
Organizations suffer from varying degrees of ailments and they can create codependencies making the unraveling hard. Often
it devolves into politics of power brokers with the company's survival dependent on the competency of the influential instead of the influence of the competent. A brutal struggle to control a sinking ship.
The crisis of the third century happens every day.